Tiffany Bao
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tiffany Bao has a total of 50 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ruoyu Wang
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
9 shared publications - Adam Doupé
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
7 shared publications - Yan Shoshitaishvili
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
7 shared publications - Adam Oest
Arizona State University, United States of America
3 shared publications - Gail-Joon Ahn
Arizona State University, Tempe, AZ, USA
3 shared publications - Zhibo Sun
Drexel University, Philadelphia, USA
3 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5911-5925
When Scammers Talk Back: Understanding Potentially Unwanted Calls via LLM-Based Interaction
- 14 November 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 5911-5925
Open AccessWhen Scammers Talk Back: Understanding Potentially Unwanted Calls via LLM-Based Interaction
- Open Access
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-73
SoK: A Modularized Framework for Symbolic Execution and Application for Usable Tool Design
- 30 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 57-73
Open AccessSoK: A Modularized Framework for Symbolic Execution and Application for Usable Tool Design
- Open Access
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 111-126
Fragile Deliveries: Inconsistencies in Android Parcel and Their Security Consequences
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 111-126
Open AccessFragile Deliveries: Inconsistencies in Android Parcel and Their Security Consequences
- Open Access
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-17
I Can SE Clearly Now: Investigating the Effectiveness of GUI-based Symbolic Execution for Software Vulnerability Discovery
- 13 April 2026
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-17
Open AccessI Can SE Clearly Now: Investigating the Effectiveness of GUI-based Symbolic Execution for Software Vulnerability Discovery
- Open Access
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 48-60
Benchmarking Binary Type Inference Techniques in Decompilers
- 13 October 2025
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 48-60
Open AccessBenchmarking Binary Type Inference Techniques in Decompilers
- Open Access
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3719-3733
Fuzz to the Future: Uncovering Occluded Future Vulnerabilities via Robust Fuzzing
- 2 December 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3719-3733
Open AccessFuzz to the Future: Uncovering Occluded Future Vulnerabilities via Robust Fuzzing
- Open Access
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 49-64
From Victims to Defenders: An Exploration of the Phishing Attack Reporting Ecosystem
Reporting phishing attacks can significantly shorten the time required to take down their operations and deter further victimization by the same phishing websites. However, little research has been conducted to understand the phishing reporting ecosystem and its effectiveness. In this paper, we comprehensively evaluate the phishing reporting ecosystem to identify the critical challenges people face and their concerns when reporting smishing, vishing, and phishing email attacks. First, we analyze the existing security advice and channels for reporting phishing attacks in both the public and private sectors. Then, we conduct a scenario-based experiment involving 89 participants to investigate what factors affect a participant’s decision to report a phishing attack and what challenges they face in preparing the report. Third, we report phishing attacks ourselves and monitor the status of the reported phishing websites to empirically measure how reports are acted upon and how that affects the reported phishing websites. Finally, we propose approaches under five major concern categories to mitigate the challenges that we discover in the phishing reporting ecosystem.
- 30 September 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 49-64
Open AccessFrom Victims to Defenders: An Exploration of the Phishing Attack Reporting Ecosystem
Reporting phishing attacks can significantly shorten the time required to take down their operations and deter further victimization by the same phishing websites. However, little research has been conducted to understand the phishing reporting ecosystem and its effectiveness. In this paper, we comprehensively evaluate the phishing reporting ecosystem to identify the critical challenges people face and their concerns when reporting smishing, vishing, and phishing email attacks. First, we analyze the existing security advice and channels for reporting phishing attacks in both the public and private sectors. Then, we conduct a scenario-based experiment involving 89 participants to investigate what factors affect a participant’s decision to report a phishing attack and what challenges they face in preparing the report. Third, we report phishing attacks ourselves and monitor the status of the reported phishing websites to empirically measure how reports are acted upon and how that affects the reported phishing websites. Finally, we propose approaches under five major concern categories to mitigate the challenges that we discover in the phishing reporting ecosystem.
- Open Access
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 638-653
Deep Dive into Client-Side Anti-Phishing: A Longitudinal Study Bridging Academia and Industry
Client-side anti-phishing methods are crucial for safeguarding individuals against phishing attacks, offering a proactive approach beyond traditional blocklisting strategies. This study expands the scope to include a comprehensive evaluation of client-side anti-phishing techniques within the Chrome browser, alongside an in-depth analysis of academic research in the field of phishing over the past five years. Our findings highlight the inherent limitations of current client-side anti-phishing measures, which demonstrated a detection rate of only 14% for phishing websites and blocked merely 10% of login-based phishing sites within the first hour, resulting in a substantial false negative rate. Additionally, our analysis reveals that attackers can readily circumvent these defenses by altering the content of phishing websites. The study also critically assesses recent academic contributions to understand their alignment and potential integration with client-side anti-phishing frameworks. Based on these insights, we propose targeted recommendations to enhance the efficacy and responsiveness of the client-side anti-phishing ecosystem, addressing the challenges of low detection coverage, slow response times, and high rates of false negatives.
- 1 July 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 638-653
Open AccessDeep Dive into Client-Side Anti-Phishing: A Longitudinal Study Bridging Academia and Industry
Client-side anti-phishing methods are crucial for safeguarding individuals against phishing attacks, offering a proactive approach beyond traditional blocklisting strategies. This study expands the scope to include a comprehensive evaluation of client-side anti-phishing techniques within the Chrome browser, alongside an in-depth analysis of academic research in the field of phishing over the past five years. Our findings highlight the inherent limitations of current client-side anti-phishing measures, which demonstrated a detection rate of only 14% for phishing websites and blocked merely 10% of login-based phishing sites within the first hour, resulting in a substantial false negative rate. Additionally, our analysis reveals that attackers can readily circumvent these defenses by altering the content of phishing websites. The study also critically assesses recent academic contributions to understand their alignment and potential integration with client-side anti-phishing frameworks. Based on these insights, we propose targeted recommendations to enhance the efficacy and responsiveness of the client-side anti-phishing ecosystem, addressing the challenges of low detection coverage, slow response times, and high rates of false negatives.
- Open Access
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 55-65
Nothing Personal: Understanding the Spread and Use of Personally Identifiable Information in the Financial Ecosystem
Online services leverage various authentication methods with differing usability and reliability trade-offs, such as password-based or multi-factor authentication (MFA). However, financial service providers face a unique challenge; authenticating the user's legal identity, which involves verifying Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which we call PII-based authentication (PII-BA). These methods assume that PII is private; however, identity theft victimizes millions annually and exposes their PII to criminals. In this paper, we investigate the potential of identity fraud that breaks PII-BA with stolen PII in the financial ecosystem. First, we measure what PII is used in PII-BA across five different financial services for 17 U.S. financial institutions. We subsequently collect data where PII and associated illegal services are available for purchase by monetizers (who perform identity fraud via obtained stolen PII)operating within the underground economy and paste sites. Finally, we analyze how monetizers can make money from stolen PII by either breaking PII-BA or directly monetizing the PII with the associated cost. Our study reveals that payment processing companies (PPCs) impose lower PII requirements for password/username recovery service PII-BA compared to commercial banks. Consequently, criminals can bypass this PII-BA service across all PPCs by paying 3.5-50 as opposed to 10.5-600 for banks. We also outline potential mitigations which could be an essential step in addressing identity fraud resulting from PII-BA in the financial ecosystem.
- 19 June 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 55-65
Open AccessNothing Personal: Understanding the Spread and Use of Personally Identifiable Information in the Financial Ecosystem
Online services leverage various authentication methods with differing usability and reliability trade-offs, such as password-based or multi-factor authentication (MFA). However, financial service providers face a unique challenge; authenticating the user's legal identity, which involves verifying Personally Identifiable Information (PII), which we call PII-based authentication (PII-BA). These methods assume that PII is private; however, identity theft victimizes millions annually and exposes their PII to criminals. In this paper, we investigate the potential of identity fraud that breaks PII-BA with stolen PII in the financial ecosystem. First, we measure what PII is used in PII-BA across five different financial services for 17 U.S. financial institutions. We subsequently collect data where PII and associated illegal services are available for purchase by monetizers (who perform identity fraud via obtained stolen PII)operating within the underground economy and paste sites. Finally, we analyze how monetizers can make money from stolen PII by either breaking PII-BA or directly monetizing the PII with the associated cost. Our study reveals that payment processing companies (PPCs) impose lower PII requirements for password/username recovery service PII-BA compared to commercial banks. Consequently, criminals can bypass this PII-BA service across all PPCs by paying 3.5-50 as opposed to 10.5-600 for banks. We also outline potential mitigations which could be an essential step in addressing identity fraud resulting from PII-BA in the financial ecosystem.
- Open Access
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3093-3107
RetSpill: Igniting User-Controlled Data to Burn Away Linux Kernel Protections
Leveraging a control flow hijacking primitive (CFHP) to gain root privileges is critical to attackers striving to exploit Linux kernel vulnerabilities. Such attack has become increasingly elusive as security researchers propose capable kernel security mitigations, leading to the development of complex (and, as a trade-off, brittle and unreliable) attack techniques to regain it. In this paper, we obviate the need for complexity by proposing RetSpill, a powerful yet elegant exploitation technique that employs user space data already present on the kernel stack for privilege escalation. RetSpill exploits the common practice of temporarily storing data on the kernel stack, such as when preserving user space register values during a switch from the user space to the kernel space. We perform a systematic study and identify four common practices that spill user space data to the kernel stack. Although this practice is perfectly within the kernel's security specification, it introduces a new exploitation path when paired with a control flow hijacking (CFH) vulnerability, enabling RetSpill to turn such vulnerabilities directly into privilege escalation reliably. Moreover, RetSpill can bypass many defenses currently deployed in the Linux kernels. To demonstrate the severity of this problem, we collected 22 real-world kernel vulnerabilities and built a semi-automated tool that abuses intentionally-stored, on-stack user space data for kernel exploitation in a semi-automated fashion. Our tool generated end-to-end privilege escalation exploits for 20 out of 22 CFH vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose a new mechanism to defend against the attack.
- 15 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 3093-3107
Open AccessRetSpill: Igniting User-Controlled Data to Burn Away Linux Kernel Protections
Leveraging a control flow hijacking primitive (CFHP) to gain root privileges is critical to attackers striving to exploit Linux kernel vulnerabilities. Such attack has become increasingly elusive as security researchers propose capable kernel security mitigations, leading to the development of complex (and, as a trade-off, brittle and unreliable) attack techniques to regain it. In this paper, we obviate the need for complexity by proposing RetSpill, a powerful yet elegant exploitation technique that employs user space data already present on the kernel stack for privilege escalation. RetSpill exploits the common practice of temporarily storing data on the kernel stack, such as when preserving user space register values during a switch from the user space to the kernel space. We perform a systematic study and identify four common practices that spill user space data to the kernel stack. Although this practice is perfectly within the kernel's security specification, it introduces a new exploitation path when paired with a control flow hijacking (CFH) vulnerability, enabling RetSpill to turn such vulnerabilities directly into privilege escalation reliably. Moreover, RetSpill can bypass many defenses currently deployed in the Linux kernels. To demonstrate the severity of this problem, we collected 22 real-world kernel vulnerabilities and built a semi-automated tool that abuses intentionally-stored, on-stack user space data for kernel exploitation in a semi-automated fashion. Our tool generated end-to-end privilege escalation exploits for 20 out of 22 CFH vulnerabilities. Finally, we propose a new mechanism to defend against the attack.