Ram Dantu
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ram Dantu has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Kirill Morozov
Department of Computer Science and Engineering, University of North Texas, USA
2 shared publications - Apurba Pokharel
Computer Science and Engineering, University of North Texas, Denton, TX, USA
1 shared publication - Duminda Wijesekera
George Mason University
1 shared publication - Garima Bajwa
Department of Computer Science, Lakehead University, Thunder Bay, ON P7B 5E1, Canada
1 shared publication Hemant Sengar
George Mason University, USA
1 shared publicationJosh Talkington
University of North Texas,Department of Computer Science and Engineering
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-11
Bringing Life to 3D Human Avatars: Integrating Motion and Texture in Real-Time
- 7 September 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-11
Open AccessBringing Life to 3D Human Avatars: Integrating Motion and Texture in Real-Time
- Open Access
- 21 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-34
Proof of Review: Trust Me, It's Been Reviewed
We present a novel consensus model called Proof of Review (PoRev) which uses reputation, evaluation of reviews/assessments, blacklisting, and minimum reputation to come to an agreement on a block of transactions, while securing the data on the blockchain. PoRev is a tool that can be used to aid applications by ensuring honest and unbiased reviews and assessments. The motivation to develop this type of consensus lies in applications to decentralized marketplaces, micro-accreditation, autonomous vehicles infrastructures and other community-based blockchain systems. Our proposed architecture is based on the Algorand platform whose engine we modified to fit our purposes. The reviews and evaluations are stored on the blockchain, driving the reputation model, where the latter is used to regulate users’ participation in the system—similarly to the Proof of Reputation systems. This regulation is also aided by the blacklisting and minimum-reputation components which we introduce to deny the malicious and uncooperative parties control over the system. Our simulation results showed that the proposed blockchain system maintains liveliness and completeness, even in the presence of the blacklisting and minimum-reputation requirements, when they are properly tuned.
- 21 July 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 23-34
Open AccessProof of Review: Trust Me, It's Been Reviewed
We present a novel consensus model called Proof of Review (PoRev) which uses reputation, evaluation of reviews/assessments, blacklisting, and minimum reputation to come to an agreement on a block of transactions, while securing the data on the blockchain. PoRev is a tool that can be used to aid applications by ensuring honest and unbiased reviews and assessments. The motivation to develop this type of consensus lies in applications to decentralized marketplaces, micro-accreditation, autonomous vehicles infrastructures and other community-based blockchain systems. Our proposed architecture is based on the Algorand platform whose engine we modified to fit our purposes. The reviews and evaluations are stored on the blockchain, driving the reputation model, where the latter is used to regulate users’ participation in the system—similarly to the Proof of Reputation systems. This regulation is also aided by the blacklisting and minimum-reputation components which we introduce to deny the malicious and uncooperative parties control over the system. Our simulation results showed that the proposed blockchain system maintains liveliness and completeness, even in the presence of the blacklisting and minimum-reputation requirements, when they are properly tuned.
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 297, 1-12
Why Protocols Fail to Transition to Mobile Domains
Applying protocols to new settings for which they were not originally designed can result in failures and vulnerabilities. This problem becomes particularly severe when security protocols are concerned. As more and more novel technologies such as IoT are being put into practical use, the study of the above mentioned problems gains an increasing importance. This paper investigates the issues which arise when transitioning the OAuth protocol to the mobile phone setting. First, we informally discuss the issues arising during such transitioning. Then, we revist the formal analysis of the OAuth protocol presented by Fett et al. at ACM CCS 2017 [1], pinpointing the issues that may lead to vulnerabilities in the mobile scenario.
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE)
- Vol. 297, 1-12
Why Protocols Fail to Transition to Mobile Domains
Applying protocols to new settings for which they were not originally designed can result in failures and vulnerabilities. This problem becomes particularly severe when security protocols are concerned. As more and more novel technologies such as IoT are being put into practical use, the study of the above mentioned problems gains an increasing importance. This paper investigates the issues which arise when transitioning the OAuth protocol to the mobile phone setting. First, we informally discuss the issues arising during such transitioning. Then, we revist the formal analysis of the OAuth protocol presented by Fett et al. at ACM CCS 2017 [1], pinpointing the issues that may lead to vulnerabilities in the mobile scenario.
- Open Access
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 53-56
Context-aware multimedia encryption in mobile platforms
- 1 January 2014
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 53-56
Open AccessContext-aware multimedia encryption in mobile platforms
- 1 November 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Network
- Vol. 20 (6) , 32-41
SS7 over IP: signaling interworking vulnerabilities
Public telephony - the preferred choice for two-way voice communication over a long time - has enjoyed remarkable popularity for providing acceptable voice quality with negligible connection delays, perhaps due to its circuit-switched heritage. Recently, IP telephony, a packet-based telephone service that runs as an application over the IP protocol, has been gaining popularity. To provide seamless interconnectivity between these two competing services, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has designed a signaling interface commonly referred to as SIGTRAN. This seamless intersignaling provided by SIGTRAN facilitates any subscriber in one network to reach any other subscriber in the other network, passing through any heterogeneous maze of networks consisting of either of these. Unfortunately, the same intersignaling potentially can be exploited from either side to disrupt the services provided on the other side. We show how this can be done and propose a solution based on access control, signal screening, and detecting anomalous signaling. We argue that to be effective, the latter two should consider syntactic correctness, semantic validity of the signal content, and the appropriateness of a particular signal in the context of earlier exchanged messages
- 1 November 2006
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Network
- Vol. 20 (6) , 32-41
SS7 over IP: signaling interworking vulnerabilities
Public telephony - the preferred choice for two-way voice communication over a long time - has enjoyed remarkable popularity for providing acceptable voice quality with negligible connection delays, perhaps due to its circuit-switched heritage. Recently, IP telephony, a packet-based telephone service that runs as an application over the IP protocol, has been gaining popularity. To provide seamless interconnectivity between these two competing services, the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) has designed a signaling interface commonly referred to as SIGTRAN. This seamless intersignaling provided by SIGTRAN facilitates any subscriber in one network to reach any other subscriber in the other network, passing through any heterogeneous maze of networks consisting of either of these. Unfortunately, the same intersignaling potentially can be exploited from either side to disrupt the services provided on the other side. We show how this can be done and propose a solution based on access control, signal screening, and detecting anomalous signaling. We argue that to be effective, the latter two should consider syntactic correctness, semantic validity of the signal content, and the appropriateness of a particular signal in the context of earlier exchanged messages