Mingming Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Mingming Wang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Qianhong Wu
Beihang University
3 shared publications - Bo Qin
Renmin University of China
1 shared publication - Fuyang Deng
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Mingzhe Zhai
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Robert Huijie Deng
Singapore Management University, Singapore, Singapore
1 shared publication - Xiaopeng Dai
School of Cyber Science and Technology, Beihang University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 3197-3211
Txtail: A Practical Transaction Relay Incentive Scheme for Bitcoin
Transaction propagation delay limits the block interval and is one of the main bottlenecks in improving Bitcoin throughput. However, transaction relay in Bitcoin is entirely voluntary, which results in low bandwidth and high transaction propagation delay. Improving relay motivation by introducing incentives can effectively reduce delay, but it still faces challenges such as Sybil attacks during reward allocation, leakage of network layer privacy, and high on-chain/off-chain overhead. Therefore, this paper proposes Txtail, a practical transaction relay incentive scheme for Bitcoin, based on continuously attaching relay evidence representing the relays’ identity and contribution during transaction propagation. We employ a free pricing mechanism based on the game between relays to allocate rewards fairly. We design an order-insensitive relay evidence structure based on aggregate signatures and public key mapping, which reduces off-chain data overhead while alleviating the leakage of relay paths by obfuscating the relay order. We construct a verifiable lottery mechanism based on Merkle tree commitments to reduce the data that needs to be uploaded to the chain. Both theoretical and experimental results show that Txtail reduces the per-hop off-chain overhead and the overall on-chain overhead by 96.6% and 79.8%, respectively, compared with state-of-the-art baselines, while remaining practical for deployment.
- 18 March 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 21 (15566013) , 3197-3211
Txtail: A Practical Transaction Relay Incentive Scheme for Bitcoin
Transaction propagation delay limits the block interval and is one of the main bottlenecks in improving Bitcoin throughput. However, transaction relay in Bitcoin is entirely voluntary, which results in low bandwidth and high transaction propagation delay. Improving relay motivation by introducing incentives can effectively reduce delay, but it still faces challenges such as Sybil attacks during reward allocation, leakage of network layer privacy, and high on-chain/off-chain overhead. Therefore, this paper proposes Txtail, a practical transaction relay incentive scheme for Bitcoin, based on continuously attaching relay evidence representing the relays’ identity and contribution during transaction propagation. We employ a free pricing mechanism based on the game between relays to allocate rewards fairly. We design an order-insensitive relay evidence structure based on aggregate signatures and public key mapping, which reduces off-chain data overhead while alleviating the leakage of relay paths by obfuscating the relay order. We construct a verifiable lottery mechanism based on Merkle tree commitments to reduce the data that needs to be uploaded to the chain. Both theoretical and experimental results show that Txtail reduces the per-hop off-chain overhead and the overall on-chain overhead by 96.6% and 79.8%, respectively, compared with state-of-the-art baselines, while remaining practical for deployment.
- 16 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Standards & Interfaces
- Vol. 89
Fast intensive validation on blockchain with scale-out dispute resolution
- 16 December 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Computer Standards & Interfaces
- Vol. 89
Fast intensive validation on blockchain with scale-out dispute resolution
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 440-461
Lever: Making Intensive Validation Practical on Blockchain
- 8 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 440-461
Lever: Making Intensive Validation Practical on Blockchain