Suresh D. Tendulkar
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Suresh D. Tendulkar has a total of 7 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Alice H. Amsden
Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Cambridge, MA
1 shared publication Célestin Monga
World Bank, 1818 H Street, NW, DC 20433, United States
1 shared publication- Dirk Willem Te Velde
Overseas Development Institute London UK
1 shared publication - Howard Pack
Department of Business and Public Policy, The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania
1 shared publication - Justin Yifu Lin
World Bank , Washington, DC, USA
1 shared publication - K. Y. Amoako
Founder and President, African Center for Economic Transformation (ACET), Accra
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 4 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 29 (3) , 259-310
DPR Debate: Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change
This DPR Debate is based on the contribution by Justin Lin, Chief Economist at the World Bank, and his colleague Célestin Monga, on ‘Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change’. The article under consideration is important and timely as it articulates a number of new policy implications from Justin Lin's earlier work on New Structural Economics, which was discussed in a previous DPR debate (Lin and Chang, 2009). This symposium contains the article and comments on it from five distinguished specialists, and closes with a rejoinder by Lin and Monga. This introduction discusses the article, the comments and the rejoinder.The historical record indicates that, in all successful economies, the state has always played an important role in facilitating structural change and helping the private sector sustain it across time. This article puts forward a new approach to help policy‐makers in developing countries identify those industries that may hold latent comparative advantage, and recommends ways of removing binding constraints to facilitate private firms' entry into those industries. Two types of government interventions are distinguished: first, policies that facilitate structural change by overcoming information, co‐ordination and externality issues, which are intrinsic to industrial upgrading and diversification; and second, policies aimed at protecting certain selected firms and industries that defy the comparative advantage determined by the existing endowment structure.
- 4 April 2011
- Published by Wiley in Development Policy Review
- Vol. 29 (3) , 259-310
DPR Debate: Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change
This DPR Debate is based on the contribution by Justin Lin, Chief Economist at the World Bank, and his colleague Célestin Monga, on ‘Growth Identification and Facilitation: The Role of the State in the Dynamics of Structural Change’. The article under consideration is important and timely as it articulates a number of new policy implications from Justin Lin's earlier work on New Structural Economics, which was discussed in a previous DPR debate (Lin and Chang, 2009). This symposium contains the article and comments on it from five distinguished specialists, and closes with a rejoinder by Lin and Monga. This introduction discusses the article, the comments and the rejoinder.The historical record indicates that, in all successful economies, the state has always played an important role in facilitating structural change and helping the private sector sustain it across time. This article puts forward a new approach to help policy‐makers in developing countries identify those industries that may hold latent comparative advantage, and recommends ways of removing binding constraints to facilitate private firms' entry into those industries. Two types of government interventions are distinguished: first, policies that facilitate structural change by overcoming information, co‐ordination and externality issues, which are intrinsic to industrial upgrading and diversification; and second, policies aimed at protecting certain selected firms and industries that defy the comparative advantage determined by the existing endowment structure.