Etay Iluz
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Etay Iluz has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ben Nassi
Tel Aviv University, School of Electrical & Computer Engineering, Tel Aviv, Israel
1 shared publication - Boris Zadov
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel
1 shared publication - Daniel Genkin
Georgia Tech, Atlanta, Georgia, USA
1 shared publication - Dudi Nassi
Ben-Gurion University of the Negev, Be'er Sheva, Israel
1 shared publication - Eran Tromer
Boston University, Boston, USA
1 shared publication - Jan Jancar
Masaryk University, Brno, Czech Rep
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 268-280
Optical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations
Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side-channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a photodiode to measure the light emitted by a device's power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during cryptographic operations. We analyze the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt, PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 268-280
Open AccessOptical Cryptanalysis: Recovering Cryptographic Keys from Power LED Light Fluctuations
Although power LEDs have been integrated in various devices that perform cryptographic operations for decades, the cryptanalysis risk they pose has not yet been investigated. In this paper, we present optical cryptanalysis, a new form of cryptanalytic side-channel attack, in which secret keys are extracted by using a photodiode to measure the light emitted by a device's power LED and analyzing subtle fluctuations in the light intensity during cryptographic operations. We analyze the optical leakage of power LEDs of various consumer devices and the factors that affect the optical SNR. We then demonstrate end-to-end optical cryptanalytic attacks against a range of consumer devices (smartphone, smartcard, and Raspberry Pi, along with their USB peripherals) and recover secret keys (RSA, ECDSA, SIKE) from prior and recent versions of popular cryptographic libraries (GnuPG, Libgcrypt, PQCrypto-SIDH) from a maximum distance of 25 meters.