Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Seungwon (Eugene) Jeong has a total of 8 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Sujin Lee
School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
2 shared publications - Tae Hyun Kim
School of Business and Technology Management, College of Business, KAIST, Daejeon, Republic of Korea
2 shared publications - Dong-Hyuk Kim
School of Economics, University of Queensland, Queensland, Australia
1 shared publication - Gaurab Aryal
Department of Economics Indiana University BU TPRI NASM-ES 2023
1 shared publication - Hanna Charankevich
University of Virginia
1 shared publication Joosung Lee
Department of Economics, SKKU, 25-2 Sungkyunkwan-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul, 03063, Republic of Korea
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Educational and Vocational Guidance
- p. 1-28
How do leaders’ expressions of gratitude relate to subordinates’ promotion focus? Links to job crafting and voice
We explore the impact of leader gratitude expression on subordinates’ proactive career behaviors, job crafting (seeking resources, seeking challenges, and reducing demands) and voice behaviors (promotive and prohibitive voice), and the mediating mechanism by subordinate promotion focus. A survey data from 597 full-time employees, analyzed using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping analyses, supported hypothesized relationships. Promotion focus mediated the relationship between leader gratitude expression and all dimensions of job crafting and voice behaviors. This study contributes to the literature on leadership and regulatory focus. We discuss future research and implications for leadership practice and career self-management.
- 20 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal for Educational and Vocational Guidance
- p. 1-28
Open AccessHow do leaders’ expressions of gratitude relate to subordinates’ promotion focus? Links to job crafting and voice
We explore the impact of leader gratitude expression on subordinates’ proactive career behaviors, job crafting (seeking resources, seeking challenges, and reducing demands) and voice behaviors (promotive and prohibitive voice), and the mediating mechanism by subordinate promotion focus. A survey data from 597 full-time employees, analyzed using structural equation modeling and bootstrapping analyses, supported hypothesized relationships. Promotion focus mediated the relationship between leader gratitude expression and all dimensions of job crafting and voice behaviors. This study contributes to the literature on leadership and regulatory focus. We discuss future research and implications for leadership practice and career self-management.
- Open Access
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 16 (1)
The role of group attachment security in minority opinion expression in decision making groups
Minority opinions often generate crucial ideas and knowledge, but it is more challenging to be a minority opinion holder in an ingroup (disagreeing with members of one’s own group) than in an outgroup (disagreeing with members of other groups). This paper extends the group decision-making, knowledge sharing, and minority influence literatures by exploring a psychological condition under which ingroup minority opinion holders can be influential in diverse decision-making groups. Across two experiments, activating group attachment security (vs. neutral condition) increased minority opinion holders’ task focus and the persuasiveness of their expressed dissenting opinions (Study 1), and increased majority members’ willingness to use that dissent while these authentic texts also differed in argument quality (Study 2). Although the predicted omnibus attachment-by-social-category (secure vs. neutral × ingroup vs. outgroup) interactions were generally non-significant, exploratory simple-effects comparisons suggested these effects were more notable among ingroup minorities. These findings suggest that group attachment security can help minority opinion holders be influential in decision-making groups that represent diverse social categories.
- 4 August 2026
- Published by Springer Nature in Scientific Reports
- Vol. 16 (1)
Open AccessThe role of group attachment security in minority opinion expression in decision making groups
Minority opinions often generate crucial ideas and knowledge, but it is more challenging to be a minority opinion holder in an ingroup (disagreeing with members of one’s own group) than in an outgroup (disagreeing with members of other groups). This paper extends the group decision-making, knowledge sharing, and minority influence literatures by exploring a psychological condition under which ingroup minority opinion holders can be influential in diverse decision-making groups. Across two experiments, activating group attachment security (vs. neutral condition) increased minority opinion holders’ task focus and the persuasiveness of their expressed dissenting opinions (Study 1), and increased majority members’ willingness to use that dissent while these authentic texts also differed in argument quality (Study 2). Although the predicted omnibus attachment-by-social-category (secure vs. neutral × ingroup vs. outgroup) interactions were generally non-significant, exploratory simple-effects comparisons suggested these effects were more notable among ingroup minorities. These findings suggest that group attachment security can help minority opinion holders be influential in decision-making groups that represent diverse social categories.
- Open Access
- 26 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1537-1542
Centralized decentralization: simple economics of the DPoS blockchain governance
- 26 December 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Applied Economics Letters
- Vol. 33 (10) , 1537-1542
Open AccessCentralized decentralization: simple economics of the DPoS blockchain governance
- Open Access
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 77 (2) , 121-127
Reserve Price (In)equivalence: Shill Bidding to Lower the Reserve Price
The optimal reserve price of the third‐price auction with two bidders differs from that with more than two bidders, whereas the optimal reserve price of the second‐price auction is the same regardless of the number of bidders. We generalize this result to the kth‐price multiunit auctions with single‐unit demand, and introduce a new kind of shill‐bidding incentive of bidders in order to lower the reserve price. Alongside budget constraints caused by overbidding, this may explain why third‐price auctions are rare in practice.
- 18 November 2024
- Published by Wiley in Bulletin of Economic Research
- Vol. 77 (2) , 121-127
Open AccessReserve Price (In)equivalence: Shill Bidding to Lower the Reserve Price
The optimal reserve price of the third‐price auction with two bidders differs from that with more than two bidders, whereas the optimal reserve price of the second‐price auction is the same regardless of the number of bidders. We generalize this result to the kth‐price multiunit auctions with single‐unit demand, and introduce a new kind of shill‐bidding incentive of bidders in order to lower the reserve price. Alongside budget constraints caused by overbidding, this may explain why third‐price auctions are rare in practice.
- Open Access
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 143, 191-203
The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
- 30 November 2023
- Published by Elsevier in Games and Economic Behavior
- Vol. 143, 191-203
Open AccessThe groupwise-pivotal referral auction: Core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism
- Open Access
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 435-440
A Note on a Moment Inequality
Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E [ X 2 ] ≥ E 2 [ X ] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E [ X r + s ] and E [ X r ] E [ X s ]. We also provide its economic application.
- 21 September 2023
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics
- Vol. 24 (1) , 435-440
Open AccessA Note on a Moment Inequality
Using Chebyshev’s sum inequality, we generalize E [ X 2 ] ≥ E 2 [ X ] into a moment inequality with a general combination of moments that compares E [ X r + s ] and E [ X r ] E [ X s ]. We also provide its economic application.
- Open Access
- 21 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Reserve Price (In)equivalence Shill-Bidding to Lower the Reserve Price
The optimal reserve price of the third-price auction with two bidders differs from that with more than two bidders, whereas the optimal reserve price of the second-price auction is the same regardless of the number of bidders. We generalize this result to multiple-item auctions with unit demand, and introduce a new kind of shill bidding incentive to lower the reserve price. In addition to the budget restriction due to overbidding, this can be one reason why third-price auctions are rare in practice.
- 21 July 2022
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessReserve Price (In)equivalence Shill-Bidding to Lower the Reserve Price
The optimal reserve price of the third-price auction with two bidders differs from that with more than two bidders, whereas the optimal reserve price of the second-price auction is the same regardless of the number of bidders. We generalize this result to multiple-item auctions with unit demand, and introduce a new kind of shill bidding incentive to lower the reserve price. In addition to the budget restriction due to overbidding, this can be one reason why third-price auctions are rare in practice.
- Open Access
Procurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion
We propose an empirical method to analyze data from first-price procurements where bidders are asymmetric in their risk-aversion (CRRA) coefficients and distributions of private costs. Our Bayesian approach evaluates the likelihood by solving type-symmetric equilibria using the boundary-value method and integrates out unobserved heterogeneity through data augmentation. We study a new dataset from Russian government procurements focusing on the category of printing papers. We find that there is no unobserved heterogeneity (presumably because the job is routine), but bidders are highly asymmetric in their cost and risk-aversion. Our counterfactual study shows that choosing a type-specific cost-minimizing reserve price marginally reduces the procurement cost; however, inviting one more bidder substantially reduces the cost, by at least 5.5%. Furthermore, incorrectly imposing risk-neutrality would severely mislead inference and policy recommendations, but the bias from imposing homogeneity in risk-aversion is small.
Open AccessProcurements with Bidder Asymmetry in Cost and Risk-Aversion
We propose an empirical method to analyze data from first-price procurements where bidders are asymmetric in their risk-aversion (CRRA) coefficients and distributions of private costs. Our Bayesian approach evaluates the likelihood by solving type-symmetric equilibria using the boundary-value method and integrates out unobserved heterogeneity through data augmentation. We study a new dataset from Russian government procurements focusing on the category of printing papers. We find that there is no unobserved heterogeneity (presumably because the job is routine), but bidders are highly asymmetric in their cost and risk-aversion. Our counterfactual study shows that choosing a type-specific cost-minimizing reserve price marginally reduces the procurement cost; however, inviting one more bidder substantially reduces the cost, by at least 5.5%. Furthermore, incorrectly imposing risk-neutrality would severely mislead inference and policy recommendations, but the bias from imposing homogeneity in risk-aversion is small.
- Open Access
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 1093-1107
On the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness
In auctions with externalities, it is well‐known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and “fairness.” Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high‐stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.
- 11 November 2020
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 51 (4) , 1093-1107
Open AccessOn the core of auctions with externalities: stability and fairness
In auctions with externalities, it is well‐known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and “fairness.” Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high‐stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.
- Open Access
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
On the Core of Auctions with Externalities: Stability and Fairness
In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high-stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.
- 1 February 2020
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Open AccessOn the Core of Auctions with Externalities: Stability and Fairness
In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. Nevertheless, some auction outcome must be chosen. We separate deviations into two types: deviations by paying more and deviations by refusing to pay. In high-stakes auctions where bidders also care about their reputation, the latter are unlikely to occur, or else can be prevented by legal interventions. In contrast, the former is more undesirable in the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot refuse to pay.