Hoda Heidari
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Hoda Heidari has a total of 25 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ameet Talwalkar
Carnegie Mellon University, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania, USA
3 shared publications - Valerie Chen
Carnegie Mellon University
3 shared publications - Jana Schaich Borg
Duke University
2 shared publications - Jon Kleinberg
Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
2 shared publications - Karen Levy
Cornell University, Ithaca, USA
2 shared publications - Keegan Harris
Carnegie Mellon University
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Toward Third-Party Assurance of AI Systems: Design Requirements, Prototype, and Early Testing
As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems proliferate, the need for systematic, transparent, and actionable processes for evaluating them is growing. While many resources exist to support AI evaluation, they have several limitations. Few address both the process of designing, developing, and deploying an AI system and the outcomes it produces. Furthermore, few are end-to-end and operational, give actionable guidance, or present evidence of usability or effectiveness in practice. In this paper, we introduce a third-party AI assurance framework that addresses these gaps. We focus on third-party assurance to prevent conflict of interest and ensure credibility and accountability of the process. We begin by distinguishing assurance from audits in several key dimensions. Then, following design principles, we reflect on the shortcomings of existing resources to identify a set of design requirements for AI assurance. We then construct a prototype of an assurance process that consists of (1) a responsibility assignment matrix to determine the different levels of involvement each stakeholder has at each stage of the AI lifecycle, (2) an interview protocol for each stakeholder of an AI system, (3) a maturity matrix to assess AI systems' adherence to best practices, and (4) a template for an assurance report that draws from more mature assurance practices in business accounting. We conduct early validation of our AI assurance framework by applying the framework to two distinct AI use cases -- a business document tagging tool for downstream processing in a large private firm, and a housing resource allocation tool in a public agency -- and conducting expert validation interviews. Our findings show early evidence that our AI assurance framework is sound and comprehensive, usable across different organizational contexts, and effective at identifying bespoke issues with AI systems.
Open AccessToward Third-Party Assurance of AI Systems: Design Requirements, Prototype, and Early Testing
As Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems proliferate, the need for systematic, transparent, and actionable processes for evaluating them is growing. While many resources exist to support AI evaluation, they have several limitations. Few address both the process of designing, developing, and deploying an AI system and the outcomes it produces. Furthermore, few are end-to-end and operational, give actionable guidance, or present evidence of usability or effectiveness in practice. In this paper, we introduce a third-party AI assurance framework that addresses these gaps. We focus on third-party assurance to prevent conflict of interest and ensure credibility and accountability of the process. We begin by distinguishing assurance from audits in several key dimensions. Then, following design principles, we reflect on the shortcomings of existing resources to identify a set of design requirements for AI assurance. We then construct a prototype of an assurance process that consists of (1) a responsibility assignment matrix to determine the different levels of involvement each stakeholder has at each stage of the AI lifecycle, (2) an interview protocol for each stakeholder of an AI system, (3) a maturity matrix to assess AI systems' adherence to best practices, and (4) a template for an assurance report that draws from more mature assurance practices in business accounting. We conduct early validation of our AI assurance framework by applying the framework to two distinct AI use cases -- a business document tagging tool for downstream processing in a large private firm, and a housing resource allocation tool in a public agency -- and conducting expert validation interviews. Our findings show early evidence that our AI assurance framework is sound and comprehensive, usable across different organizational contexts, and effective at identifying bespoke issues with AI systems.
- Open Access
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 8 (3) , 2772-2784
Why Do Decision Makers (Not) Use AI? A Cross-Domain Analysis of Factors Impacting AI Adoption
Growing excitement around deploying AI across various domains calls for a careful assessment of how human decision-makers interact with AI-powered systems. In particular, it is essential to understand when decision-makers voluntarily choose to consult AI tools, which we term decision-maker adoption. We interviewed experts across four domains—medicine, law, journalism, and the public sector—to explore current AI use cases and perceptions of adoption. From these interviews, we identify key factors that shape decision-maker adoption of AI tools: the decision-maker's background, perceptions of the AI, consequences for the decision-maker, and perceived implications for other stakeholders. We translate these factors into an AI adoption sheet to analyze how decision-makers approach adoption choices through comparative, cross-domain case studies, highlighting how our factors help explain inter-domain differences in adoption. Our findings offer practical guidance for supporting the responsible and context-aware deployment of AI by better accounting for the decision-maker's perspective.
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 8 (3) , 2772-2784
Open AccessWhy Do Decision Makers (Not) Use AI? A Cross-Domain Analysis of Factors Impacting AI Adoption
Growing excitement around deploying AI across various domains calls for a careful assessment of how human decision-makers interact with AI-powered systems. In particular, it is essential to understand when decision-makers voluntarily choose to consult AI tools, which we term decision-maker adoption. We interviewed experts across four domains—medicine, law, journalism, and the public sector—to explore current AI use cases and perceptions of adoption. From these interviews, we identify key factors that shape decision-maker adoption of AI tools: the decision-maker's background, perceptions of the AI, consequences for the decision-maker, and perceived implications for other stakeholders. We translate these factors into an AI adoption sheet to analyze how decision-makers approach adoption choices through comparative, cross-domain case studies, highlighting how our factors help explain inter-domain differences in adoption. Our findings offer practical guidance for supporting the responsible and context-aware deployment of AI by better accounting for the decision-maker's perspective.
- Open Access
Why Do Decision Makers (Not) Use AI? A Cross-Domain Analysis of Factors Impacting AI Adoption
Growing excitement around deploying AI across various domains calls for a careful assessment of how human decision-makers interact with AI-powered systems. In particular, it is essential to understand when decision-makers voluntarily choose to consult AI tools, which we term decision-maker adoption. We interviewed experts across four domains -- medicine, law, journalism, and the public sector -- to explore current AI use cases and perceptions of adoption. From these interviews, we identify key factors that shape decision-maker adoption of AI tools: the decision-maker's background, perceptions of the AI, consequences for the decision-maker, and perceived implications for other stakeholders. We translate these factors into an AI adoption sheet to analyze how decision-makers approach adoption choices through comparative, cross-domain case studies, highlighting how our factors help explain inter-domain differences in adoption. Our findings offer practical guidance for supporting the responsible and context-aware deployment of AI by better accounting for the decision-maker's perspective.
Open AccessWhy Do Decision Makers (Not) Use AI? A Cross-Domain Analysis of Factors Impacting AI Adoption
Growing excitement around deploying AI across various domains calls for a careful assessment of how human decision-makers interact with AI-powered systems. In particular, it is essential to understand when decision-makers voluntarily choose to consult AI tools, which we term decision-maker adoption. We interviewed experts across four domains -- medicine, law, journalism, and the public sector -- to explore current AI use cases and perceptions of adoption. From these interviews, we identify key factors that shape decision-maker adoption of AI tools: the decision-maker's background, perceptions of the AI, consequences for the decision-maker, and perceived implications for other stakeholders. We translate these factors into an AI adoption sheet to analyze how decision-makers approach adoption choices through comparative, cross-domain case studies, highlighting how our factors help explain inter-domain differences in adoption. Our findings offer practical guidance for supporting the responsible and context-aware deployment of AI by better accounting for the decision-maker's perspective.
- Open Access
Designing Algorithmic Delegates: The Role of Indistinguishability in Human-AI Handoff
As AI technologies improve, people are increasingly willing to delegate tasks to AI agents. In many cases, the human decision-maker chooses whether to delegate to an AI agent based on properties of the specific instance of the decision-making problem they are facing. Since humans typically lack full awareness of all the factors relevant to this choice for a given decision-making instance, they perform a kind of categorization by treating indistinguishable instances -- those that have the same observable features -- as the same. In this paper, we define the problem of designing the optimal algorithmic delegate in the presence of categories. This is an important dimension in the design of algorithms to work with humans, since we show that the optimal delegate can be an arbitrarily better teammate than the optimal standalone algorithmic agent. The solution to this optimal delegation problem is not obvious: we discover that this problem is fundamentally combinatorial, and illustrate the complex relationship between the optimal design and the properties of the decision-making task even in simple settings. Indeed, we show that finding the optimal delegate is computationally hard in general. However, we are able to find efficient algorithms for producing the optimal delegate in several broad cases of the problem, including when the optimal action may be decomposed into functions of features observed by the human and the algorithm. Finally, we run computational experiments to simulate a designer updating an algorithmic delegate over time to be optimized for when it is actually adopted by users, and show that while this process does not recover the optimal delegate in general, the resulting delegate often performs quite well.
Open AccessDesigning Algorithmic Delegates: The Role of Indistinguishability in Human-AI Handoff
As AI technologies improve, people are increasingly willing to delegate tasks to AI agents. In many cases, the human decision-maker chooses whether to delegate to an AI agent based on properties of the specific instance of the decision-making problem they are facing. Since humans typically lack full awareness of all the factors relevant to this choice for a given decision-making instance, they perform a kind of categorization by treating indistinguishable instances -- those that have the same observable features -- as the same. In this paper, we define the problem of designing the optimal algorithmic delegate in the presence of categories. This is an important dimension in the design of algorithms to work with humans, since we show that the optimal delegate can be an arbitrarily better teammate than the optimal standalone algorithmic agent. The solution to this optimal delegation problem is not obvious: we discover that this problem is fundamentally combinatorial, and illustrate the complex relationship between the optimal design and the properties of the decision-making task even in simple settings. Indeed, we show that finding the optimal delegate is computationally hard in general. However, we are able to find efficient algorithms for producing the optimal delegate in several broad cases of the problem, including when the optimal action may be decomposed into functions of features observed by the human and the algorithm. Finally, we run computational experiments to simulate a designer updating an algorithmic delegate over time to be optimized for when it is actually adopted by users, and show that while this process does not recover the optimal delegate in general, the resulting delegate often performs quite well.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 156-167
On The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods
Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants’ responses are stable over time such that, all other things being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants’ true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don’t track. If participants’ moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants’ true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) controversial and uncontroversial repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios (i.e., were unstable) was around 10-18% (±14-15%) across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of common moral preference elicitation methods, highlighting the role of response instability in potentially causing value misalignment between the stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 156-167
Open AccessOn The Stability of Moral Preferences: A Problem with Computational Elicitation Methods
Preference elicitation frameworks feature heavily in the research on participatory ethical AI tools and provide a viable mechanism to enquire and incorporate the moral values of various stakeholders. As part of the elicitation process, surveys about moral preferences, opinions, and judgments are typically administered only once to each participant. This methodological practice is reasonable if participants’ responses are stable over time such that, all other things being held constant, their responses today will be the same as their responses to the same questions at a later time. However, we do not know how often that is the case. It is possible that participants’ true moral preferences change, are subject to temporary moods or whims, or are influenced by environmental factors we don’t track. If participants’ moral responses are unstable in such ways, it would raise important methodological and theoretical issues for how participants’ true moral preferences, opinions, and judgments can be ascertained. We address this possibility here by asking the same survey participants the same moral questions about which patient should receive a kidney when only one is available ten times in ten different sessions over two weeks, varying only presentation order across sessions. We measured how often participants gave different responses to simple (Study One) and more complicated (Study Two) controversial and uncontroversial repeated scenarios. On average, the fraction of times participants changed their responses to controversial scenarios (i.e., were unstable) was around 10-18% (±14-15%) across studies, and this instability is observed to have positive associations with response time and decision-making difficulty. We discuss the implications of these results for the efficacy of common moral preference elicitation methods, highlighting the role of response instability in potentially causing value misalignment between the stakeholders and AI tools trained on their moral judgments.
- Open Access
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 711-723
On the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation
Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people’s preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct queries (framed as comparisons between context-specific cases) that are likely to be most informative about an agent’s underlying preferences. In this work, we argue that the use of active learning for moral preference elicitation relies on certain assumptions about the underlying moral preferences, which can be violated in practice. Specifically, we highlight the following common assumptions (a) preferences are stable over time and not sensitive to the sequence of presented queries, (b) the appropriate hypothesis class is chosen to model moral preferences, and (c) noise in the agent’s responses is limited. While these assumptions can be appropriate for preference elicitation in certain domains, prior research on moral psychology suggests they may not be valid for moral judgments. Through a synthetic simulation of preferences that violate the above assumptions, we observe that active learning can have similar or worse performance than a basic random query selection method in certain settings. Yet, simulation results also demonstrate that active learning can still be viable if the degree of instability or noise is relatively small and when the agent’s preferences can be approximately represented with the hypothesis class used for learning. Our study highlights the nuances associated with effective moral preference elicitation in practice and advocates for the cautious use of active learning as a methodology to learn moral preferences.
- 16 October 2024
- Published by Association for the Advancement of Artificial Intelligence (AAAI) in Proceedings of the AAAI/ACM Conference on AI, Ethics, and Society
- Vol. 7, 711-723
Open AccessOn the Pros and Cons of Active Learning for Moral Preference Elicitation
Computational preference elicitation methods are tools used to learn people’s preferences quantitatively in a given context. Recent works on preference elicitation advocate for active learning as an efficient method to iteratively construct queries (framed as comparisons between context-specific cases) that are likely to be most informative about an agent’s underlying preferences. In this work, we argue that the use of active learning for moral preference elicitation relies on certain assumptions about the underlying moral preferences, which can be violated in practice. Specifically, we highlight the following common assumptions (a) preferences are stable over time and not sensitive to the sequence of presented queries, (b) the appropriate hypothesis class is chosen to model moral preferences, and (c) noise in the agent’s responses is limited. While these assumptions can be appropriate for preference elicitation in certain domains, prior research on moral psychology suggests they may not be valid for moral judgments. Through a synthetic simulation of preferences that violate the above assumptions, we observe that active learning can have similar or worse performance than a basic random query selection method in certain settings. Yet, simulation results also demonstrate that active learning can still be viable if the degree of instability or noise is relatively small and when the agent’s preferences can be approximately represented with the hypothesis class used for learning. Our study highlights the nuances associated with effective moral preference elicitation in practice and advocates for the cautious use of active learning as a methodology to learn moral preferences.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (3) , 557-580
Fair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions
This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Economics and Philosophy
- Vol. 40 (3) , 557-580
Open AccessFair equality of chances for prediction-based decisions
This article presents a fairness principle for evaluating decision-making based on predictions: a decision rule is unfair when the individuals directly impacted by the decisions who are equal with respect to the features that justify inequalities in outcomes do not have the same statistical prospects of being benefited or harmed by them, irrespective of their socially salient morally arbitrary traits. The principle can be used to evaluate prediction-based decision-making from the point of view of a wide range of antecedently specified substantive views about justice in outcome distributions.
- Open Access
Informational Diversity and Affinity Bias in Team Growth Dynamics
Prior work has provided strong evidence that, within organizational settings, teams that bring a diversity of information and perspectives to a task are more effective than teams that do not. If this form of informational diversity confers performance advantages, why do we often see largely homogeneous teams in practice? One canonical argument is that the benefits of informational diversity are in tension with affinity bias. To better understand the impact of this tension on the makeup of teams, we analyze a sequential model of team formation in which individuals care about their team's performance (captured in terms of accurately predicting some future outcome based on a set of features) but experience a cost as a result of interacting with teammates who use different approaches to the prediction task. Our analysis of this simple model reveals a set of subtle behaviors that team-growth dynamics can exhibit: (i) from certain initial team compositions, they can make progress toward better performance but then get stuck partway to optimally diverse teams; while (ii) from other initial compositions, they can also move away from this optimal balance as the majority group tries to crowd out the opinions of the minority. The initial composition of the team can determine whether the dynamics will move toward or away from performance optimality, painting a path-dependent picture of inefficiencies in team compositions. Our results formalize a fundamental limitation of utility-based motivations to drive informational diversity in organizations and hint at interventions that may improve informational diversity and performance simultaneously.
Open AccessInformational Diversity and Affinity Bias in Team Growth Dynamics
Prior work has provided strong evidence that, within organizational settings, teams that bring a diversity of information and perspectives to a task are more effective than teams that do not. If this form of informational diversity confers performance advantages, why do we often see largely homogeneous teams in practice? One canonical argument is that the benefits of informational diversity are in tension with affinity bias. To better understand the impact of this tension on the makeup of teams, we analyze a sequential model of team formation in which individuals care about their team's performance (captured in terms of accurately predicting some future outcome based on a set of features) but experience a cost as a result of interacting with teammates who use different approaches to the prediction task. Our analysis of this simple model reveals a set of subtle behaviors that team-growth dynamics can exhibit: (i) from certain initial team compositions, they can make progress toward better performance but then get stuck partway to optimally diverse teams; while (ii) from other initial compositions, they can also move away from this optimal balance as the majority group tries to crowd out the opinions of the minority. The initial composition of the team can determine whether the dynamics will move toward or away from performance optimality, painting a path-dependent picture of inefficiencies in team compositions. Our results formalize a fundamental limitation of utility-based motivations to drive informational diversity in organizations and hint at interventions that may improve informational diversity and performance simultaneously.
- Open Access
Bayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker's problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely-many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.
Open AccessBayesian Persuasion for Algorithmic Recourse
When subjected to automated decision-making, decision subjects may strategically modify their observable features in ways they believe will maximize their chances of receiving a favorable decision. In many practical situations, the underlying assessment rule is deliberately kept secret to avoid gaming and maintain competitive advantage. The resulting opacity forces the decision subjects to rely on incomplete information when making strategic feature modifications. We capture such settings as a game of Bayesian persuasion, in which the decision maker offers a form of recourse to the decision subject by providing them with an action recommendation (or signal) to incentivize them to modify their features in desirable ways. We show that when using persuasion, the decision maker and decision subject are never worse off in expectation, while the decision maker can be significantly better off. While the decision maker's problem of finding the optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible (BIC) signaling policy takes the form of optimization over infinitely-many variables, we show that this optimization can be cast as a linear program over finitely-many regions of the space of possible assessment rules. While this reformulation simplifies the problem dramatically, solving the linear program requires reasoning about exponentially-many variables, even in relatively simple cases. Motivated by this observation, we provide a polynomial-time approximation scheme that recovers a near-optimal signaling policy. Finally, our numerical simulations on semi-synthetic data empirically demonstrate the benefits of using persuasion in the algorithmic recourse setting.
- Open Access
Stateful Strategic Regression
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decision-subjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple time-steps. In particular, we consider settings in which the agent's effort investment today can accumulate over time in the form of an internal state - impacting both his future rewards and that of the principal. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting game and provide novel algorithms for computing it. Our analysis reveals several intriguing insights about the role of multiple interactions in shaping the game's outcome: First, we establish that in our stateful setting, the class of all linear assessment policies remains as powerful as the larger class of all monotonic assessment policies. While recovering the principal's optimal policy requires solving a non-convex optimization problem, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for recovering both the principal and agent's optimal policies under common assumptions about the process by which effort investments convert to observable features. Most importantly, we show that with multiple rounds of interaction at her disposal, the principal is more effective at incentivizing the agent to accumulate effort in her desired direction. Our work addresses several critical gaps in the growing literature on the societal impacts of automated decision-making - by focusing on longer time horizons and accounting for the compounding nature of decisions individuals receive over time.
Open AccessStateful Strategic Regression
Automated decision-making tools increasingly assess individuals to determine if they qualify for high-stakes opportunities. A recent line of research investigates how strategic agents may respond to such scoring tools to receive favorable assessments. While prior work has focused on the short-term strategic interactions between a decision-making institution (modeled as a principal) and individual decision-subjects (modeled as agents), we investigate interactions spanning multiple time-steps. In particular, we consider settings in which the agent's effort investment today can accumulate over time in the form of an internal state - impacting both his future rewards and that of the principal. We characterize the Stackelberg equilibrium of the resulting game and provide novel algorithms for computing it. Our analysis reveals several intriguing insights about the role of multiple interactions in shaping the game's outcome: First, we establish that in our stateful setting, the class of all linear assessment policies remains as powerful as the larger class of all monotonic assessment policies. While recovering the principal's optimal policy requires solving a non-convex optimization problem, we provide polynomial-time algorithms for recovering both the principal and agent's optimal policies under common assumptions about the process by which effort investments convert to observable features. Most importantly, we show that with multiple rounds of interaction at her disposal, the principal is more effective at incentivizing the agent to accumulate effort in her desired direction. Our work addresses several critical gaps in the growing literature on the societal impacts of automated decision-making - by focusing on longer time horizons and accounting for the compounding nature of decisions individuals receive over time.