Jiajun Gong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jiajun Gong has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Tao Wang
School of Computing Science, Simon Fraser University, Burnaby, BC, Canada
5 shared publications - Ee-Chien Chang
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
4 shared publications - Siyuan Liang
National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
4 shared publications - Wei Cai
Network Connection Security Department, Zhongguancun Lab, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Zhong Guan
University of Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Aishan Liu
Beihang University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 2610-2625
TrapFlow: Controllable Website Fingerprinting Defense via Dynamic Backdoor Learning
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, which covertly monitor user communications to identify the web pages they visit, pose a serious threat to user privacy. Existing WF defenses attempt to reduce attack accuracy by disrupting traffic patterns, but attackers can retrain their models to adapt, making these defenses ineffective. Meanwhile, their high overhead limits deployability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a novel controllable website fingerprinting defense called TrapFlow based on backdoor learning. TrapFlow exploits the tendency of neural networks to memorize subtle patterns by injecting crafted trigger sequences into targeted website traffic, causing the attacker’s model to build incorrect associations during training. If the attacker attempts to adapt by training on such noisy data, TrapFlow ensures that the model internalizes the trigger as a dominant feature, leading to widespread misclassification across unrelated websites. Conversely, if the attacker ignores these patterns and trains only on clean data, the trigger behaves as an adversarial patch at inference time, causing model misclassification. To achieve this dual effect, we optimize the trigger using the Fast Levenshtein-like distance to maximize both its learnability and distinctiveness from normal traffic. Experiments show that TrapFlow significantly reduces the accuracy of the RF attack from 99% to 6% with 74% data overhead. This compares favorably against two SOTA defenses: FRONT reduces accuracy by only 2% at a similar overhead, while Palette achieves 32% accuracy, but with 48% more overhead. We further validate the practicality of our method in a real Tor network environment.
- 12 February 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 2610-2625
TrapFlow: Controllable Website Fingerprinting Defense via Dynamic Backdoor Learning
Website fingerprinting (WF) attacks, which covertly monitor user communications to identify the web pages they visit, pose a serious threat to user privacy. Existing WF defenses attempt to reduce attack accuracy by disrupting traffic patterns, but attackers can retrain their models to adapt, making these defenses ineffective. Meanwhile, their high overhead limits deployability. To overcome these limitations, we introduce a novel controllable website fingerprinting defense called TrapFlow based on backdoor learning. TrapFlow exploits the tendency of neural networks to memorize subtle patterns by injecting crafted trigger sequences into targeted website traffic, causing the attacker’s model to build incorrect associations during training. If the attacker attempts to adapt by training on such noisy data, TrapFlow ensures that the model internalizes the trigger as a dominant feature, leading to widespread misclassification across unrelated websites. Conversely, if the attacker ignores these patterns and trains only on clean data, the trigger behaves as an adversarial patch at inference time, causing model misclassification. To achieve this dual effect, we optimize the trigger using the Fast Levenshtein-like distance to maximize both its learnability and distinctiveness from normal traffic. Experiments show that TrapFlow significantly reduces the accuracy of the RF attack from 99% to 6% with 74% data overhead. This compares favorably against two SOTA defenses: FRONT reduces accuracy by only 2% at a similar overhead, while Palette achieves 32% accuracy, but with 48% more overhead. We further validate the practicality of our method in a real Tor network environment.
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 149-163
WFCAT: Augmenting Website Fingerprinting With Channel-Wise Attention on Timing Features
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two architectural blocks designed to effectively extract and utilize timing information. The model employs convolutional kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale temporal features, which are then integrated through a weighted combination across feature channels. This channel-wise attention mechanism enables the model to adaptively emphasize informative patterns while suppressing noise, thereby improving its robustness against timing obfuscation. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 149-163
WFCAT: Augmenting Website Fingerprinting With Channel-Wise Attention on Timing Features
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two architectural blocks designed to effectively extract and utilize timing information. The model employs convolutional kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale temporal features, which are then integrated through a weighted combination across feature channels. This channel-wise attention mechanism enables the model to adaptively emphasize informative patterns while suppressing noise, thereby improving its robustness against timing obfuscation. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.
- 14 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 8014-8029
FOADA: Toward Robust Open-World Mobile App Fingerprinting
Smartphone users are susceptible to a privacy leakage attack called App Fingerprinting (AF), where traffic analysis is used to infer the apps in use. Despite packet encryption, AF attacks leverage packet size and timing information to identify apps, posing a privacy threat. However, existing attacks fail when a few apps are used concurrently, causing unsegmented traffic with app multiplexing and overlapping. The key reason is that they cannot accurately identify active time boundaries for the apps. This paper presents a novel AF attack, FOADA, the first to accurately predict both the location and label of a target app in traffic. FOADA approaches AF as an object detection problem, training a deep learning model to estimate boundary positions and classify traffic segments. Accurate boundary predictions help the model focus on the most relevant traffic segment, enhancing its classification performance. FOADA excels in handling noisy app traffic. With app multiplexing, it achieves an F1-score of 0.96 for predicting only app labels and an F1-score of 0.92 for predicting both app labels and their locations. FOADA surpasses the state-of-the-art attack PacketPrint, which achieves F1-scores of 0.80 and 0.48 in these two scenarios, respectively. The inference time of FOADA is 2,000 times faster than PacketPrint.
- 14 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 8014-8029
FOADA: Toward Robust Open-World Mobile App Fingerprinting
Smartphone users are susceptible to a privacy leakage attack called App Fingerprinting (AF), where traffic analysis is used to infer the apps in use. Despite packet encryption, AF attacks leverage packet size and timing information to identify apps, posing a privacy threat. However, existing attacks fail when a few apps are used concurrently, causing unsegmented traffic with app multiplexing and overlapping. The key reason is that they cannot accurately identify active time boundaries for the apps. This paper presents a novel AF attack, FOADA, the first to accurately predict both the location and label of a target app in traffic. FOADA approaches AF as an object detection problem, training a deep learning model to estimate boundary positions and classify traffic segments. Accurate boundary predictions help the model focus on the most relevant traffic segment, enhancing its classification performance. FOADA excels in handling noisy app traffic. With app multiplexing, it achieves an F1-score of 0.96 for predicting only app labels and an F1-score of 0.92 for predicting both app labels and their locations. FOADA surpasses the state-of-the-art attack PacketPrint, which achieves F1-scores of 0.80 and 0.48 in these two scenarios, respectively. The inference time of FOADA is 2,000 times faster than PacketPrint.
- Open Access
WFCAT: Augmenting Website Fingerprinting with Channel-wise Attention on Timing Features
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two innovative architectural blocks designed to optimally extract and utilize timing information. Our approach uses kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale features, which are then integrated using a weighted sum across all feature channels to enhance the model's efficacy in identifying temporal patterns. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.
Open AccessWFCAT: Augmenting Website Fingerprinting with Channel-wise Attention on Timing Features
Website Fingerprinting (WF) aims to deanonymize users on the Tor network by analyzing encrypted network traffic. Recent deep-learning-based attacks show high accuracy on undefended traces. However, they struggle against modern defenses that use tactics like injecting dummy packets and delaying real packets, which significantly degrade classification performance. Our analysis reveals that current attacks inadequately leverage the timing information inherent in traffic traces, which persists as a source of leakage even under robust defenses. Addressing this shortfall, we introduce a novel feature representation named the Inter-Arrival Time (IAT) histogram, which quantifies the frequencies of packet inter-arrival times across predetermined time slots. Complementing this feature, we propose a new CNN-based attack, WFCAT, enhanced with two innovative architectural blocks designed to optimally extract and utilize timing information. Our approach uses kernels of varying sizes to capture multi-scale features, which are then integrated using a weighted sum across all feature channels to enhance the model's efficacy in identifying temporal patterns. Our experiments validate that WFCAT substantially outperforms existing methods on defended traces in both closed- and open-world scenarios. Notably, WFCAT achieves over 59% accuracy against Surakav, a recently developed robust defense, marking an improvement of over 28% and 48% against the state-of-the-art attacks RF and Tik-Tok, respectively, in the closed-world scenario.
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 1357-1371
WFDefProxy: Real World Implementation and Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Tor, an onion-routing anonymity network, can be attacked by Website Fingerprinting (WF), which de-anonymizes encrypted web browsing traffic by analyzing its unique sequence characteristics. Although many defenses have been proposed, few have been implemented and tested in the real world; most state-of-the-art defenses were only simulated. Simulations fail to capture the real performance of these defenses as they make simplifying assumptions about the protocol stack and network conditions. To allow WF defenses to be analyzed as real implementations, we create WFDefProxy, the first general platform for WF defense implementation on Tor as pluggable transports. We implement three state-of-the-art WF defenses: FRONT, Tamaraw, and RegulaTor. We evaluate each defense extensively by directly collecting defended datasets under WFDefProxy. Our results show that simulation can be inaccurate in many cases. Specifically, Tamaraw’s time overhead was underestimated by 22% in one setting and overestimated by 24% in another. RegulaTor’s time overhead was underestimated by 30–40%. We find that a major source of simulation inaccuracy is that they cannot incorporate how packets depend on each other. We also find that adverse network conditions (which are ignored in simulation), especially congestion, can affect the evaluated overhead of defenses. These results show that it is important to evaluate defenses as implementations instead of only simulations to avoid errors in evaluation.
- 25 October 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 1357-1371
WFDefProxy: Real World Implementation and Evaluation of Website Fingerprinting Defenses
Tor, an onion-routing anonymity network, can be attacked by Website Fingerprinting (WF), which de-anonymizes encrypted web browsing traffic by analyzing its unique sequence characteristics. Although many defenses have been proposed, few have been implemented and tested in the real world; most state-of-the-art defenses were only simulated. Simulations fail to capture the real performance of these defenses as they make simplifying assumptions about the protocol stack and network conditions. To allow WF defenses to be analyzed as real implementations, we create WFDefProxy, the first general platform for WF defense implementation on Tor as pluggable transports. We implement three state-of-the-art WF defenses: FRONT, Tamaraw, and RegulaTor. We evaluate each defense extensively by directly collecting defended datasets under WFDefProxy. Our results show that simulation can be inaccurate in many cases. Specifically, Tamaraw’s time overhead was underestimated by 22% in one setting and overestimated by 24% in another. RegulaTor’s time overhead was underestimated by 30–40%. We find that a major source of simulation inaccuracy is that they cannot incorporate how packets depend on each other. We also find that adverse network conditions (which are ignored in simulation), especially congestion, can affect the evaluated overhead of defenses. These results show that it is important to evaluate defenses as implementations instead of only simulations to avoid errors in evaluation.