Kaiwei Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Kaiwei Zhang has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Jiyuan Nai1 shared publication
- Junjie Zhong1 shared publication
- Lei Jiang
Center for Bioengineering and Biotechnology, College of Chemical Engineering, China University of Petroleum (East China), Qingdao 266580, China
1 shared publication - Meng Wang1 shared publication
- Shoudu Zhang
Marine Science Research Institute of Shandong Province (National Oceanographic Center, Qingdao), Qingdao 266104, China
1 shared publication - Xi Weng
Guanghua School of Management, Peking University, Beijing 100871, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
Optimal Pricing Schemes in the Presence of Social Learning and Costly Reporting
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly for agents to report utility; hence the platform has to design both the prices and the reporting bonus to motivate the agents to explore and generate new information. By allowing sellers to set bonuses, we are essentially enabling them to dynamically control the supply of learning signals without significantly affecting the demand for the product. We characterize the optimal bonus and pricing schemes offered by the profit-maximizing platform. It turns out that the optimal scheme falls into one of four types: Full Coverage, Partial Coverage, Immediate Revelation, and Non-Bonus. In a model of exponential bandit, we find that there is a dynamical switch of the types along the learning trajectory. Although learning stops efficiently, information is revealed too slowly compared with the planner's optimal solution.
Open AccessOptimal Pricing Schemes in the Presence of Social Learning and Costly Reporting
A monopoly platform sells either a risky product (with unknown utility) or a safe product (with known utility) to agents who sequentially arrive and learn the utility of the risky product by the reporting of previous agents. It is costly for agents to report utility; hence the platform has to design both the prices and the reporting bonus to motivate the agents to explore and generate new information. By allowing sellers to set bonuses, we are essentially enabling them to dynamically control the supply of learning signals without significantly affecting the demand for the product. We characterize the optimal bonus and pricing schemes offered by the profit-maximizing platform. It turns out that the optimal scheme falls into one of four types: Full Coverage, Partial Coverage, Immediate Revelation, and Non-Bonus. In a model of exponential bandit, we find that there is a dynamical switch of the types along the learning trajectory. Although learning stops efficiently, information is revealed too slowly compared with the planner's optimal solution.
- Open Access
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Science: Advanced Materials and Devices
- Vol. 8 (4)
Phenol red hydrogel as pH indicator with protection against nanoceria degradation
- 7 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Science: Advanced Materials and Devices
- Vol. 8 (4)
Open AccessPhenol red hydrogel as pH indicator with protection against nanoceria degradation