Shaoor Munir
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Shaoor Munir has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Zubair Shafiq
University of California, Davis, Davis, California, USA
3 shared publications - Abdul Haddi Amjad
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, VA, USA
1 shared publication - Carmela Troncoso
SPRING Lab, EPFL, Lausanne, Switzerland
1 shared publication - Hari Venugopalan
University of California, Davis, Davis, USA
1 shared publication - Muhammad Ali Gulzar
Virginia Tech, Blacksburg, USA
1 shared publication - Samuel T. King
University of California, Davis, Davis, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 134-149
FP-Inconsistent: Measurement and Analysis of Fingerprint Inconsistencies in Evasive Bot Traffic
- 15 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 134-149
Open AccessFP-Inconsistent: Measurement and Analysis of Fingerprint Inconsistencies in Evasive Bot Traffic
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2177-2191
Blocking Tracking JavaScript at the Function Granularity
Modern websites extensively rely on JavaScript to implement both functionality and tracking. Existing privacy-enhancing content-blocking tools struggle against mixed scripts, which simultaneously implement both functionality and tracking. Blocking such scripts would break functionality, and not blocking them would allow tracking. We propose Not.js, a fine-grained JavaScript blocking tool that operates at the function-level granularity. Not.js's strengths lie in analyzing the dynamic execution context, including the call stack and calling context of each JavaScript function, and then encoding this context to build a rich graph representation. Not.js trains a supervised machine learning classifier on a webpage's graph representation to first detect tracking at the function-level and then automatically generates surrogate scripts that preserve functionality while removing tracking. Our evaluation of Not.js on the top-10K websites demonstrates that it achieves high precision (94%) and recall (98%) in detecting tracking functions, outperforming the state-of-the-art while being robust against off-the-shelf JavaScript obfuscation. Fine-grained detection of tracking functions allows Not.js to automatically generate surrogate scripts, which our evaluation shows that successfully remove tracking functions without causing major breakage. Our deployment of Not.js shows that mixed scripts are present on 62.3% of the top-10K websites, with 70.6% of the mixed scripts being third-party that engage in tracking activities such as cookie ghostwriting.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2177-2191
Open AccessBlocking Tracking JavaScript at the Function Granularity
Modern websites extensively rely on JavaScript to implement both functionality and tracking. Existing privacy-enhancing content-blocking tools struggle against mixed scripts, which simultaneously implement both functionality and tracking. Blocking such scripts would break functionality, and not blocking them would allow tracking. We propose Not.js, a fine-grained JavaScript blocking tool that operates at the function-level granularity. Not.js's strengths lie in analyzing the dynamic execution context, including the call stack and calling context of each JavaScript function, and then encoding this context to build a rich graph representation. Not.js trains a supervised machine learning classifier on a webpage's graph representation to first detect tracking at the function-level and then automatically generates surrogate scripts that preserve functionality while removing tracking. Our evaluation of Not.js on the top-10K websites demonstrates that it achieves high precision (94%) and recall (98%) in detecting tracking functions, outperforming the state-of-the-art while being robust against off-the-shelf JavaScript obfuscation. Fine-grained detection of tracking functions allows Not.js to automatically generate surrogate scripts, which our evaluation shows that successfully remove tracking functions without causing major breakage. Our deployment of Not.js shows that mixed scripts are present on 62.3% of the top-10K websites, with 70.6% of the mixed scripts being third-party that engage in tracking activities such as cookie ghostwriting.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3490-3504
CookieGraph: Understanding and Detecting First-Party Tracking Cookies
As third-party cookie blocking is becoming the norm in mainstream web browsers, advertisers and trackers have started to use first-party cookies for tracking. To understand this phenomenon, we conduct a differential measurement study with versus without third-party cookies. We find that first-party cookies are used to store and exfiltrate identifiers to known trackers even when third-party cookies are blocked. As opposed to third-party cookie blocking, first-party cookie blocking is not practical because it would result in major breakage of website functionality. We propose CookieGraph, a machine learning-based approach that can accurately and robustly detect and block first-party tracking cookies. CookieGraph detects first-party tracking cookies with 90.18% accuracy, outperforming the state-of-the-art CookieBlock by 17.31%. We show that CookieGraph is robust against cookie name manipulation, while CookieBlock's accuracy drops by 15.87%. While blocking all first-party cookies results in major breakage on 32% of the sites with SSO logins, and CookieBlock reduces it to 10%, we show that CookieGraph does not cause any major breakage on these sites. Our deployment of CookieGraph shows that first-party tracking cookies are used on 89.86% of the top-million websites. We find that 96.61% of these first-party tracking cookies are in fact ghostwritten by third-party scripts embedded in the first-party context. We also find evidence of first-party tracking cookies being set by fingerprinting scripts. The most prevalent first-party tracking cookies are set by major advertising entities such as Google, Facebook, and TikTok.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3490-3504
Open AccessCookieGraph: Understanding and Detecting First-Party Tracking Cookies
As third-party cookie blocking is becoming the norm in mainstream web browsers, advertisers and trackers have started to use first-party cookies for tracking. To understand this phenomenon, we conduct a differential measurement study with versus without third-party cookies. We find that first-party cookies are used to store and exfiltrate identifiers to known trackers even when third-party cookies are blocked. As opposed to third-party cookie blocking, first-party cookie blocking is not practical because it would result in major breakage of website functionality. We propose CookieGraph, a machine learning-based approach that can accurately and robustly detect and block first-party tracking cookies. CookieGraph detects first-party tracking cookies with 90.18% accuracy, outperforming the state-of-the-art CookieBlock by 17.31%. We show that CookieGraph is robust against cookie name manipulation, while CookieBlock's accuracy drops by 15.87%. While blocking all first-party cookies results in major breakage on 32% of the sites with SSO logins, and CookieBlock reduces it to 10%, we show that CookieGraph does not cause any major breakage on these sites. Our deployment of CookieGraph shows that first-party tracking cookies are used on 89.86% of the top-million websites. We find that 96.61% of these first-party tracking cookies are in fact ghostwritten by third-party scripts embedded in the first-party context. We also find evidence of first-party tracking cookies being set by fingerprinting scripts. The most prevalent first-party tracking cookies are set by major advertising entities such as Google, Facebook, and TikTok.