Sourav Das
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Sourav Das has a total of 30 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ling Ren
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
8 shared publications - Atsuki Momose
University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, Urbana, IL, USA
2 shared publications - Julian Loss
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications - Renas Bacho
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications - Umesh Bellur
Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science and Engineering Department of Computer Science and Engineering University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign Indian Institute of Technology Delhi Indian Institute of Technology Delhi Indian Institute of Technology Bombay Indian Institute of Technology Bombay
2 shared publications - Victor Shoup
Category Labs, New York, USA
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1447-1461
BTX and SimpleBTE: Efficient Batched Threshold Encryption
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1447-1461
Open AccessBTX and SimpleBTE: Efficient Batched Threshold Encryption
- Open Access
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 478-488
Forget-IT: Optimal Good-Case Latency For Information-Theoretic BFT
- 6 July 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 478-488
Open AccessForget-IT: Optimal Good-Case Latency For Information-Theoretic BFT
- Open Access
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 390-422
Adaptively Secure Three-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH
- 17 August 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 390-422
Open AccessAdaptively Secure Three-Round Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 304-334
Glacius: Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH with Full Adaptive Security
- 28 April 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 304-334
Glacius: Threshold Schnorr Signatures from DDH with Full Adaptive Security
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3242-3256
Asynchronous Consensus without Trusted Setup or Public-Key Cryptography
Byzantine consensus is a fundamental building block in distributed cryptographic problems. Despite decades of research, most existing asynchronous consensus protocols require a strong trusted setup and expensive public-key cryptography. In this paper, we study asynchronous Byzantine consensus protocols that do not rely on a trusted setup and do not use public-key cryptography such as digital signatures. We give an Asynchronous Common Subset (ACS) protocol whose security is only based on cryptographic hash functions modeled as a random oracle. Our protocol has O(κn3) total communication and runs in expected O(1) rounds. The fact that we use only cryptographic hash functions also means that our protocol is post-quantum secure. The minimal use of cryptography and the small number of rounds make our protocol practical. We implement our protocol and evaluate it in a geo-distributed setting with up to 128 machines. Our experimental evaluation shows that our protocol is more efficient than the only other setup-free consensus protocol that has been implemented to date. En route to our asynchronous consensus protocols, we also introduce new primitives called asynchronous secret key sharing and cover gather, which may be of independent interest.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3242-3256
Open AccessAsynchronous Consensus without Trusted Setup or Public-Key Cryptography
Byzantine consensus is a fundamental building block in distributed cryptographic problems. Despite decades of research, most existing asynchronous consensus protocols require a strong trusted setup and expensive public-key cryptography. In this paper, we study asynchronous Byzantine consensus protocols that do not rely on a trusted setup and do not use public-key cryptography such as digital signatures. We give an Asynchronous Common Subset (ACS) protocol whose security is only based on cryptographic hash functions modeled as a random oracle. Our protocol has O(κn3) total communication and runs in expected O(1) rounds. The fact that we use only cryptographic hash functions also means that our protocol is post-quantum secure. The minimal use of cryptography and the small number of rounds make our protocol practical. We implement our protocol and evaluate it in a geo-distributed setting with up to 128 machines. Our experimental evaluation shows that our protocol is more efficient than the only other setup-free consensus protocol that has been implemented to date. En route to our asynchronous consensus protocols, we also introduce new primitives called asynchronous secret key sharing and cover gather, which may be of independent interest.
- 18 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 251-284
Adaptively Secure BLS Threshold Signatures from DDH and co-CDH
- 18 August 2024
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 251-284
Adaptively Secure BLS Threshold Signatures from DDH and co-CDH
- 27 November 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 91-120
Distributed-Prover Interactive Proofs
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2561-2575
On the Security of KZG Commitment for VSS
The constant-sized polynomial commitment scheme by Kate, Zaverucha, and Goldberg (Asiscrypt 2010), also known as the KZG commitment, is an essential component in designing bandwidth-efficient verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) protocols. We point out, however, that the KZG commitment is missing two important properties that are crucial for VSS protocols. First, the KZG commitment has not been proven to be degree binding in the standard adversary model without idealized group assumptions. In other words, the committed polynomial is not guaranteed to have the claimed degree, which is supposed to be the reconstruction threshold of VSS. Without this property, shareholders in VSS may end up reconstructing different secrets depending on which shares are used. Second, the KZG commitment does not support polynomials with different degrees at once with a single setup. If the reconstruction threshold of the underlying VSS protocol changes, the protocol must redo the setup, which involves an expensive multi-party computation known as the powers of tau setup. In this work, we augment the KZG commitment to address both of these limitations. Our scheme is degree-binding in the standard model under the strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption. It supports any degree 0 < d ≤ m under a powers-of-tau common reference string with m+ 1 group elements generated by a one-time setup.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2561-2575
Open AccessOn the Security of KZG Commitment for VSS
The constant-sized polynomial commitment scheme by Kate, Zaverucha, and Goldberg (Asiscrypt 2010), also known as the KZG commitment, is an essential component in designing bandwidth-efficient verifiable secret-sharing (VSS) protocols. We point out, however, that the KZG commitment is missing two important properties that are crucial for VSS protocols. First, the KZG commitment has not been proven to be degree binding in the standard adversary model without idealized group assumptions. In other words, the committed polynomial is not guaranteed to have the claimed degree, which is supposed to be the reconstruction threshold of VSS. Without this property, shareholders in VSS may end up reconstructing different secrets depending on which shares are used. Second, the KZG commitment does not support polynomials with different degrees at once with a single setup. If the reconstruction threshold of the underlying VSS protocol changes, the protocol must redo the setup, which involves an expensive multi-party computation known as the powers of tau setup. In this work, we augment the KZG commitment to address both of these limitations. Our scheme is degree-binding in the standard model under the strong Diffie-Hellman (SDH) assumption. It supports any degree 0 < d ≤ m under a powers-of-tau common reference string with m+ 1 group elements generated by a one-time setup.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 356-370
Threshold Signatures from Inner Product Argument: Succinct, Weighted, and Multi-threshold
Threshold signatures protect the signing key by sharing it among a group of signers so that an adversary must corrupt a threshold number of signers to be able to forge signatures. Existing threshold signatures with succinct signatures and constant verification times do not work if signers have different weights. Such weighted settings are seeing increasing importance in decentralized systems, especially in the Proof-of-Stake blockchains. This paper presents a new paradigm for threshold signatures for pairing and discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems. Our scheme has a compact verification key consisting of only 7 group elements, and a signature consisting of 8 group elements. Verifying the signature requires 8 exponentiations and 8 bilinear pairings. Our scheme supports arbitrary weight distributions among signers and arbitrary thresholds. It requires non-interactive preprocessing after a universal powers-of-tau setup. We prove the security of our scheme in the Algebraic Group Model and implement it using Golang. Our evaluation shows that our scheme achieves a comparable signature size and verification time to a standard (unweighted) threshold signature. Compared to existing multisignature schemes, our scheme has a much smaller public verification key.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 356-370
Open AccessThreshold Signatures from Inner Product Argument: Succinct, Weighted, and Multi-threshold
Threshold signatures protect the signing key by sharing it among a group of signers so that an adversary must corrupt a threshold number of signers to be able to forge signatures. Existing threshold signatures with succinct signatures and constant verification times do not work if signers have different weights. Such weighted settings are seeing increasing importance in decentralized systems, especially in the Proof-of-Stake blockchains. This paper presents a new paradigm for threshold signatures for pairing and discrete logarithm-based cryptosystems. Our scheme has a compact verification key consisting of only 7 group elements, and a signature consisting of 8 group elements. Verifying the signature requires 8 exponentiations and 8 bilinear pairings. Our scheme supports arbitrary weight distributions among signers and arbitrary thresholds. It requires non-interactive preprocessing after a universal powers-of-tau setup. We prove the security of our scheme in the Algebraic Group Model and implement it using Golang. Our evaluation shows that our scheme achieves a comparable signature size and verification time to a standard (unweighted) threshold signature. Compared to existing multisignature schemes, our scheme has a much smaller public verification key.