MCMin Chen

Min Chen

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Min Chen has a total of 35 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    SEAL: Reinforcing Global Safety in Mixture-of-Experts through S hared E xpert AL ignment

    by Qingyu Meng, Yiwei Zha, Jiahuan Pei, Koen Hindriks, Herbert Bos, Min Chen

  • Open Access

    NotaryMark: Multi-Bit Watermarking for Black-Box Dataset Usage Auditing in Text-to-Image Diffusion Models

    by Xinyi Yu, Linkang Du, Zhou Su, Min Chen, Yuntao Wang, Zhikun Zhang

  • Open Access

    DWBench: Holistic Evaluation of Watermark for Dataset Copyright Auditing

    by Xiao Ren, Xinyi Yu, Linkang Du, Min Chen, Yuanchao Shu, Zhou Su, Yunjun Gao, Zhikun Zhang

  • Open Access

    InceptionRAG: Stealthy Poisoning Attack Against Retrieval-Augmented Generation

    by Jiachang Zhang, Min Chen, Xiao Ren, Zhenyong Zhang, Yuanchao Shu, Yunjun Gao, Zhikun Zhang

  • Efficient Poisoning Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning-Based Recommender Systems

    by Quan Yuan, Linkang Du, Min Chen, Mingyang Sun, Yunjun Gao, Peng Cheng, Shibo He, Jiming Chen, Zhikun Zhang


  • Revealing the Risk of Hyper-Parameter Leakage in Deep Reinforcement Learning Models

    by Linkang Du, Zhikun Zhang, Min Chen, Mingyang Sun, Shouling Ji, Peng Cheng, Jiming Chen, Michael Backes, Yang Zhang

    Deep reinforcement learning (DRL) has been implemented across various critical applications, including smart grids, trac management systems, and autonomous vehicles. To safeguard intellectual property and mitigate security vulnerabilities, access to DRL models is typically restricted to a black-box format. is means specic details like the structure of the policy network and optimization processes are not openly available to users. It is crucial to determine if the hyper-parameters can be inferred from observable states and actions within these models, presenting two primary challenges: 1) limited data available from the black-box model and 2) the intertwined eects of hyperparameters on the model's behavior. Since DRL models exhibit varying behaviors in identical tasks depending on their hyper-parameter congurations, we introduce a novel hyper-parameter inference attack against DRL, named HyperInfer, which allows adversaries to deduce the settings of a black-box DRL model. In order to fully assess the risk of model hyper-parameter leakage, we design two novel state generation methods that provoke divergent responses from DRL models. We also develop an inference framework to elucidate the relationship between model behavior and hyper-parameter settings. rough comprehensive experiments involving multiple DRL models and environments, we demonstrate that model behaviors can indeed reveal hyper-parameter settings, with inference accuracy surpassing 90% in scenarios such as PPO with CartPole. We also discuss keyndings relevant to practical applications and explore how knowledge of hyperparameters can facilitate more sophisticated attacks. Lastly, we propose potential defensive strategies to minimize the risk of hyper-parameter leakage in DRL models.


  • Open Access

    ArtistAuditor: Auditing Artist Style Pirate in Text-to-Image Generation Models

    by Linkang Du, Zheng Zhu, Min Chen, Zhou Su, Shouling Ji, Peng Cheng, Jiming Chen, Zhikun Zhang


  • Open Access

    PARL: Poisoning Attacks Against Reinforcement Learning-based Recommender Systems

    by Linkang Du, Quan Yuan, Min Chen, Mingyang Sun, Peng Cheng, Jiming Chen, Zhikun Zhang

    Recommender systems predict and suggest relevant options to users in various domains, such as e-commerce, streaming services, and social media. Recently, deep reinforcement learning (DRL)-based recommendation systems have become increasingly popular in academics and industry since DRL can characterize the long-term interaction between the system and users to achieve a better recommendation experience, e.g., Netflix, Spotify, Google, and YouTube. This paper demonstrates that an adversary can manipulate the DRL-based recommender system by injecting carefully designed user-system interaction records. The poisoning attack against the DRL-based recommender system is formulated as a non-convex integer programming problem. To solve the problem, we proposed a three-phase mechanism (called PARL) to maximize the hit ratio (the proportion of recommendations that result in actual user interactions, such as clicks, purchases, or other relevant actions) while avoiding easy detection. The core idea of PARL is to improve the ranking of the target item while fixing the rankings of other items. Considering the sequential decision-making characteristics of DRL, PARL rearranges the items' order of the fake users to mimic the normal users' sequential features, an aspect usually overlooked in existing work. Our experiments on three real-world datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of PARL and better concealment against the detection techniques. PARL is open-sourced at https://github.com/PARL-RS/PARL.


  • Open Access

    DPMLBench: Holistic Evaluation of Differentially Private Machine Learning

    by Chengkun Wei, Minghu Zhao, Zhikun Zhang, Min Chen, Wenlong Meng, Bo Liu, Yuan Fan, Wenzhi Chen

    Differential privacy (DP), as a rigorous mathematical definition quantifying privacy leakage, has become a well-accepted standard for privacy protection. Combined with powerful machine learning (ML) techniques, differentially private machine learning (DPML) is increasingly important. As the most classic DPML algorithm, DP-SGD incurs a significant loss of utility, which hinders DPML's deployment in practice. Many studies have recently proposed improved algorithms based on DP-SGD to mitigate utility loss. However, these studies are isolated and cannot comprehensively measure the performance of improvements proposed in algorithms. More importantly, there is a lack of comprehensive research to compare improvements in these DPML algorithms across utility, defensive capabilities, and generalizability. We fill this gap by performing a holistic measurement of improved DPML algorithms on utility and defense capability against membership inference attacks (MIAs) on image classification tasks. We first present a taxonomy of where improvements are located in the ML life cycle. Based on our taxonomy, we jointly perform an extensive measurement study of the improved DPML algorithms, over twelve algorithms, four model architectures, four datasets, two attacks, and various privacy budget configurations. We also cover state-of-the-art label differential privacy (Label DP) algorithms in the evaluation. According to our empirical results, DP can effectively defend against MIAs, and sensitivity-bounding techniques such as per-sample gradient clipping play an important role in defense. We also explore some improvements that can maintain model utility and defend against MIAs more effectively. Experiments show that Label DP algorithms achieve less utility loss but are fragile to MIAs. ML practitioners may benefit from these evaluations to select appropriate algorithms. To support our evaluation, we implement a modular re-usable software, DPMLBench,1. We open-source the tool in https://github.com/DmsKinson/DPMLBench which enables sensitive data owners to deploy DPML algorithms and serves as a benchmark tool for researchers and practitioners.


  • Open Access

    When Machine Unlearning Jeopardizes Privacy

    by Min Chen, Zhikun Zhang, Tianhao Wang, Michael Backes, Mathias Humbert, Yang Zhang

    The right to be forgotten states that a data owner has the right to erase their data from an entity storing it. In the context of machine learning (ML), the right to be forgotten requires an ML model owner to remove the data owner's data from the training set used to build the ML model, a process known asmachine unlearning. While originally designed to protect the privacy of the data owner, we argue that machine unlearning may leave some imprint of the data in the ML model and thus create unintended privacy risks. In this paper, we perform the first study on investigating the unintended information leakage caused by machine unlearning. We propose a novel membership inference attack that leverages the different outputs of an ML model's two versions to infer whether a target sample is part of the training set of the original model but out of the training set of the corresponding unlearned model. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed membership inference attack achieves strong performance. More importantly, we show that our attack in multiple cases outperforms the classical membership inference attack on the original ML model, which indicates that machine unlearning can have counterproductive effects on privacy. We notice that the privacy degradation is especially significant for well-generalized ML models where classical membership inference does not perform well. We further investigate four mechanisms to mitigate the newly discovered privacy risks and show that releasing the predicted label only, temperature scaling, and differential privacy are effective. We believe that our results can help improve privacy protection in practical implementations of machine unlearning. \footnoteOur code is available at \urlhttps://github.com/MinChen00/UnlearningLeaks.