CKChris Kanich

Chris Kanich

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Chris Kanich has a total of 18 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Unbundle-Rewrite-Rebundle: Runtime Detection and Rewriting of Privacy-Harming Code in JavaScript Bundles

    by Mir Masood Ali, Peter Snyder, Chris Kanich, Hamed Haddadi

    This work presents Unbundle-Rewrite-Rebundle (URR), a system for detecting privacy-harming portions of bundled JavaScript code and rewriting that code at runtime to remove the privacy-harming behavior without breaking the surrounding code or overall application. URR is a novel solution to the problem of JavaScript bundles, where websites pre-compile multiple code units into a single file, making it impossible for content filters and ad-blockers to differentiate between desired and unwanted resources. Where traditional content filtering tools rely on URLs, URR analyzes the code at the AST level, and replaces harmful AST sub-trees with privacy-and-functionality maintaining alternatives. We present an open-sourced implementation of URR as a Firefox extension and evaluate it against JavaScript bundles generated by the most popular bundling system (Webpack) deployed on the Tranco 10k. We evaluate URR by precision (1.00), recall (0.95), and speed (0.43s per script) when detecting and rewriting three representative privacy-harming libraries often included in JavaScript bundles, and find URR to be an effective approach to a large-and-growing blind spot unaddressed by current privacy tools.


  • Open Access

    Poster: Longitudinal Measurement of the Adoption Dynamics in Apple's Privacy Label Ecosystem

    by David G. Balash, Mir Masood Ali, Monica Kodwani, Xiaoyuan Wu, Chris Kanich, Adam J. Aviv

    This work reports on a large scale, longitudinal analysis of the adoption dynamics of privacy labels in the iOS App Store, measuring this first-of-its kind ecosystem as it reaches maturity over two and a half years after launching in December 2020. The motivation is to shed light on the factors affecting the shifts in privacy labels and provide insights into how and when an app's label changes. By collecting nearly weekly snapshots of over 1.6 million apps for over a year, we analyze the dynamics of privacy label adoption and the accuracy of reported labels. Our analysis of 74.5% of apps having labels after two years provides important context into this mature ecosystem where labels are becoming the standard. However, we find compelling evidence that labels may not fully capture behavior, as 28.9% of apps indicate no data collection and distributions differ between voluntary versus mandatory adoptions. Once set, labels rarely change but additions reflect more data collection. In addition to our measurement, we also plan to release a new (and growing) data set that can be used by future researchers.

  • It's All in the Name: Why Some URLs are More Vulnerable to Typosquatting

    by Rashid Tahir, Ali Raza, Faizan Ahmad, Jehangir Kazi, Fareed Zaffar, Chris Kanich, Matthew Caesar

    Typosquatting is a blackhat practice that relies on human error and low-cost domain registrations to hijack legitimate traffic from well-established websites. The technique is typically used for phishing, driving traffic towards competitors or disseminating indecent or malicious content and as such remains a concern for businesses. We take a fresh new look at this well-studied phenomenon to explore why some URLs are more vulnerable to typing mistakes than others. We explore the relationship between human hand anatomy, keyboard layouts and typing mistakes using various URL datasets. We create an extensive user-centric typographical model and compute a Hardness Quotient (likelihood of mistyping) for each URL using a quantitative measure for finger and hand effort. Furthermore, our model predicts the most likely typos for each URL which can then be defensively registered. Cross-validation against actual URL and DNS datasets suggests that this is a meaningful and effective defense mechanism.


  • Characterizing the impact of malware infections and remediation attempts through support forum analysis

    by Sara Amini, Chris Kanich

    Detection and removal of malware infections have always been significant concerns for every computer user. Countless people are victims of malicious programs per day all around the world despite substantial improvements in malware defense. Developing techniques to characterize the harm caused by these programs enables new defenses to counteract these behaviors. One way to create these metrics is to explore online remediation forums because so many people refer to them for help in finding solutions for their systems' malware-related problems. Here we describe and implement a technique to characterize and quantify the harm that victims encounter when their systems are infected with a specific malware strain. We analyze various malware families harmfulness by exploiting the user-generated data collected from Bleeping Computer, one of the most popular online malware remediation forums. Moreover, we quantify how successful and effective this type of online community is when it comes to addressing victims malware-related issues.