TCTaejoong Chung

Taejoong Chung

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Taejoong Chung has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    RScope: Unveiling Global ROV Deployments and Dependencies in the Post-ROV Era

    by Weitong Li, Yongzhe Xu, Mingwei Zhang, Vasileios Giotsas, Taejoong Chung

    The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and Route Origin Validation (ROV) are critical to securing Internet routing, yet measuring real-world ROV deployment and dependencies remains challenging. Existing methods (control-plane analysis and data-plane probing) often struggle to distinguish local ROV adoption from upstream filtering at scale and face diminishing visibility as ROV adoption grows. We present RScope, a measurement framework that dynamically manipulates Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs) from controlled publication points to isolate the impact of individual Relying Party (RP) servers. By selectively invalidating prefixes for specific RPs and probing connectivity changes, RScope maps dependencies among 21,827 ASes, their transit providers, and RP infrastructure. Our findings reveal that 1,127 ASes actively deploy ROV in IPv6, while 1,815 benefit from upstream protection, leaving 69.6% of such "protected" ASes vulnerable to local hijacks. Notably, ROV deployment by major ISPs strongly shape global security, enabling it in the top 100 ASes protects 27.6% of networks, but disabling it in Tier-1s endangers 23.8%. We also uncover operational delays: router enforcement lags ROA updates by 37 minutes on average. These results highlight systemic risks in incremental ROV adoption, emphasizing the need for broader deployment. We open-source tools and datasets to support ongoing routing security efforts.

  • Open Access

    Delegation of TLS Authentication to CDNs using Revocable Delegated Credentials

    by Daegeun Yoon, Taejoong Chung, Yongdae Kim

    When using a Content Delivery Network (CDN), domain owners typically delegate Transport Layer Security (TLS) authentication to the CDN by sharing their TLS certificate’s private key. However, this practice not only delegates TLS authentication but also grants the CDN complete control over the certificate. To mitigate these concerns, Delegated Credential (DC) was proposed as a solution; DC, which contains both the CDN’s public key and the domain owner’s signature, allows the domain owners to delegate their own credentials for TLS authentication, thereby avoiding the need to share their private keys. However, the absence of a mechanism to distribute the revocation status of a DC renders it non-revocable, even when a compromise of a credential has been detected. DCs were thus designed to be short-lived, necessitating frequent renewal for continued use. To overcome this limitation, we designed Revocable Delegated Credential (RDC), which provides a revocation method for DCs. With RDCs, there is no need for frequent renewals as they can be revoked, allowing for a longer validity period. The revocation status of RDCs is distributed via DNS, an essential component of web communication. RDCs utilize the NSEC record, a type of DNSSEC record, as a means to store, validate, and easily manage their revocation status. When domain owners no longer trust their CDNs or detect compromise in their RDCs, they can distribute the RDC’s revocation status by simply creating a subdomain named with an RDC identifier. The browser then confirms the existence of this subdomain using the NSEC record to validate the revocation status. We implemented RDC in the go tls package and Firefox Nightly to demonstrate and evaluate its feasibility.


  • Open Access

    No Root Store Left Behind

    by James Larisch, Waqar Aqeel, Taejoong Chung, Eddie Kohler, Dave Levin, Bruce M. Maggs, Bryan Parno, Christo Wilson

    When a root certificate authority (CA) in the Web PKI misbehaves, primary root-store operators such as Mozilla and Google respond by distrusting that CA. However, full distrust is often too broad, so root stores often implement partial distrust of roots, such as only accepting a root for a subset of domains. Unfortunately, derivative root stores (e.g., Debian and Android) that mirror decisions made by primary root stores are often out-of-date and cannot implement partial distrust, leaving TLS applications vulnerable. We propose augmenting root stores with per-certificate programs called General Certificate Constraints (GCCs) that precisely control the trust of root certificates. We propose that primary root-store operators write GCCs and distribute them, along with routine root certificate additions and removals, to all root stores in the Web PKI. To justify our arguments, we review specific instances of CA certificate mis-issuance over the last decade that resulted in partial distrust of roots that derivative root stores were unable to precisely mirror. We also review prior work that illustrates the alarming lag between primary and derivative root stores. We discuss preliminary designs for GCC deployment and how GCCs could enable pre-emptive restrictions on CA power.


  • Open Access

    RoVista: Measuring and Analyzing the Route Origin Validation (ROV) in RPKI

    by Weitong Li, Zhexiao Lin, Ishtiaq Ashiq, Emile Aben, Romain Fontugne, Amreesh Phokeer, Taejoong Chung

    The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) is a system to add security to the Internet routing. In recent years, the publication of Route Origin Authorization (ROA) objects, which bind IP prefixes to their legitimate origin ASN, has been rapidly increasing. However, ROAs are effective only if the routers use them to verify and filter invalid BGP announcements, a process called Route Origin Validation (ROV). There are many proposed approaches to measure the status of ROV in the wild, but they are limited in scalability or accuracy. In this paper, we present RoVista, an ROV measurement framework that leverages IP-ID side channel and in-the-wild RPKI-invalid prefix. With over 20 months of longitudinal measurement, RoVista successfully covers more than 28K ASes where 63.8% of ASes have derived benefits from ROV, although the percentage of fully protected ASes remains relatively low at 12.3%. In order to validate our findings, we have also sought input from network operators. We then evaluate the security impact of current ROV deployment and reveal misconfigurations that will weaken the protection of ROV. Lastly, we compare RoVista with other approaches and conclude with a discussion of our findings and limitations.