Ilia Shumailov

Model-induced distribution shifts (MIDS) occur as previous model outputs pollute new model training sets over generations of models. This is known as model collapse in the case of generative models, and performative prediction or unfairness feedback loops for supervised models. When a model induces a distribution shift, it also encodes its mistakes, biases, and unfairnesses into the ground truth of its data ecosystem. We introduce a framework that allows us to track multiple MIDS over many generations, finding that they can lead to loss in performance, fairness, and minoritized group representation, even in initially unbiased datasets. Despite these negative consequences, we identify how models might be used for positive, intentional, interventions in their data ecosystems, providing redress for historical discrimination through a framework called algorithmic reparation (AR). We simulate AR interventions by curating representative training batches for stochastic gradient descent to demonstrate how AR can improve upon the unfairnesses of models and data ecosystems subject to other MIDS. Our work takes an important step towards identifying, mitigating, and taking accountability for the unfair feedback loops enabled by the idea that ML systems are inherently neutral and objective.

Search engines are vulnerable to attacks against indexing and searching via text encoding manipulation. By imperceptibly perturbing text using uncommon encoded representations, adversaries can control results across search engines for specific search queries. We demonstrate that this attack is successful against two major commercial search engines - Google and Bing - and one open source search engine - Elasticsearch. We further demonstrate that this attack is successful against LLM chat search including Bing’s GPT-4 chatbot and Google’s Bard chatbot. We also present a variant of the attack targeting text summarization and plagiarism detection models, two ML tasks closely tied to search. We provide a set of defenses against these techniques and warn that adversaries can leverage these attacks to launch disinformation campaigns against unsuspecting users, motivating the need for search engine maintainers to patch deployed systems.

Network Architecture Search (NAS) methods have recently gathered much attention. They design networks with better performance and use a much shorter search time compared to traditional manual tuning. Despite their efficiency in model deployments, most NAS algorithms target a single task on a fixed hardware system. However, real-life few-shot learning environments often cover a great number of tasks (T ) and deployments on a wide variety of hardware platforms (H ). The combinatorial search complexity T times H creates a fundamental search efficiency challenge if one naively applies existing NAS methods to these scenarios. To overcome this issue, we show, for the first time, how to rapidly adapt model architectures to new tasks in a many-task many-hardware few-shot learning setup by integrating Model Agnostic Meta Learning (MAML) into the NAS flow. The proposed NAS method (H-Meta-NAS) is hardware-aware and performs optimisation in the MAML framework. H-Meta-NAS shows a Pareto dominance compared to a variety of NAS and manual baselines in popular few-shot learning benchmarks with various hardware platforms and constraints. In particular, on the 5-way 1-shot Mini-ImageNet classification task, the proposed method outperforms the best manual baseline by a large margin (5.21% in accuracy) using 60% less computation.

The wide adaption of 3D point-cloud data in safety-critical applications such as autonomous driving makes adversarial samples a real threat. Existing adversarial attacks on point clouds achieve high success rates but modify a large number of points, which is usually difficult to do in real-life scenarios. In this paper, we explore a family of attacks that only perturb a few points of an input point cloud, and name them nudge attacks. We demonstrate that nudge attacks can successfully flip the results of modern point-cloud DNNs. We present two variants, gradient-based and decision-based, showing their effectiveness in white-box and grey-box scenarios. Our extensive experiments show nudge attacks are effective at generating both targeted and untargeted adversarial point clouds, by changing a few points or even a single point from the entire point-cloud input. We find that with a single point we can reliably thwart predictions in 12--80% of cases, whereas 10 points allow us to further increase this to 37--95%. Finally, we discuss the possible defenses against such attacks, and explore their limitations.