Chao Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chao Wang has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zhiqiang Lin
The Ohio State University
6 shared publications - Yue Zhang
Shandong University
2 shared publications - Yuqing Yang
CISPA Helmholtz Center for Information Security, Saarbrücken, Germany
2 shared publications - Adam Doupé
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
1 shared publication - Haoling Zhou
The Ohio State University
1 shared publication - Hongkai Chen
Arizona State University, Tempe, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 230-253
Too Private to Tell: Practical Token Theft Attacks on Apple Intelligence
- 1 November 2026
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 230-253
Too Private to Tell: Practical Token Theft Attacks on Apple Intelligence
- Open Access
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
When LLM is the Kernel: Toward an Operating System for App-in-App AI Platforms
- 31 August 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-5
Open AccessWhen LLM is the Kernel: Toward an Operating System for App-in-App AI Platforms
- Open Access
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 111-126
Fragile Deliveries: Inconsistencies in Android Parcel and Their Security Consequences
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 111-126
Open AccessFragile Deliveries: Inconsistencies in Android Parcel and Their Security Consequences
- 23 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 23-33
The Rise of Miniapps: A New Frontier with Security Challenges in Mobile Apps
We examine mobile super apps that host third-party miniapps reusing platform services. Tracing their evolution to store-vetted runtimes, we develop taxonomies and threat models, identify security flaws and abuses, and propose guidance and research directions to strengthen super app ecosystems without harming usability.
- 23 January 2026
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Security & Privacy
- Vol. 24 (2) , 23-33
The Rise of Miniapps: A New Frontier with Security Challenges in Mobile Apps
We examine mobile super apps that host third-party miniapps reusing platform services. Tracing their evolution to store-vetted runtimes, we develop taxonomies and threat models, identify security flaws and abuses, and propose guidance and research directions to strengthen super app ecosystems without harming usability.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 830-842
RootFree Attacks: Exploiting Mobile Platform's Super Apps From Desktop
In recent years, there has been a surge in the popularity of mobile super apps, which consolidate a variety of services, including messaging, ride-hailing, and e-commerce, into a single application, eliminating the need to switch between different apps. Originally tailored for mobile usage, super apps like WeChat and WeCom have expanded their reach to desktop platforms, including Windows. However, different operating systems have different threat models (e.g., Windows can directly grant users with root privilege but Android and iOS do not). Therefore, the single super app (including both its host app and miniapps) can face completely different threats in different platforms. In this paper, we systematically study the attacks caused by the discrepancies from different platforms. Specifically, we show that there are at least two classes of attacks, dubbed RootFree attacks, against mobile super apps: layer below that attacks the super apps from privileged software, and layer up that attacks the super apps from the internal malicious miniapps. We have disclosed our attacks and the corresponding vulnerabilities to the host app vendor, and received bug bounties. These vulnerabilities all are ranked as high severity vulnerabilities, and some of them have already been patched.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 830-842
Open AccessRootFree Attacks: Exploiting Mobile Platform's Super Apps From Desktop
In recent years, there has been a surge in the popularity of mobile super apps, which consolidate a variety of services, including messaging, ride-hailing, and e-commerce, into a single application, eliminating the need to switch between different apps. Originally tailored for mobile usage, super apps like WeChat and WeCom have expanded their reach to desktop platforms, including Windows. However, different operating systems have different threat models (e.g., Windows can directly grant users with root privilege but Android and iOS do not). Therefore, the single super app (including both its host app and miniapps) can face completely different threats in different platforms. In this paper, we systematically study the attacks caused by the discrepancies from different platforms. Specifically, we show that there are at least two classes of attacks, dubbed RootFree attacks, against mobile super apps: layer below that attacks the super apps from privileged software, and layer up that attacks the super apps from the internal malicious miniapps. We have disclosed our attacks and the corresponding vulnerabilities to the host app vendor, and received bug bounties. These vulnerabilities all are ranked as high severity vulnerabilities, and some of them have already been patched.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2471-2485
Uncovering and Exploiting Hidden APIs in Mobile Super Apps
Mobile applications, particularly those from social media platforms such as WeChat and TikTok, are evolving into "super apps" that offer a wide range of services such as instant messaging and media sharing, e-commerce, e-learning, and e-government. These super apps often provide APIs for developers to create "miniapps" that run within the super app. These APIs should have been thoroughly scrutinized for security. Unfortunately, we find that many of them are undocumented and unsecured, potentially allowing miniapps to bypass restrictions and gain higher privileged access. To systematically identify these hidden APIs before they are exploited by attackers, we have developed a tool APIScope with both static analysis and dynamic analysis, where static analysis is used to recognize hidden undocumented APIs, and dynamic analysis is used to confirm whether the identified APIs can be invoked by an unprivileged 3rd-party miniapps. We have applied APIScope to five popular super apps (i.e., WeChat, WeCom, Baidu, QQ, and Tiktok) and found that all of them contain hidden APIs, many of which can be exploited due to missing security checks. We have also quantified the hidden APIs that may have security implications by verifying if they have access to resources protected by Android permissions. Furthermore, we demonstrate the potential security hazards by presenting various attack scenarios, including unauthorized access to any web pages, downloading and installing malicious software, and stealing sensitive information. We have reported our findings to the relevant vendors, some of whom have patched the vulnerabilities and rewarded us with bug bounties.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2471-2485
Open AccessUncovering and Exploiting Hidden APIs in Mobile Super Apps
Mobile applications, particularly those from social media platforms such as WeChat and TikTok, are evolving into "super apps" that offer a wide range of services such as instant messaging and media sharing, e-commerce, e-learning, and e-government. These super apps often provide APIs for developers to create "miniapps" that run within the super app. These APIs should have been thoroughly scrutinized for security. Unfortunately, we find that many of them are undocumented and unsecured, potentially allowing miniapps to bypass restrictions and gain higher privileged access. To systematically identify these hidden APIs before they are exploited by attackers, we have developed a tool APIScope with both static analysis and dynamic analysis, where static analysis is used to recognize hidden undocumented APIs, and dynamic analysis is used to confirm whether the identified APIs can be invoked by an unprivileged 3rd-party miniapps. We have applied APIScope to five popular super apps (i.e., WeChat, WeCom, Baidu, QQ, and Tiktok) and found that all of them contain hidden APIs, many of which can be exploited due to missing security checks. We have also quantified the hidden APIs that may have security implications by verifying if they have access to resources protected by Android permissions. Furthermore, we demonstrate the potential security hazards by presenting various attack scenarios, including unauthorized access to any web pages, downloading and installing malicious software, and stealing sensitive information. We have reported our findings to the relevant vendors, some of whom have patched the vulnerabilities and rewarded us with bug bounties.