Kenneth Hendricks
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Kenneth Hendricks has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guofu Tan
University of Southern California
1 shared publication - R. Preston McAfee
Humanities & Social Sciences California Institute of Technology Pasadena, CA 91125
1 shared publication - Robert Porter
Northwestern University; r‐
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 5 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 1018-1041
Bidding rings and the winner's curse
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price. In the latter case, collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers, it also gives buyers a chance to pool their information prior to trade and make an efficient investment decision. However, full efficiency may not be compatible with information revelation. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes, leading to inefficient trade. This result provides a possible explanation for the low incidence of joint bidding, especially on marginal tracts, in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions.
- 5 December 2008
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 39 (4) , 1018-1041
Bidding rings and the winner's curse
This article extends the theory of legal cartels to affiliated private value and common value environments. We show that efficient collusion is always possible in private value environments, but may not be in common value environments with a binding reserve price. In the latter case, collusion does more than simply transfer rents from the seller to the buyers, it also gives buyers a chance to pool their information prior to trade and make an efficient investment decision. However, full efficiency may not be compatible with information revelation. Buyers with high signals may be better off if no one colludes, leading to inefficient trade. This result provides a possible explanation for the low incidence of joint bidding, especially on marginal tracts, in U.S. federal government offshore oil and gas lease auctions.
- 27 April 2006
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 15 (2) , 431-456
Feints
In both economic and military situations, agents may try to mislead rivals about their true types or plans, whatever they may be. We consider a simple model in which one player attacks and the other player defends. We show that such environments have two types of possible equilibrium behavior, depending upon the signaling technology. If the signal is not very revealing about the attacker's plans, then the attacker always invests more resources in attack than in misdirection. If the technology is revealing, then the attacker does not always feint, but when he feints, he invests more than half of his resources into misdirection. Comparative statics also depend on whether the technology is revealing. “Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible.”—General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson “Create havoc in the east and strike in the west.”—Sun Tze
- 27 April 2006
- Published by Wiley in Journal of Economics & Management Strategy
- Vol. 15 (2) , 431-456
Feints
In both economic and military situations, agents may try to mislead rivals about their true types or plans, whatever they may be. We consider a simple model in which one player attacks and the other player defends. We show that such environments have two types of possible equilibrium behavior, depending upon the signaling technology. If the signal is not very revealing about the attacker's plans, then the attacker always invests more resources in attack than in misdirection. If the technology is revealing, then the attacker does not always feint, but when he feints, he invests more than half of his resources into misdirection. Comparative statics also depend on whether the technology is revealing. “Always mystify, mislead and surprise the enemy, if possible.”—General Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson “Create havoc in the east and strike in the west.”—Sun Tze