Fernando Silva
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Fernando Silva has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Andrey Brito
UFCG
4 shared publications - Eduardo Falcão
Department of Computer Engineering and Automation, Federal University of Rio Grande do Norte, Natal 59078-970, Brazil
4 shared publications - Anderson Melo
Department of Computers and Systems, Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande 58190-970, Brazil
3 shared publications - Davi Pontes
Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande, PB, Brazil
3 shared publications - A S M Asadujjaman
Department of Computers and Systems, Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande 58190-970, Brazil
1 shared publication - A. S. M. Asadujjaman
Federal University of Campina Grande, Campina Grande, PB, Brazil
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 September 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 15 (18) , 10160
Confidential Kubernetes Deployment Models: Architecture, Security, and Performance Trade-Offs
Cloud computing brings numerous advantages that can be leveraged through containerized workloads to deliver agile, dependable, and cost-effective microservices. However, the security of such cloud-based services depends on the assumption of trusting potentially vulnerable components, such as code installed on the host. The addition of confidential computing technology to the cloud computing landscape brings the possibility of stronger security guarantees by removing such assumptions. Nevertheless, the merger of containerization and confidential computing technologies creates a complex ecosystem. In this work, we show how Kubernetes workloads can be secured despite these challenges. In addition, we design, analyze, and evaluate five different Kubernetes deployment models using the infrastructure of three of the most popular cloud providers with CPUs from two major vendors. Our evaluation shows that performance can vary significantly across the possible deployment models while remaining similar across CPU vendors and cloud providers. Our security analysis highlights the trade-offs between different workload isolation levels, trusted computing base size, and measurement reproducibility. Through a comprehensive performance, security, and financial analysis, we identify the deployment models best suited to different scenarios.
- 17 September 2025
- Published by MDPI AG in Applied Sciences
- Vol. 15 (18) , 10160
Open AccessConfidential Kubernetes Deployment Models: Architecture, Security, and Performance Trade-Offs
Cloud computing brings numerous advantages that can be leveraged through containerized workloads to deliver agile, dependable, and cost-effective microservices. However, the security of such cloud-based services depends on the assumption of trusting potentially vulnerable components, such as code installed on the host. The addition of confidential computing technology to the cloud computing landscape brings the possibility of stronger security guarantees by removing such assumptions. Nevertheless, the merger of containerization and confidential computing technologies creates a complex ecosystem. In this work, we show how Kubernetes workloads can be secured despite these challenges. In addition, we design, analyze, and evaluate five different Kubernetes deployment models using the infrastructure of three of the most popular cloud providers with CPUs from two major vendors. Our evaluation shows that performance can vary significantly across the possible deployment models while remaining similar across CPU vendors and cloud providers. Our security analysis highlights the trade-offs between different workload isolation levels, trusted computing base size, and measurement reproducibility. Through a comprehensive performance, security, and financial analysis, we identify the deployment models best suited to different scenarios.
- Open Access
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 241-251
Multi-Platform and Vault-Free Attestation of Confidential VMs
- 26 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 241-251
Open AccessMulti-Platform and Vault-Free Attestation of Confidential VMs
- Open Access
- 4 March 2024
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação in Journal of Internet Services and Applications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 179-193
Interoperable node integrity verification for confidential machines based on AMD SEV-SNP
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) are cloud providers' most recent security offer, providing confidentiality and integrity features. Although confidentiality protects the machine from the host operating system, firmware, and cloud operators, integrity protection is even more useful, enabling protection for a wider range of security issues. Unfortunately, CVM integrity verification depends on remote attestation protocols, which are not trivial for operators and differ largely among cloud providers. We propose an approach for abstracting CVM attestation that leverages an open-source standard, Cloud Native Foundation's Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE). Our approach can integrate smoothly even when applications are unaware of CVMs or the SPIFFE standard. Nevertheless, our implementation inherits SPIFFE flexibility for empowering access control when applications support SPIFFE. In terms of performance, CVMs incur an additional 1.3 s to 21.9 s in boot times (it varies with the cloud environment), a marginal degradation for CPU, RAM, and IO workloads (maximum degradation of 2.6%), and low but not imperceptible degradation for database workloads (between 3.6% to 7.13%). Finally, we provide usability mechanisms and a threat analysis to help users navigate cloud providers' different CVM implementations and resulting guarantees.
- 4 March 2024
- Published by Sociedade Brasileira de Computação in Journal of Internet Services and Applications
- Vol. 15 (1) , 179-193
Open AccessInteroperable node integrity verification for confidential machines based on AMD SEV-SNP
Confidential virtual machines (CVMs) are cloud providers' most recent security offer, providing confidentiality and integrity features. Although confidentiality protects the machine from the host operating system, firmware, and cloud operators, integrity protection is even more useful, enabling protection for a wider range of security issues. Unfortunately, CVM integrity verification depends on remote attestation protocols, which are not trivial for operators and differ largely among cloud providers. We propose an approach for abstracting CVM attestation that leverages an open-source standard, Cloud Native Foundation's Secure Production Identity Framework for Everyone (SPIFFE). Our approach can integrate smoothly even when applications are unaware of CVMs or the SPIFFE standard. Nevertheless, our implementation inherits SPIFFE flexibility for empowering access control when applications support SPIFFE. In terms of performance, CVMs incur an additional 1.3 s to 21.9 s in boot times (it varies with the cloud environment), a marginal degradation for CPU, RAM, and IO workloads (maximum degradation of 2.6%), and low but not imperceptible degradation for database workloads (between 3.6% to 7.13%). Finally, we provide usability mechanisms and a threat analysis to help users navigate cloud providers' different CVM implementations and resulting guarantees.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-10
Attesting AMD SEV-SNP Virtual Machines with SPIRE
SPIRE is an open-source project that enables the provisioning of verifiable identities to software components based on an attestation of the software properties, avoiding the leakage risks of pre-provisioned secrets. This paper presents an implementation of a SPIRE plugin that enables the attestation of AMD SEV-SNP confidential virtual machines. Our approach leverages the pluggable architecture from SPIRE and depends only on minor changes to QEMU, changes taken from its open-source community, and that should soon be merged. As a result, application providers can now use SPIRE to restrict sensitive credentials to be available only to services in environments protected from malicious hosts and cloud operators using AMD SEV-SNP technology. Our experiments show that the steps needed to create and attest the confidential VM do not prohibitively increase boot times (from 10.8 to 20.9 seconds) and that confidential VMs with encrypted disks only slightly degrade the CPU and RAM performance (about ) of unmodified applications.
- 16 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-10
Open AccessAttesting AMD SEV-SNP Virtual Machines with SPIRE
SPIRE is an open-source project that enables the provisioning of verifiable identities to software components based on an attestation of the software properties, avoiding the leakage risks of pre-provisioned secrets. This paper presents an implementation of a SPIRE plugin that enables the attestation of AMD SEV-SNP confidential virtual machines. Our approach leverages the pluggable architecture from SPIRE and depends only on minor changes to QEMU, changes taken from its open-source community, and that should soon be merged. As a result, application providers can now use SPIRE to restrict sensitive credentials to be available only to services in environments protected from malicious hosts and cloud operators using AMD SEV-SNP technology. Our experiments show that the steps needed to create and attest the confidential VM do not prohibitively increase boot times (from 10.8 to 20.9 seconds) and that confidential VMs with encrypted disks only slightly degrade the CPU and RAM performance (about ) of unmodified applications.