Simon Ochsenreither
Research Subjects
Simon Ochsenreither has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julian Loss
Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
2 shared publications - Christoph Lenzen
Aalto University, Espoo, Finland and Reykjavik University, Reykjavík, Iceland
1 shared publication - Dimitrios Papachristoudis
Researcher, Saarbrücken, Germany
1 shared publication - Erica Blum
Reed College, Portland, OR, USA
1 shared publication - Jonathan Katz
Google & University of Maryland, Washington DC, USA
1 shared publication - Kartik Nayak
Duke University
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 941-955
GRandLine: Adaptively Secure DKG and Randomness Beacon with (Log-)Quadratic Communication Complexity
A randomness beacon is a source of continuous and publicly verifiable randomness which is of crucial importance for many applications. Existing works on randomness beacons suffer from at least one of the following drawbacks: (i) security only against static (i.e., non-adaptive) adversaries, (ii) each epoch takes many rounds of communication, or (iii) computationally expensive tools such as proof-of-work (PoW) or verifiable delay functions (VDF). In this work, we introduce GRandLine, the first adaptively secure randomness beacon protocol that overcomes all these limitations while preserving simplicity and optimal resilience in the synchronous network setting. We achieve our result in two steps. First, we design a novel distributed key generation (DKG) protocol GRand that runs in O(λ n2 log n ) bits of communication but, unlike most conventional DKG protocols, outputs both secret and public keys as group elements. Here, λ denotes the security parameter. Second, following termination of GRand, parties can use their keys to derive a sequence of randomness beacon values, where each random value costs only a single asynchronous round and O(λ n2) bits of communication. We implement GRandLine and evaluate it using a network of up to 64 parties running in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that GRandLine can produce about 2 beacon outputs per second in a network of 64 parties. We compare our protocol to the state-of-the-art randomness beacon protocols OptRand (NDSS '23), BRandPiper (CCS '21), and Drand, in the same setting and observe that it vastly outperforms them.
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 941-955
Open AccessGRandLine: Adaptively Secure DKG and Randomness Beacon with (Log-)Quadratic Communication Complexity
A randomness beacon is a source of continuous and publicly verifiable randomness which is of crucial importance for many applications. Existing works on randomness beacons suffer from at least one of the following drawbacks: (i) security only against static (i.e., non-adaptive) adversaries, (ii) each epoch takes many rounds of communication, or (iii) computationally expensive tools such as proof-of-work (PoW) or verifiable delay functions (VDF). In this work, we introduce GRandLine, the first adaptively secure randomness beacon protocol that overcomes all these limitations while preserving simplicity and optimal resilience in the synchronous network setting. We achieve our result in two steps. First, we design a novel distributed key generation (DKG) protocol GRand that runs in O(λ n2 log n ) bits of communication but, unlike most conventional DKG protocols, outputs both secret and public keys as group elements. Here, λ denotes the security parameter. Second, following termination of GRand, parties can use their keys to derive a sequence of randomness beacon values, where each random value costs only a single asynchronous round and O(λ n2) bits of communication. We implement GRandLine and evaluate it using a network of up to 64 parties running in geographically distributed AWS instances. Our evaluation shows that GRandLine can produce about 2 beacon outputs per second in a network of 64 parties. We compare our protocol to the state-of-the-art randomness beacon protocols OptRand (NDSS '23), BRandPiper (CCS '21), and Drand, in the same setting and observe that it vastly outperforms them.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 519-533
Abraxas: Throughput-Efficient Hybrid Asynchronous Consensus
Protocols for state-machine replication (SMR) often trade off performance for resilience to network delay. In particular, protocols for asynchronous SMR tolerate arbitrary network delay but sacrifice throughput/latency when the network is fast, while partially synchronous protocols have good performance in a fast network but fail to make progress if the network experiences high delay. Existing hybrid protocols are resilient to arbitrary network delay and have good performance when the network is fast, but suffer from high overhead (''thrashing'') if the network repeatedly switches between being fast and slow, e.g., in a network that is typically fast but has intermittent message delays. We propose Abraxas, a generic approach for constructing a hybrid protocol from any ''fast'' protocol Πfast and asynchronous protocolΠslow to achieve (1) security and performance equivalent to Πslow under arbitrary network behavior, and (2) performance equivalent to Πfast when conditions are favorable. We instantiate Abraxas with the best existing protocols for Πfast (Jolteon) and Πslow (\mbox2-chain VABA), and show experimentally that the resulting protocol significantly outperforms Ditto, the previous state-of-the-art hybrid protocol.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 519-533
Open AccessAbraxas: Throughput-Efficient Hybrid Asynchronous Consensus
Protocols for state-machine replication (SMR) often trade off performance for resilience to network delay. In particular, protocols for asynchronous SMR tolerate arbitrary network delay but sacrifice throughput/latency when the network is fast, while partially synchronous protocols have good performance in a fast network but fail to make progress if the network experiences high delay. Existing hybrid protocols are resilient to arbitrary network delay and have good performance when the network is fast, but suffer from high overhead (''thrashing'') if the network repeatedly switches between being fast and slow, e.g., in a network that is typically fast but has intermittent message delays. We propose Abraxas, a generic approach for constructing a hybrid protocol from any ''fast'' protocol Πfast and asynchronous protocolΠslow to achieve (1) security and performance equivalent to Πslow under arbitrary network behavior, and (2) performance equivalent to Πfast when conditions are favorable. We instantiate Abraxas with the best existing protocols for Πfast (Jolteon) and Πslow (\mbox2-chain VABA), and show experimentally that the resulting protocol significantly outperforms Ditto, the previous state-of-the-art hybrid protocol.