NMNing Miao

Ning Miao

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Ning Miao has a total of 21 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    LightBench: A Hardware-Aware Trusted Execution Platform for Intelligent Malware Detection at the Edge

    by Ning Miao, Hossein Sayadi, Kumara Srivatsa Kondapalli, Mahdi Eslamimehr, Houman Homayoun


  • Open Access

    Gotcha! I Know What You Are Doing on the FPGA Cloud: Fingerprinting Co-Located Cloud FPGA Accelerators via Measuring Communication Links

    by Chongzhou Fang, Ning Miao, Han Wang, Jiacheng Zhou, Tyler Sheaves, John M. Emmert, Avesta Sasan, Houman Homayoun

    In recent decades, due to the emerging requirements of computation acceleration, cloud FPGAs have become popular in public clouds. Major cloud service providers, e.g. AWS and Microsoft Azure have provided FPGA computing resources in their infrastructure and have enabled users to design and deploy their own accelerators on these FPGAs. Multi-tenancy FPGAs, where multiple users can share the same FPGA fabric with certain types of isolation to improve resource efficiency, have already been proved feasible. However, this also raises security concerns. Various types of side-channel attacks targeting multi-tenancy FPGAs have been proposed and validated. The awareness of security vulnerabilities in the cloud has motivated cloud providers to take action to enhance the security of their cloud environments. In FPGA security research papers, researchers always perform attacks under the assumption that attackers successfully co-locate with victims and are aware of the existence of victims on the same FPGA board. However, the way to reach this point, i.e., how attackers secretly obtain information regarding accelerators on the same fabric, is constantly ignored despite the fact that it is non-trivial and important for attackers. In this paper, we present a novel fingerprinting attack to gain the types of co-located FPGA accelerators. We utilize a seemingly non-malicious benchmark accelerator to sniff the communication link and collect performance traces of the FPGA-host communication link. By analyzing these traces, we are able to achieve high classification accuracy for fingerprinting co-located accelerators, which proves that attackers can use our method to perform cloud FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with a high success rate. As far as we know, this is the first paper targeting multi-tenant FPGA accelerator fingerprinting with the communication side-channel.


  • Open Access

    Special Session: Mitigating Side-channel Attacks through Circuit to Application Layer Approaches

    by Nima Kavand, Armin Darjani, Jens Trommer, Giulio Galderisi, Thomas Mikolajick, Nicolai Mueller, Amir Moradi, Chongzhou Fang, Ning Miao, Han Wang, et al.

    Side-Channel Attacks (SCAs), which are always considered a severe threat to the security of the cryptographic circuits, today can also be employed to extract IP secrets and neural network models. Hence, developing novel security solutions at different design levels is crucial. In this paper, we explore recent countermeasures at the circuit, algorithmic, and microarchitecture levels. First, we explain how Reconfigurable Field-Effect Transistor (RFET), as a beyond CMOS technology, enables us to provide both IP and data protection against SCAs at the circuit level. Second, we investigate an automated method for generating masked circuits as an algorithmic solution, and then we review machine learning-based SCA detection mechanisms at the microarchitecture level. Finally, we discuss emerging threats of SCAs from the industrial point of view.