Wei Wan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Wei Wan has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Leo Yu Zhang
School of Information and Communication Technology, Griffith University, Southport, Queensland, Australia
5 shared publications - Shengshan Hu
School of Cyber Science and Engineering, Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China
5 shared publications - Minghui Li
Huazhong University of Science and Technology
4 shared publications - Hai Jin
Huazhong University of Science and Technology
3 shared publications - Hangtao Zhang
Huazhong University of Science and Technology, Wuhan, China
2 shared publications - Jianrong Lu
Zhejiang University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 250-262
Fine-Grained Poisoning Framework Against Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is one of the most widely used distributed machine learning frameworks. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks that can degrade the quality of the global model. Recent studies on fine-grained poisoning attacks highlight a strategic shift where attackers no longer prioritize maximal disruption of the global model, but instead control the degree of model poisoning to maintain stealth and avoid detection. However, research on fine-grained poisoning is still in the infant stage. Numerous fundamental questions have yet to be addressed, including its underlying mechanisms and optimization strategies. To this end, we introduces FGP, the first comprehensive framework for Fine-Grained Poisoning on FL, which allows adversaries to precisely manipulate the global model by strategically inducing accurate and stealthy sub-optimal solution. Fundamentally, FGP innovatively formalizes fine-grained attacks as an optimization problem to minimize the distance between the current global model and the adversary's target (a sub-optimal solution). It then employs a real-time search strategy to dynamically refine the malicious model updates in each round. To ensure optimal attack performance, we further introduce a novel topology-based approach as the error feedback. Additionally, we present a formal convergence analysis of our attacks. Armed with FGP, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of FL's robustness against fine-grained poisoning across diverse settings. Results demonstrate that FGP significantly outperforms the prior work, achieving an average $6.5\times$ higher attack accuracy.
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Dependable and Secure Computing
- Vol. 23 (1) , 250-262
Fine-Grained Poisoning Framework Against Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is one of the most widely used distributed machine learning frameworks. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks that can degrade the quality of the global model. Recent studies on fine-grained poisoning attacks highlight a strategic shift where attackers no longer prioritize maximal disruption of the global model, but instead control the degree of model poisoning to maintain stealth and avoid detection. However, research on fine-grained poisoning is still in the infant stage. Numerous fundamental questions have yet to be addressed, including its underlying mechanisms and optimization strategies. To this end, we introduces FGP, the first comprehensive framework for Fine-Grained Poisoning on FL, which allows adversaries to precisely manipulate the global model by strategically inducing accurate and stealthy sub-optimal solution. Fundamentally, FGP innovatively formalizes fine-grained attacks as an optimization problem to minimize the distance between the current global model and the adversary's target (a sub-optimal solution). It then employs a real-time search strategy to dynamically refine the malicious model updates in each round. To ensure optimal attack performance, we further introduce a novel topology-based approach as the error feedback. Additionally, we present a formal convergence analysis of our attacks. Armed with FGP, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of FL's robustness against fine-grained poisoning across diverse settings. Results demonstrate that FGP significantly outperforms the prior work, achieving an average $6.5\times$ higher attack accuracy.
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 8139-8153
DarkHash: A Data-Free Backdoor Attack Against Deep Hashing
Benefiting from its superior feature learning capabilities and efficiency, deep hashing has achieved remarkable success in large-scale image retrieval. Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of deep hashing models to backdoor attacks. Although these studies have shown promising attack results, they rely on access to the training dataset to implant the backdoor. In the real world, obtaining such data (e.g., identity information) is often prohibited due to privacy protection and intellectual property concerns. Embedding backdoors into deep hashing models without access to the training data, while maintaining retrieval accuracy for the original task, presents a novel and challenging problem. In this paper, we propose DarkHash, the first data-free backdoor attack against deep hashing. Specifically, we design a novel shadow backdoor attack framework with dual-semantic guidance. It embeds backdoor functionality and maintains original retrieval accuracy by fine-tuning only specific layers of the victim model using a surrogate dataset. We consider leveraging the relationship between individual samples and their neighbors to enhance backdoor attacks during training. By designing a topological alignment loss, we optimize both individual and neighboring poisoned samples toward the target sample, further enhancing the attack capability. Experimental results on four image datasets, five model architectures, and two hashing methods demonstrate the high effectiveness of DarkHash, outperforming existing state-of-the-art backdoor attack methods. Defense experiments show that DarkHash can withstand existing mainstream backdoor defense methods.
- 30 July 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 20 (15566013) , 8139-8153
DarkHash: A Data-Free Backdoor Attack Against Deep Hashing
Benefiting from its superior feature learning capabilities and efficiency, deep hashing has achieved remarkable success in large-scale image retrieval. Recent studies have demonstrated the vulnerability of deep hashing models to backdoor attacks. Although these studies have shown promising attack results, they rely on access to the training dataset to implant the backdoor. In the real world, obtaining such data (e.g., identity information) is often prohibited due to privacy protection and intellectual property concerns. Embedding backdoors into deep hashing models without access to the training data, while maintaining retrieval accuracy for the original task, presents a novel and challenging problem. In this paper, we propose DarkHash, the first data-free backdoor attack against deep hashing. Specifically, we design a novel shadow backdoor attack framework with dual-semantic guidance. It embeds backdoor functionality and maintains original retrieval accuracy by fine-tuning only specific layers of the victim model using a surrogate dataset. We consider leveraging the relationship between individual samples and their neighbors to enhance backdoor attacks during training. By designing a topological alignment loss, we optimize both individual and neighboring poisoned samples toward the target sample, further enhancing the attack capability. Experimental results on four image datasets, five model architectures, and two hashing methods demonstrate the high effectiveness of DarkHash, outperforming existing state-of-the-art backdoor attack methods. Defense experiments show that DarkHash can withstand existing mainstream backdoor defense methods.
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 146-166
ECLIPSE: Expunging Clean-Label Indiscriminate Poisons via Sparse Diffusion Purification
- 5 September 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 146-166
ECLIPSE: Expunging Clean-Label Indiscriminate Poisons via Sparse Diffusion Purification
- Open Access
- 31 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 5405-5418
Depriving the Survival Space of Adversaries Against Poisoned Gradients in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) allows clients at the edge to learn a shared global model without disclosing their private data. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks, wherein an adversary injects tainted local models that ultimately corrupt the global model. Despite various defensive mechanisms having been developed to combat poisoning attacks, they all fall short of securing practical FL scenarios with heterogeneous and unbalanced data distribution. Moreover, the cutting-edge defenses currently at our disposal demand access to a proprietary dataset that closely mirrors the distribution of clients’ data, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of privacy protection in FL. It is still challenging to devise an effective defense approach that applies to practical FL. In this work, we strive to narrow the divide between FL defense and its practical use. We first present a general framework to comprehend the effect of poisoning attacks in FL when the training data is not independent and identically distributed (non-IID). We then HeteroFL, a novel FL scheme that incorporates four complementary defensive strategies. These tactics are implemented in succession to refine the aggregated model toward approaching the global optimum. Ultimately, we devise an adaptive attack specifically for HeteroFL, aimed at offering a more thorough evaluation of its robustness. Our extensive experiments over heterogeneous datasets and models show that HeteroFL surpasses all state-of-the-art defenses in thwarting various poisoning attacks, i.e., HeteroFL achieves global model accuracies comparable to the baseline, whereas other defenses suffer a significant accuracy reduction ranging from 34% to 79%.
- 31 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 5405-5418
Open AccessDepriving the Survival Space of Adversaries Against Poisoned Gradients in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) allows clients at the edge to learn a shared global model without disclosing their private data. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks, wherein an adversary injects tainted local models that ultimately corrupt the global model. Despite various defensive mechanisms having been developed to combat poisoning attacks, they all fall short of securing practical FL scenarios with heterogeneous and unbalanced data distribution. Moreover, the cutting-edge defenses currently at our disposal demand access to a proprietary dataset that closely mirrors the distribution of clients’ data, which runs counter to the fundamental principle of privacy protection in FL. It is still challenging to devise an effective defense approach that applies to practical FL. In this work, we strive to narrow the divide between FL defense and its practical use. We first present a general framework to comprehend the effect of poisoning attacks in FL when the training data is not independent and identically distributed (non-IID). We then HeteroFL, a novel FL scheme that incorporates four complementary defensive strategies. These tactics are implemented in succession to refine the aggregated model toward approaching the global optimum. Ultimately, we devise an adaptive attack specifically for HeteroFL, aimed at offering a more thorough evaluation of its robustness. Our extensive experiments over heterogeneous datasets and models show that HeteroFL surpasses all state-of-the-art defenses in thwarting various poisoning attacks, i.e., HeteroFL achieves global model accuracies comparable to the baseline, whereas other defenses suffer a significant accuracy reduction ranging from 34% to 79%.
- Open Access
- 26 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7394-7402
A Four-Pronged Defense Against Byzantine Attacks in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is a nascent distributed learning paradigm to train a shared global model without violating users' privacy. FL has been shown to be vulnerable to various Byzantine attacks, where malicious participants could independently or collusively upload well-crafted updates to deteriorate the performance of the global model. However, existing defenses could only mitigate part of Byzantine attacks, without providing an all-sided shield for FL. It is difficult to simply combine them as they rely on totally contradictory assumptions. In this paper, we propose FPD, a four-pronged defense against both non-colluding and colluding Byzantine attacks. Our main idea is to utilize absolute similarity to filter updates rather than relative similarity used in existingI works. To this end, we first propose a reliable client selection strategy to prevent the majority of threats in the bud. Then we design a simple but effective score-based detection method to mitigate colluding attacks. Third, we construct an enhanced spectral-based outlier detector to accurately discard abnormal updates when the training data is not independent and identically distributed (non-IID). Finally, we design update denoising to rectify the direction of the slightly noisy but harmful updates. The four sequentially combined modules can effectively reconcile the contradiction in addressing non-colluding and colluding Byzantine attacks. Extensive experiments over three benchmark image classification datasets against four state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks demonstrate that FPD drastically outperforms existing defenses in IID and non-IID scenarios (with 30% improvement on model accuracy).
- 26 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 7394-7402
Open AccessA Four-Pronged Defense Against Byzantine Attacks in Federated Learning
Federated learning (FL) is a nascent distributed learning paradigm to train a shared global model without violating users' privacy. FL has been shown to be vulnerable to various Byzantine attacks, where malicious participants could independently or collusively upload well-crafted updates to deteriorate the performance of the global model. However, existing defenses could only mitigate part of Byzantine attacks, without providing an all-sided shield for FL. It is difficult to simply combine them as they rely on totally contradictory assumptions. In this paper, we propose FPD, a four-pronged defense against both non-colluding and colluding Byzantine attacks. Our main idea is to utilize absolute similarity to filter updates rather than relative similarity used in existingI works. To this end, we first propose a reliable client selection strategy to prevent the majority of threats in the bud. Then we design a simple but effective score-based detection method to mitigate colluding attacks. Third, we construct an enhanced spectral-based outlier detector to accurately discard abnormal updates when the training data is not independent and identically distributed (non-IID). Finally, we design update denoising to rectify the direction of the slightly noisy but harmful updates. The four sequentially combined modules can effectively reconcile the contradiction in addressing non-colluding and colluding Byzantine attacks. Extensive experiments over three benchmark image classification datasets against four state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks demonstrate that FPD drastically outperforms existing defenses in IID and non-IID scenarios (with 30% improvement on model accuracy).