YBYérom-David Bromberg

Yérom-David Bromberg

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article

Previous Organizations / Institutes

The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years


Yérom-David Bromberg has a total of 31 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Cheating in Multiplayer Online Games: A Perspective

    by Hugo Bertin, Salman Shaikh, Yérom-David Bromberg, Marc Dacier

    In this chapter, we address the issues related to cheating in multiplayer online games (MOGs). We briefly introduce the importance of cheating in today’s gaming ecosystem. We describe the various locations where cheating can take place (server, client, and network) and outline the current state-of-the-art approaches to mitigate cheating. We focus afterward on two classes of attacks that cannot be prevented either at the server or the client side, namely the network-based attacks (Lag-Switch, Sequence Hopping, Distributed Denial-of-Service [DDoS]) and the aimbots relying on an external (i.e., outside the client machine) analysis of the rendered images. We explain various instances of both classes, outline the challenges in detecting them, and describe proposed detection methods that are currently the subject of ongoing research to infer the cheating behavior of some players. These detection methods constitute our original contributions to addressing cheating techniques that are structurally unsolvable by current industry and academic standards.

  • Open Access

    D roid H unter : A Robust Vision-Based Detection Against Hidden Android Malware

    by Victoire Nganfang, Simon Queyrut, Yérom-David Bromberg, Valerio Schiavoni, Djob Mvondo, Kengne Tchendji Vianney


  • Open Access

    Everything You Need to Know About Virtual Machine Live Migration Between Heterogeneous Processors

    by Kenta Ishiguro, Caleb Fonyuy-Asheri, Elouan Barraud, Renaud Lachaize, Yérom-David Bromberg, Alain Tchana


  • Open Access

    The Impact of Kernel Asynchronous APIs on the Performance of a Kernel VPN

    by Honore Cesaire Mounah, Djob Mvondo, Julia Lawall, Yerom-David Bromberg

    • 7 August 2025
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Disconnecting Users from Virtual Worlds with a Single Packet: an Unreal Untold Story

    by Hugo Bertin, Ilies Benhabbour, Marc Dacier, Yérom-David Bromberg

    Online worlds, with online games at the forefront, have become ubiquitous in our lives. In 2024, the gaming industry worldwide revenue was estimated at US$455 billion [1]. Yet, this industry is facing a growing number of cheating actors and techniques. We introduce new attacks targeting multiplayer games based on Unreal Engine (UE), such as Fortnite, PUBG, and Valorant. These attacks disconnect players from ongoing game sessions against their will. Cheaters can launch them as a Denial-of-Service against opponents with very few packets (sometimes only one) to steal the victory from the target without exposing themselves as fraudsters. This paper shows how such issues present in a single game engine can spread widely across several games produced by different editors, focusing on Unreal Engine, whose source code is publicly available. UE is also commonly found in digital twins, virtual reality, and other Metaverse solutions. We present our analysis of the design and implementation choices made within Unreal Engine. We cover how to exploit UE networking protocols and discuss how to defeat some common countermeasures used on the Internet against IP spoofing. We propose some mitigation strategies for video game developers.

  • A Framework to Enable Cheating Detection in Multiplayer Online Games

    by Salman Shaikh, Hugo Bertin, Marc Dacier, Yérom-David Bromberg


  • Open Access

    HORSE: Ultra-low latency workloads on FaaS platforms

    by Djob Mvondo, Francois Taiani, Yérom-David Bromberg

    We investigate if FaaS platforms can handle ultra-low latency workloads that run as low as less than 1μs and show that even for a warm start, the initialization time takes up to 99, 99% of the total execution time. This is due to the resume process of warm sandboxes that takes more time as the number of the sandbox's allocated virtual CPUs (vCPUs) increases. We uncover that two operations use up to 93, 1% of the resume time. The first is the insertion of the paused sandbox's vCPUs to a CPU-sorted run queue. The second is the update of a lock-protected variable, which represents the vCPUs' load on each CPU. This variable is used for frequency scaling. We introduce Horse, for hot resume. Horse presents two simple approaches. The first is parallel precomputed sorted merge (P2 SM), a parallel algorithm that leverages pre-computed data to have a parallel sorted merge of two sorted lists in O(1). The second is to coalesce the updates on the lock-protected variable used for frequency scaling. We implement Horse in Xen and Firecracker, two mainstream virtualization platforms. Our evaluation with real-world FaaS traces shows that Horse achieves up to 7, 16× resume time improvement and reduces sandbox initialization overhead by up to 142, 84× with no impact on functions.


  • Open Access

    Partition Detection in Byzantine Networks

    by Yérom-David Bromberg, Jérémie Decouchant, Manon Sourisseau, François Taïani

    Detecting and handling network partitions is a fundamental requirement of distributed systems. Although existing partition detection methods in arbitrary graphs tolerate unreliable networks, they either assume that all nodes are correct or that a limited number of nodes might crash. In particular, Byzantine behaviors are out of the scope of these algorithms despite Byzantine fault tolerance being an active research topic for important problems such as consensus. Moreover, Byzantinetolerant protocols, such as broadcast or consensus, always rely on the assumption of connected networks. This paper addresses the problem of detecting partition in Byzantine networks (without connectivity assumption). We present a novel algorithm, which we call NECTAR, that safely detects partitioned and possibly partitionable networks and prove its correctness. NECTAR allows all correct nodes to detect whether a network could suffer from Byzantine nodes. We evaluate NECTAR's performance and compare it to two existing baselines using up to 100 nodes running real code, on various realistic topologies. Our results confirm that NECTAR maintains a 100% accuracy while the accuracy of the various existing baselines decreases by at least 40% as soon as one participant is Byzantine. Although NECTAR's network cost increases with the number of nodes and decreases with the network's diameter, it does not go above around 500KB in the worst cases.

  • Open Access

    GuaNary: Efficient Buffer Overflow Detection In Virtualized Clouds Using Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection Support

    by Stella Bitchebe, Yves Kone, Pierre Olivier, Jalil Boukhobza, Yérom-David Bromberg, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    Buffer overflow is a widespread memory safety violation in C/C++, reported as the top vulnerability in 2022. Secure memory allocators are generally used to protect systems against attacks that may exploit buffer overflows. Existing allocators mainly rely on two types of countermeasures to prevent or detect overflows: canaries and guard pages, each with pros and cons in terms of detection latency and memory footprint. This paper follows the Out of Hypervisor (OoH) trend for virtualized cloud applications. It introduces GuaNary, a novel safety guard against overflows allowing synchronous detection at a low memory footprint cost. OoH is a new virtualization research axis introduced in 2022 advocating the exposure of hardware features for virtualization to the guest OS so that its processes can take advantage of them. Based on the OoH principle, GuaNary leverages Intel Sub-Page write Permission (SPP), a recent hardware virtualization feature that allows to write-protect guest memory at the granularity of 128B (namely, sub-page) instead of 4KB. We implement a software stack, LeanGuard, which promotes the utilization of SPP from inside virtual machines by new secure allocators that use GuaNary. Our evaluation shows that for the same number of protected buffers, LeanGuard consumes 8.3x less memory than SlimGuard, a state-of-the-art secure allocator. Furthermore, for the same memory consumption, LeanGuard protecting 25x more buffers than SlimGuard.


  • Open Access

    GuaNary: Efficient Buffer Overflow Detection In Virtualized Clouds Using Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection Support

    by Stella Bitchebe, Yves Kone, Pierre Olivier, Jalil Boukhobza, Yérom-David Bromberg, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    Buffer overflow is a widespread memory safety violation in C/C++, reported as the top vulnerability in 2022. Secure memory allocators are generally used to protect systems against attacks that may exploit buffer overflows. Existing allocators mainly rely on two types of countermeasures to prevent or detect overflows: canaries and guard pages, each with pros and cons in terms of detection latency and memory footprint. This paper follows the Out of Hypervisor (OoH) trend for virtualized cloud applications. It introduces GuaNary, a novel safety guard against overflows allowing synchronous detection at a low memory footprint cost. OoH is a new virtualization research axis introduced in 2022 advocating the exposure of hardware features for virtualization to the guest OS so that its processes can take advantage of them. Based on the OoH principle, GuaNary leverages Intel Sub-Page write Permission (SPP), a recent hardware virtualization feature that allows to write-protect guest memory at the granularity of 128B (namely, sub-page) instead of 4KB. We implement a software stack, LeanGuard, which promotes the utilization of SPP from inside virtual machines by new secure allocators that use GuaNary. Our evaluation shows that for the same number of protected buffers, LeanGuard consumes 8.3x less memory than SlimGuard, a state-of-the-art secure allocator. Furthermore, for the same memory consumption, LeanGuard protecting 25x more buffers than SlimGuard.