Liang Xin
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Liang Xin has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zhiqiang Long
College of Intelligence Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha 410073, China
7 shared publications Guang He
National University of Defense Technology
5 shared publications- Biao Yang
College of Intelligence Science and Technology, National University of Defense Technology, Changsha, China
4 shared publications Zhiqiang Long
National University of Defense Technology
2 shared publicationsBiao Yang
College of Intelligence Science and Technology National University of Defense Technology Changsha Hunan China
1 shared publication- Wentao Xia
Hunan Agricultural Equipment Research Institute, Hunan Academy of Agricultural Sciences, Changsha 410125, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 26 April 2026
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics
- Vol. 49 (8) , 1-9
Lightweight Online Learning Kalman Filter for INS/GPS Navigation Under GPS Denial
- 26 April 2026
- Published by American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics (AIAA) in Journal of Guidance, Control, and Dynamics
- Vol. 49 (8) , 1-9
Lightweight Online Learning Kalman Filter for INS/GPS Navigation Under GPS Denial
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Vol. 75 (1) , 1057-1072
Unified Detection and Estimation of Stealthy Attacks in UGVs: An Online Self-Encoding With Linear Q-Learning Approach
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are vulnerable to stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks, which compromise system integrity by altering control signals and injecting fraudulent sensor data. Most existing methods for detecting SFDI attacks rely on computationally intensive approaches and overlook the unified design of attack detection and state estimation frameworks. To address these limitations, this study proposes a lightweight protection framework that integrates detection and state estimation for SFDI attacks. The proposed framework encodes the system's internal state, eliminating the need to transmit encoded information seeds and thus reducing the risk of compromise. Reinforcement Q-learning is employed to enhance detection performance against micro-amplitude SFDI attacks. Additionally, an attack-resilient state estimator with plug-and-play capabilities is developed using Kalman filtering, achieving an integrated framework for attack detection and state estimation. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated experimentally using a UGV as the test platform and compared with related methods. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method exhibits strong generalizability and low computational complexity. It achieves a 100% detection rate for various types of SFDI attacks, particularly those with small magnitudes, and maintains an average state estimation accuracy of 95%. Moreover, the framework proves resilient to computational delays of up to 200 ms and 30 ms for detection and estimation, respectively, showcasing its practical applicability and robustness in real-world scenarios.
- 7 August 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Vehicular Technology
- Vol. 75 (1) , 1057-1072
Unified Detection and Estimation of Stealthy Attacks in UGVs: An Online Self-Encoding With Linear Q-Learning Approach
Unmanned ground vehicles (UGVs) are vulnerable to stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks, which compromise system integrity by altering control signals and injecting fraudulent sensor data. Most existing methods for detecting SFDI attacks rely on computationally intensive approaches and overlook the unified design of attack detection and state estimation frameworks. To address these limitations, this study proposes a lightweight protection framework that integrates detection and state estimation for SFDI attacks. The proposed framework encodes the system's internal state, eliminating the need to transmit encoded information seeds and thus reducing the risk of compromise. Reinforcement Q-learning is employed to enhance detection performance against micro-amplitude SFDI attacks. Additionally, an attack-resilient state estimator with plug-and-play capabilities is developed using Kalman filtering, achieving an integrated framework for attack detection and state estimation. The effectiveness of the proposed method is validated experimentally using a UGV as the test platform and compared with related methods. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method exhibits strong generalizability and low computational complexity. It achieves a 100% detection rate for various types of SFDI attacks, particularly those with small magnitudes, and maintains an average state estimation accuracy of 95%. Moreover, the framework proves resilient to computational delays of up to 200 ms and 30 ms for detection and estimation, respectively, showcasing its practical applicability and robustness in real-world scenarios.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica
- Vol. 12 (7) , 1368-1380
A Learning-Based Passive Resilient Controller for Cyber-Physical Systems: Countering Stealthy Deception Attacks and Complete Loss of Actuators Control Authority
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their integral connection between cyberspace and the physical world, which is augmented by Internet connectivity. This vulnerability necessitates a heightened focus on developing resilient control mechanisms for CPSs. However, current observer-based active compensation resilient controllers exhibit poor performance against stealthy deception attacks (SDAs) due to the difficulty in accurately reconstructing system states because of the stealthy nature of these attacks. Moreover, some non-active compensation approaches are insufficient when there is a complete loss of actuator control authority. To address these issues, we introduce a novel learning-based passive resilient controller (LPRC). Our approach, unlike observer-based state reconstruction, shows enhanced effectiveness in countering SDAs. We developed a safety state set, represented by an ellipsoid, to ensure CPS stability under SDA conditions, maintaining system trajectories within this set. Additionally, by employing deep reinforcement learning (DRL), the LPRC acquires the capacity to adapt and diverse evolving attack strategies. To empirically substantiate our methodology, various attack methods were compared with current passive and active compensation resilient control methods to evaluate their performance.
- 1 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE/CAA Journal of Automatica Sinica
- Vol. 12 (7) , 1368-1380
A Learning-Based Passive Resilient Controller for Cyber-Physical Systems: Countering Stealthy Deception Attacks and Complete Loss of Actuators Control Authority
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly vulnerable to cyber-attacks due to their integral connection between cyberspace and the physical world, which is augmented by Internet connectivity. This vulnerability necessitates a heightened focus on developing resilient control mechanisms for CPSs. However, current observer-based active compensation resilient controllers exhibit poor performance against stealthy deception attacks (SDAs) due to the difficulty in accurately reconstructing system states because of the stealthy nature of these attacks. Moreover, some non-active compensation approaches are insufficient when there is a complete loss of actuator control authority. To address these issues, we introduce a novel learning-based passive resilient controller (LPRC). Our approach, unlike observer-based state reconstruction, shows enhanced effectiveness in countering SDAs. We developed a safety state set, represented by an ellipsoid, to ensure CPS stability under SDA conditions, maintaining system trajectories within this set. Additionally, by employing deep reinforcement learning (DRL), the LPRC acquires the capacity to adapt and diverse evolving attack strategies. To empirically substantiate our methodology, various attack methods were compared with current passive and active compensation resilient control methods to evaluate their performance.
- 15 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (3) , 1470-1481
Secure State Estimation for Multi-Sensor Cyber–Physical Systems Using Virtual Sensor and Deep Reinforcement Learning Under Multiple Attacks on Major Sensor
In multi-sensor Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), an indispensable and highly accurate sensor, referred to as the major sensor, such as GPS in the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), plays a crucial role. However, despite their reliability, these sensors are susceptible to various attacks, such as false data injection and denial of service, potentially undermining state estimation accuracy. To counteract this challenge, our study presents the innovative Virtual Sensor Based Secure State Estimator (VSBSSE) framework. This system utilizes Virtual SensorNet to generate preliminary estimations when a major sensor is compromised and integrates deep reinforcement learning to refine these estimations online. We have meticulously derived and validated the upper bounds of state estimation errors within the VSBSSE framework. Comparing it to another method that employs reinforcement learning for secure state estimation and using open-source GNSS datasets, including Kitti and Multi-Spectral Stereo (MS2), our findings demonstrate that VSBSSE's average state estimation error remains below the theoretical upper limit of 10%, even amidst multiple attacks on the major sensor of CPSs.
- 15 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network Science and Engineering
- Vol. 12 (3) , 1470-1481
Secure State Estimation for Multi-Sensor Cyber–Physical Systems Using Virtual Sensor and Deep Reinforcement Learning Under Multiple Attacks on Major Sensor
In multi-sensor Cyber-Physical Systems (CPSs), an indispensable and highly accurate sensor, referred to as the major sensor, such as GPS in the Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS), plays a crucial role. However, despite their reliability, these sensors are susceptible to various attacks, such as false data injection and denial of service, potentially undermining state estimation accuracy. To counteract this challenge, our study presents the innovative Virtual Sensor Based Secure State Estimator (VSBSSE) framework. This system utilizes Virtual SensorNet to generate preliminary estimations when a major sensor is compromised and integrates deep reinforcement learning to refine these estimations online. We have meticulously derived and validated the upper bounds of state estimation errors within the VSBSSE framework. Comparing it to another method that employs reinforcement learning for secure state estimation and using open-source GNSS datasets, including Kitti and Multi-Spectral Stereo (MS2), our findings demonstrate that VSBSSE's average state estimation error remains below the theoretical upper limit of 10%, even amidst multiple attacks on the major sensor of CPSs.
- Open Access
- 16 December 2024
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Control Theory & Applications
- Vol. 19 (1)
Residual based tilt tri‐rotor UAV actuator fault detection using TSK fuzzy model
Undetected actuator faults on tilt tri‐rotor UAVs can lead to system failures and uncontrolled crashes. Multiple flight modes result in complex models with strong nonlinearity, making fault detection of their actuators a very challenging task. To address this issue, this article proposes a fault detection method based on residual generated by using TSK fuzzy model. Initially, the flight modes of the tilt tri‐rotor UAV are modeled as the TSK fuzzy model. Following this, the residual generator is employed for rapid detection of actuator failures. To enhance detection accuracy, the kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) algorithm is used for a secondary confirmation. The proposed algorithm was validated using both a simulation platform and real flight data. The results demonstrate that the fault detection algorithm achieves high accuracy and real‐time performance, with a computing time of approximately 41 ms in real controller hardware, thus meeting the requirements of practical applications.
- 16 December 2024
- Published by Institution of Engineering and Technology (IET) in IET Control Theory & Applications
- Vol. 19 (1)
Open AccessResidual based tilt tri‐rotor UAV actuator fault detection using TSK fuzzy model
Undetected actuator faults on tilt tri‐rotor UAVs can lead to system failures and uncontrolled crashes. Multiple flight modes result in complex models with strong nonlinearity, making fault detection of their actuators a very challenging task. To address this issue, this article proposes a fault detection method based on residual generated by using TSK fuzzy model. Initially, the flight modes of the tilt tri‐rotor UAV are modeled as the TSK fuzzy model. Following this, the residual generator is employed for rapid detection of actuator failures. To enhance detection accuracy, the kernel principal component analysis (KPCA) algorithm is used for a secondary confirmation. The proposed algorithm was validated using both a simulation platform and real flight data. The results demonstrate that the fault detection algorithm achieves high accuracy and real‐time performance, with a computing time of approximately 41 ms in real controller hardware, thus meeting the requirements of practical applications.
- 25 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering
- Vol. 22 (15455955) , 141-153
Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks Detection and Classification in Cyber-Physical Systems Using Deep Reinforcement Learning
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly threatened by stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks, which compromise system integrity by manipulating control signals and introducing false sensor data. These attacks are particularly challenging due to their diversity and often indistinguishable nature. In response to this issue, our work uncovers the fundamental causes behind SFDI attacks in linear time-invariant (LTI) systems and elucidates the principles enabling their stealth. We present a novel virtual extended system framework designed to eliminate strictly stealthy attacks within the entire CPS. Utilizing deep reinforcement learning (DRL) methodologies, we pioneer the use of detection results for real-time SFDI attack classification. Through numerical simulations, we validate our proposed method’s effectiveness, demonstrating a classification accuracy of no less than 95%. Notably, even in scenarios where attackers manage to breach the framework partially, our method continues to provide a reliable success rate in SFDI attack detection and classification, showcasing its robustness and efficacy. Note to Practitioners —Cyber-physical systems (CPSs), a critical component of modern industries, are becoming increasingly susceptible to stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks. These attacks compromise system integrity by subtly manipulating control signals and feeding false sensor data, making them challenging to detect. Our research presents an innovative framework that uses deep reinforcement learning techniques to detect and classify these elusive attacks, achieving a classification accuracy of over 95%. The information on SFDI attack categories, ascertained by this method, lays the groundwork for the development of subsequent defence strategies. For professionals working in sectors reliant on CPSs, such as manufacturing, healthcare, and transportation, this framework offers a promising tool to enhance system security. Even in scenarios where the system has been partially compromised, our method continues to provide reliable detection and classification, underscoring its robustness and practical utility. The system remains effective despite full breach attempts on specific attack types, ensuring resilience against a broad range of SFDI attacks. In conclusion, our research offers a substantial advancement in protecting CPSs against cyber threats.
- 25 March 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Automation Science and Engineering
- Vol. 22 (15455955) , 141-153
Stealthy False Data Injection Attacks Detection and Classification in Cyber-Physical Systems Using Deep Reinforcement Learning
Cyber-physical systems (CPSs) are increasingly threatened by stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks, which compromise system integrity by manipulating control signals and introducing false sensor data. These attacks are particularly challenging due to their diversity and often indistinguishable nature. In response to this issue, our work uncovers the fundamental causes behind SFDI attacks in linear time-invariant (LTI) systems and elucidates the principles enabling their stealth. We present a novel virtual extended system framework designed to eliminate strictly stealthy attacks within the entire CPS. Utilizing deep reinforcement learning (DRL) methodologies, we pioneer the use of detection results for real-time SFDI attack classification. Through numerical simulations, we validate our proposed method’s effectiveness, demonstrating a classification accuracy of no less than 95%. Notably, even in scenarios where attackers manage to breach the framework partially, our method continues to provide a reliable success rate in SFDI attack detection and classification, showcasing its robustness and efficacy. Note to Practitioners —Cyber-physical systems (CPSs), a critical component of modern industries, are becoming increasingly susceptible to stealthy false data injection (SFDI) attacks. These attacks compromise system integrity by subtly manipulating control signals and feeding false sensor data, making them challenging to detect. Our research presents an innovative framework that uses deep reinforcement learning techniques to detect and classify these elusive attacks, achieving a classification accuracy of over 95%. The information on SFDI attack categories, ascertained by this method, lays the groundwork for the development of subsequent defence strategies. For professionals working in sectors reliant on CPSs, such as manufacturing, healthcare, and transportation, this framework offers a promising tool to enhance system security. Even in scenarios where the system has been partially compromised, our method continues to provide reliable detection and classification, underscoring its robustness and practical utility. The system remains effective despite full breach attempts on specific attack types, ensuring resilience against a broad range of SFDI attacks. In conclusion, our research offers a substantial advancement in protecting CPSs against cyber threats.
- Open Access
Research on Secure State Estimation and Recovery Control for CPS under Stealthy Attacks
As the application of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) becomes more and more widespread, its security is becoming a focus of attention. Currently, there has been much research on the security defense of the physical layer of the CPS. However, most of the research only focuses on one of the aspects, for example, attack detection, security state estimation, or recovery control. Obviously, the effectiveness of security defense targeting only one aspect is limited. Therefore, in this paper, a set of security defense processes is proposed for the case that a CPS containing multiple sensors is subject to three kinds of stealthy attacks (i.e., zero-dynamics attack, covert attack, and replay attack). Firstly, the existing attack detection method based on improved residuals is used to detect stealthy attacks. Secondly, based on the detection results, an optimal state estimation method based on improved Kalman filtering is proposed to estimate the actual state of the system. Then, based on the optimal state, internal model control (IMC) is introduced to complete the recovery control of the system. Finally, the proposed methods are integrated to give a complete security defense process, and the simulation is verified for three kinds of stealthy attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed methods are effective.
Open AccessResearch on Secure State Estimation and Recovery Control for CPS under Stealthy Attacks
As the application of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) becomes more and more widespread, its security is becoming a focus of attention. Currently, there has been much research on the security defense of the physical layer of the CPS. However, most of the research only focuses on one of the aspects, for example, attack detection, security state estimation, or recovery control. Obviously, the effectiveness of security defense targeting only one aspect is limited. Therefore, in this paper, a set of security defense processes is proposed for the case that a CPS containing multiple sensors is subject to three kinds of stealthy attacks (i.e., zero-dynamics attack, covert attack, and replay attack). Firstly, the existing attack detection method based on improved residuals is used to detect stealthy attacks. Secondly, based on the detection results, an optimal state estimation method based on improved Kalman filtering is proposed to estimate the actual state of the system. Then, based on the optimal state, internal model control (IMC) is introduced to complete the recovery control of the system. Finally, the proposed methods are integrated to give a complete security defense process, and the simulation is verified for three kinds of stealthy attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed methods are effective.
- 18 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Control
- Vol. 26 (2) , 960-973
The sensor‐actuators stealthy cyber‐attacks framework on networked control systems: A data‐driven approach
In this study, we address two fundamental questions that are crucial for designing stealthy cyber‐attacks similar to false data injection. The first question involves obtaining an accurate dynamic model of the target to ensure stealthy performance under a detector. The second question pertains to understanding the opponent's ongoing detection tactics, such as dynamic watermarking, and developing a counter‐strategy. To answer the first question, we propose a data‐driven framework that calculates the accurate dynamic model used in stealthy false data injection cyber‐attacks, including zero dynamics attacks, covert attacks, and replay attacks. To address the second question, we present a scheme against the dynamic watermarking defense strategy, which typically detects replay attacks. We validate the methods introduced in this study through an experimental setup of a cyber‐physical system, which includes an omnidirectional mobile robot, a wireless network router, and a remote control center.
- 18 October 2023
- Published by Wiley in Asian Journal of Control
- Vol. 26 (2) , 960-973
The sensor‐actuators stealthy cyber‐attacks framework on networked control systems: A data‐driven approach
In this study, we address two fundamental questions that are crucial for designing stealthy cyber‐attacks similar to false data injection. The first question involves obtaining an accurate dynamic model of the target to ensure stealthy performance under a detector. The second question pertains to understanding the opponent's ongoing detection tactics, such as dynamic watermarking, and developing a counter‐strategy. To answer the first question, we propose a data‐driven framework that calculates the accurate dynamic model used in stealthy false data injection cyber‐attacks, including zero dynamics attacks, covert attacks, and replay attacks. To address the second question, we present a scheme against the dynamic watermarking defense strategy, which typically detects replay attacks. We validate the methods introduced in this study through an experimental setup of a cyber‐physical system, which includes an omnidirectional mobile robot, a wireless network router, and a remote control center.
- Open Access
- 29 September 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Research on Secure State Estimation and Recovery Control for CPS under Stealthy Attacks
As the application of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) becomes more and more widespread, its security is becoming a focus of attention. Currently, there has been much research on the security defense of the physical layer of the CPS. However, most of the research only focuses on one of the aspects, for example, attack detection, security state estimation or recovery control. Obviously, the effectiveness of security defense targeting only one aspect is limited. Therefore, in this paper, a set of security defense processes is proposed for the case that a CPS containing multiple sensors is subject to three kinds of stealthy attacks (i.e., zero-dynamics attack, covert attack, and replay attack). Firstly, the existing attack detection method based on improved residuals is used to detect stealthy attacks. Secondly, based on the detection results, an optimal state estimation method based on improved Kalman filtering is proposed to estimate the actual state of the system. Then, based on the optimal state, internal model control (IMC) is introduced to complete the recovery control of the system. Finally, the proposed methods are integrated to give a complete security defense process, and the simulation is verified for three kinds of stealthy attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed methods are effective.
- 29 September 2023
- Published by MDPI AG in Preprints.org
Open AccessResearch on Secure State Estimation and Recovery Control for CPS under Stealthy Attacks
As the application of cyber-physical systems (CPSs) becomes more and more widespread, its security is becoming a focus of attention. Currently, there has been much research on the security defense of the physical layer of the CPS. However, most of the research only focuses on one of the aspects, for example, attack detection, security state estimation or recovery control. Obviously, the effectiveness of security defense targeting only one aspect is limited. Therefore, in this paper, a set of security defense processes is proposed for the case that a CPS containing multiple sensors is subject to three kinds of stealthy attacks (i.e., zero-dynamics attack, covert attack, and replay attack). Firstly, the existing attack detection method based on improved residuals is used to detect stealthy attacks. Secondly, based on the detection results, an optimal state estimation method based on improved Kalman filtering is proposed to estimate the actual state of the system. Then, based on the optimal state, internal model control (IMC) is introduced to complete the recovery control of the system. Finally, the proposed methods are integrated to give a complete security defense process, and the simulation is verified for three kinds of stealthy attacks. The simulation results show that the proposed methods are effective.