Xinyu Xing
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Xinyu Xing has a total of 20 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Adam Doupé
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
1 shared publication - Chang Liu
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Gang Wang
University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign
1 shared publication - Gang Xiong
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Gaopeng Gou
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China and School of Cyber Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Hongwei Li
Purdue University, West Lafayette, Indiana, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 55-56
BandFuzz: A Practical Framework for Collaborative Fuzzing with Reinforcement Learning
In recent years, the technique of collaborative fuzzing has gained prominence as an efficient method for identifying software vulnerabilities. This paper introduces BandFuzz, a distinctive collaborative fuzzing framework designed to intelligently coordinate the use of multiple fuzzers. Unlike previous tools, our approach employs reinforcement learning to enhance both the efficiency and effectiveness of fuzz testing.
- 14 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 55-56
Open AccessBandFuzz: A Practical Framework for Collaborative Fuzzing with Reinforcement Learning
In recent years, the technique of collaborative fuzzing has gained prominence as an efficient method for identifying software vulnerabilities. This paper introduces BandFuzz, a distinctive collaborative fuzzing framework designed to intelligently coordinate the use of multiple fuzzers. Unlike previous tools, our approach employs reinforcement learning to enhance both the efficiency and effectiveness of fuzz testing.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 352-365
TGC: Transaction Graph Contrast Network for Ethereum Phishing Scam Detection
Phishing scams have become the most serious type of crime involved in Ethereum. However, existing methods ignore the natural camouflage and sparse distribution of phishing scams in Ethereum leading to unsatisfactory performance, and they are also limited by the data scale which cannot be applied to real-world dynamic scenarios. In this paper, we propose a Transaction Graph Contrast network (TGC) to enhance phishing scam detection performance on Ethereum. TGC inputs subgraphs instead of the entire graph for training, which eases the model’s requirements for machine configuration and data connectivity. Motivated by phishing nodes are surrounded by normal nodes, we design the comparison between node-level to help phishing nodes learn the unique properties of themselves different from their neighbors. Observing the small number and sparse distribution of phishing nodes, we narrow the distance between phishing nodes by comparing node context-level structures, so as to learn universal transaction patterns. We further combine the obtained features with common statistics to identify phishing addresses. Evaluated on real-world Ethereum phishing scams datasets, our TGC outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in detecting phishing addresses and has obvious advantages in large-scale and dynamic scenarios.
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 352-365
Open AccessTGC: Transaction Graph Contrast Network for Ethereum Phishing Scam Detection
Phishing scams have become the most serious type of crime involved in Ethereum. However, existing methods ignore the natural camouflage and sparse distribution of phishing scams in Ethereum leading to unsatisfactory performance, and they are also limited by the data scale which cannot be applied to real-world dynamic scenarios. In this paper, we propose a Transaction Graph Contrast network (TGC) to enhance phishing scam detection performance on Ethereum. TGC inputs subgraphs instead of the entire graph for training, which eases the model’s requirements for machine configuration and data connectivity. Motivated by phishing nodes are surrounded by normal nodes, we design the comparison between node-level to help phishing nodes learn the unique properties of themselves different from their neighbors. Observing the small number and sparse distribution of phishing nodes, we narrow the distance between phishing nodes by comparing node context-level structures, so as to learn universal transaction patterns. We further combine the obtained features with common statistics to identify phishing addresses. Evaluated on real-world Ethereum phishing scams datasets, our TGC outperforms the state-of-the-art methods in detecting phishing addresses and has obvious advantages in large-scale and dynamic scenarios.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3093-3107
RetSpill: Igniting User-Controlled Data to Burn Away Linux Kernel Protections
Leveraging a control flow hijacking primitive (CFHP) to gain root privileges is critical to attackers striving to exploit Linux kernel vulnerabilities. Such attack has become increasingly elusive as security researchers propose capable kernel security mitigations, leading to the development of complex (and, as a trade-off, brittle and unreliable) attack techniques to regain it. In this paper, we obviate the need for complexity by proposing RetSpill, a powerful yet elegant exploitation technique that employs user space data already present on the kernel stack for privilege escalation. RetSpill exploits the common practice of temporarily storing data on the kernel stack, such as when preserving user space register values during a switch from the user space to the kernel space. We perform a systematic study and identify four common practices that spill user space data to the kernel stack. Although this practice is perfectly within the kernel's security specification, it introduces a new exploitation path when paired with a control flow hijacking (CFH) vulnerability, enabling RetSpill to turn such vulnerabilities directly into privilege escalation reliably. Moreover, RetSpill can bypass many defenses currently deployed in the Linux kernels. To demonstrate the severity of this problem, we collected 22 real-world kernel vulnerabilities and built a semi-automated tool that abuses intentionally-stored, on-stack user space data for kernel exploitation in a semi-automated fashion. Our tool generated end-to-end privilege escalation exploits for 20 out of 22 CFH vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose a new mechanism to defend against the attack.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3093-3107
Open AccessRetSpill: Igniting User-Controlled Data to Burn Away Linux Kernel Protections
Leveraging a control flow hijacking primitive (CFHP) to gain root privileges is critical to attackers striving to exploit Linux kernel vulnerabilities. Such attack has become increasingly elusive as security researchers propose capable kernel security mitigations, leading to the development of complex (and, as a trade-off, brittle and unreliable) attack techniques to regain it. In this paper, we obviate the need for complexity by proposing RetSpill, a powerful yet elegant exploitation technique that employs user space data already present on the kernel stack for privilege escalation. RetSpill exploits the common practice of temporarily storing data on the kernel stack, such as when preserving user space register values during a switch from the user space to the kernel space. We perform a systematic study and identify four common practices that spill user space data to the kernel stack. Although this practice is perfectly within the kernel's security specification, it introduces a new exploitation path when paired with a control flow hijacking (CFH) vulnerability, enabling RetSpill to turn such vulnerabilities directly into privilege escalation reliably. Moreover, RetSpill can bypass many defenses currently deployed in the Linux kernels. To demonstrate the severity of this problem, we collected 22 real-world kernel vulnerabilities and built a semi-automated tool that abuses intentionally-stored, on-stack user space data for kernel exploitation in a semi-automated fashion. Our tool generated end-to-end privilege escalation exploits for 20 out of 22 CFH vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose a new mechanism to defend against the attack.
- Open Access
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 230-244
Errors, Misunderstandings, and Attacks
Ad-blocking systems such as Adblock Plus rely on crowdsourcing to build and maintain filter lists, which are the basis for determining which ads to block on web pages. In this work, we seek to advance our understanding of the ad-blocking community as well as the errors and pitfalls of the crowdsourcing process. To do so, we collected and analyzed a longitudinal dataset that covered the dynamic changes of popular filter-list EasyList for nine years and the error reports submitted by the crowd in the same period. Our study yielded a number of significant findings regarding the characteristics of FP and FN errors and their causes. For instances, we found that false positive errors (i.e., incorrectly blocking legitimate content) still took a long time before they could be discovered (50% of them took more than a month) despite the community effort. Both EasyList editors and website owners were to blame for the false positives. In addition, we found that a great number of false negative errors (i.e., failing to block real advertisements) were either incorrectly reported or simply ignored by the editors. Furthermore, we analyzed evasion attacks from ad publishers against ad-blockers. In total, our analysis covers 15 types of attack methods including 8 methods that have not been studied by the research community. We show how ad publishers have utilized them to circumvent ad-blockers and empirically measure the reactions of ad blockers. Through in-depth analysis, our findings are expected to help shed light on any future work to evolve ad blocking and optimize crowdsourcing mechanisms.
- 21 October 2019
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 230-244
Open AccessErrors, Misunderstandings, and Attacks
Ad-blocking systems such as Adblock Plus rely on crowdsourcing to build and maintain filter lists, which are the basis for determining which ads to block on web pages. In this work, we seek to advance our understanding of the ad-blocking community as well as the errors and pitfalls of the crowdsourcing process. To do so, we collected and analyzed a longitudinal dataset that covered the dynamic changes of popular filter-list EasyList for nine years and the error reports submitted by the crowd in the same period. Our study yielded a number of significant findings regarding the characteristics of FP and FN errors and their causes. For instances, we found that false positive errors (i.e., incorrectly blocking legitimate content) still took a long time before they could be discovered (50% of them took more than a month) despite the community effort. Both EasyList editors and website owners were to blame for the false positives. In addition, we found that a great number of false negative errors (i.e., failing to block real advertisements) were either incorrectly reported or simply ignored by the editors. Furthermore, we analyzed evasion attacks from ad publishers against ad-blockers. In total, our analysis covers 15 types of attack methods including 8 methods that have not been studied by the research community. We show how ad publishers have utilized them to circumvent ad-blockers and empirically measure the reactions of ad blockers. Through in-depth analysis, our findings are expected to help shed light on any future work to evolve ad blocking and optimize crowdsourcing mechanisms.