Ning Miao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Ning Miao has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Houman Homayoun
University of California, Davis, Davis, CA, USA
3 shared publications - Chongzhou Fang
Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of California Davis
2 shared publications - Han Wang
Temple University
2 shared publications - Akash Kumar
Ruhr University Bochum
1 shared publication - Amir Moradi
Technische Universität Darmstadt, Darmstadt, Germany
1 shared publication - Armin Darjani
TU Dresden, Dresden, Germany and Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 954-961
LightBench: A Hardware-Aware Trusted Execution Platform for Intelligent Malware Detection at the Edge
- 29 June 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 954-961
Open AccessLightBench: A Hardware-Aware Trusted Execution Platform for Intelligent Malware Detection at the Edge
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2024-2037
Gotcha! I Know What You Are Doing on the FPGA Cloud: Fingerprinting Co-Located Cloud FPGA Accelerators via Measuring Communication Links
In recent decades, due to the emerging requirements of computation acceleration, cloud FPGAs have become popular in public clouds. Major cloud service providers, e.g. AWS and Microsoft Azure have provided FPGA computing resources in their infrastructure and have enabled users to design and deploy their own accelerators on these FPGAs. Multi-tenancy FPGAs, where multiple users can share the same FPGA fabric with certain types of isolation to improve resource efficiency, have already been proved feasible. However, this also raises security concerns. Various types of side-channel attacks targeting multi-tenancy FPGAs have been proposed and validated. The awareness of security vulnerabilities in the cloud has motivated cloud providers to take action to enhance the security of their cloud environments. In FPGA security research papers, researchers always perform attacks under the assumption that attackers successfully co-locate with victims and are aware of the existence of victims on the same FPGA board. However, the way to reach this point, i.e., how attackers secretly obtain information regarding accelerators on the same fabric, is constantly ignored despite the fact that it is non-trivial and important for attackers. In this paper, we present a novel fingerprinting attack to gain the types of co-located FPGA accelerators. We utilize a seemingly non-malicious benchmark accelerator to sniff the communication link and collect performance traces of the FPGA-host communication link. By analyzing these traces, we are able to achieve high classification accuracy for fingerprinting co-located accelerators, which proves that attackers can use our method to perform cloud FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with a high success rate. As far as we know, this is the first paper targeting multi-tenant FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with the communication side-channel.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 2024-2037
Open AccessGotcha! I Know What You Are Doing on the FPGA Cloud: Fingerprinting Co-Located Cloud FPGA Accelerators via Measuring Communication Links
In recent decades, due to the emerging requirements of computation acceleration, cloud FPGAs have become popular in public clouds. Major cloud service providers, e.g. AWS and Microsoft Azure have provided FPGA computing resources in their infrastructure and have enabled users to design and deploy their own accelerators on these FPGAs. Multi-tenancy FPGAs, where multiple users can share the same FPGA fabric with certain types of isolation to improve resource efficiency, have already been proved feasible. However, this also raises security concerns. Various types of side-channel attacks targeting multi-tenancy FPGAs have been proposed and validated. The awareness of security vulnerabilities in the cloud has motivated cloud providers to take action to enhance the security of their cloud environments. In FPGA security research papers, researchers always perform attacks under the assumption that attackers successfully co-locate with victims and are aware of the existence of victims on the same FPGA board. However, the way to reach this point, i.e., how attackers secretly obtain information regarding accelerators on the same fabric, is constantly ignored despite the fact that it is non-trivial and important for attackers. In this paper, we present a novel fingerprinting attack to gain the types of co-located FPGA accelerators. We utilize a seemingly non-malicious benchmark accelerator to sniff the communication link and collect performance traces of the FPGA-host communication link. By analyzing these traces, we are able to achieve high classification accuracy for fingerprinting co-located accelerators, which proves that attackers can use our method to perform cloud FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with a high success rate. As far as we know, this is the first paper targeting multi-tenant FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with the communication side-channel.
- Open Access
- 17 September 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 8-17
Special Session: Mitigating Side-channel Attacks through Circuit to Application Layer Approaches
Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), which are always considered a severe threat to the security of the cryptographic circuits, today can also be employed to extract IP secrets and neural network models. Hence, developing novel security solutions at different design levels is crucial. In this paper, we explore recent countermeasures at the circuit, algorithmic, and microarchitecture levels. First, we explain how Reconfigurable Field-Effect Transistor (RFET), as a beyond CMOS technology, enables us to provide both IP and data protection against SCAs at the circuit level. Second, we investigate an automated method for generating masked circuits as an algorithmic solution, and then we review machine learning-based SCA detection mechanisms at the microarchitecture level. Finally, we discuss emerging threats of SCAs from the industrial point of view.
- 17 September 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 8-17
Open AccessSpecial Session: Mitigating Side-channel Attacks through Circuit to Application Layer Approaches
Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), which are always considered a severe threat to the security of the cryptographic circuits, today can also be employed to extract IP secrets and neural network models. Hence, developing novel security solutions at different design levels is crucial. In this paper, we explore recent countermeasures at the circuit, algorithmic, and microarchitecture levels. First, we explain how Reconfigurable Field-Effect Transistor (RFET), as a beyond CMOS technology, enables us to provide both IP and data protection against SCAs at the circuit level. Second, we investigate an automated method for generating masked circuits as an algorithmic solution, and then we review machine learning-based SCA detection mechanisms at the microarchitecture level. Finally, we discuss emerging threats of SCAs from the industrial point of view.