Mingyu Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Mingyu Wang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Fangyu Zheng
School of Cryptology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
3 shared publications - Jingqiang Lin
University of Science and Technology of China
3 shared publications - Yu Fu
School of Cyber Science and Technology, University of Science and Technology of China, Hefei, China
2 shared publications - Bowen Xu
State Key Laboratory of Information Security, Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing 100045, China
1 shared publication - Dengguo Feng
Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication Fangjie Jiang
School of Cryptology, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 89-106
Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Metaphorology: Embodied Philosophy
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 89-106
Philosophical Foundations of Cognitive Metaphorology: Embodied Philosophy
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 173-195
Emotional Metaphor: A Case Study of “Love (爱情)”
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 173-195
Emotional Metaphor: A Case Study of “Love (爱情)”
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 263-274
Idiomatic Metaphor
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 57-73
Conceptual Metaphor Theory
- 2 September 2025
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 345-364
Metaphor and Translation
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 3504-3514
HTM-PQC: Hardening Cryptography Keys Under the Trend of Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration on Industrial Internet
With the rapid expansion of Industry 4.0 technology, the proliferation of large-scale devices faces increasingly severe cyber threats, underscoring the critical importance of cryptographic technology for secure communication and authentication. However, cryptographic systems, as the bedrock of security, have faced a barrage of attacks in recent years, including potential threats from quantum computing and memory disclosure vulnerabilities. In this article, we focus on enhancing the security of two standard quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, Dilithium and eXtended Merkle signature scheme (XMSS), by leveraging hardware transactional memory (HTM) to create a secure operational environment. Unlike traditional cryptography such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), Dilithium, and XMSS involve more and larger sensitive variables, rendering conventional solutions inadequate. By conducting a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of variables within the abovementioned algorithms, we confine sensitive operations to transactional execution regions and employ transaction-splitting technology for efficiency. Our prototype, utilizing Intel transactional synchronization extension (TSX), demonstrates robust protection against memory disclosure attacks with acceptable performance overheads. Notably, our security-enhanced Dilithium and XMSS software implementations, recommended by NIST, achieve an average throughput factor of 0.75 compared to the (unprotected) reference implementations.
- 27 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics
- Vol. 21 (4) , 3504-3514
HTM-PQC: Hardening Cryptography Keys Under the Trend of Post-Quantum Cryptography Migration on Industrial Internet
With the rapid expansion of Industry 4.0 technology, the proliferation of large-scale devices faces increasingly severe cyber threats, underscoring the critical importance of cryptographic technology for secure communication and authentication. However, cryptographic systems, as the bedrock of security, have faced a barrage of attacks in recent years, including potential threats from quantum computing and memory disclosure vulnerabilities. In this article, we focus on enhancing the security of two standard quantum-safe cryptographic algorithms, Dilithium and eXtended Merkle signature scheme (XMSS), by leveraging hardware transactional memory (HTM) to create a secure operational environment. Unlike traditional cryptography such as Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) and elliptic curve cryptography (ECC), Dilithium, and XMSS involve more and larger sensitive variables, rendering conventional solutions inadequate. By conducting a comprehensive sensitivity analysis of variables within the abovementioned algorithms, we confine sensitive operations to transactional execution regions and employ transaction-splitting technology for efficiency. Our prototype, utilizing Intel transactional synchronization extension (TSX), demonstrates robust protection against memory disclosure attacks with acceptable performance overheads. Notably, our security-enhanced Dilithium and XMSS software implementations, recommended by NIST, achieve an average throughput factor of 0.75 compared to the (unprotected) reference implementations.
- 29 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 7389-7403
ZeroShield: Transparently Mitigating Code Page Sharing Attacks With Zero-Cost Stand-By
Numerous cache side-channel attack techniques enable attackers to execute a cross-VM cache side-channel attack through the sharing of code pages with the targeted victim. Nonetheless, most prior defense solutions fall short of efficiency and ease of deployment, thus restricting their practicality for real-world implementation. This paper introduces ZeroShield, an adaptive and transparent approach implemented at the hypervisor layer, designed to counteract the code page sharing attack, a subset of cache side-channel attacks, occurring within a single virtual machine (VM) or spanning across multiple VMs. By thoroughly scrutinizing the “by-products” resulting from a code page sharing attack, we meticulously track the attacker’s access to security-sensitive code pages. This is achieved through harnessing hardware virtualization features, such as the Intel extended page table, in conjunction with the CR3 register. Utilizing this information, ZeroShield continuously monitors security-sensitive code pages, adeptly navigating complex OS and hypervisor behaviors. The architecture of ZeroShield exhibits an attack-aware design, enabling it to deploy protection measures on demand. Consequently, the system theoretically experiences negligible overhead in the absence of attackers. Empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of ZeroShield in thwarting code page sharing attacks. It achieves this without imposing any performance penalties in the absence of attackers, and with a minimal overhead of less than 3.8% when attackers are active. Significantly, ZeroShield boasts a cost-free standby state and necessitates no adjustments to upper applications, guest OS, or hardware configurations. This attribute positions ZeroShield as an optimal default solution in real-world cloud environments to effectively counter code page sharing attacks.
- 29 July 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security
- Vol. 19 (15566013) , 7389-7403
ZeroShield: Transparently Mitigating Code Page Sharing Attacks With Zero-Cost Stand-By
Numerous cache side-channel attack techniques enable attackers to execute a cross-VM cache side-channel attack through the sharing of code pages with the targeted victim. Nonetheless, most prior defense solutions fall short of efficiency and ease of deployment, thus restricting their practicality for real-world implementation. This paper introduces ZeroShield, an adaptive and transparent approach implemented at the hypervisor layer, designed to counteract the code page sharing attack, a subset of cache side-channel attacks, occurring within a single virtual machine (VM) or spanning across multiple VMs. By thoroughly scrutinizing the “by-products” resulting from a code page sharing attack, we meticulously track the attacker’s access to security-sensitive code pages. This is achieved through harnessing hardware virtualization features, such as the Intel extended page table, in conjunction with the CR3 register. Utilizing this information, ZeroShield continuously monitors security-sensitive code pages, adeptly navigating complex OS and hypervisor behaviors. The architecture of ZeroShield exhibits an attack-aware design, enabling it to deploy protection measures on demand. Consequently, the system theoretically experiences negligible overhead in the absence of attackers. Empirical evidence confirms the effectiveness of ZeroShield in thwarting code page sharing attacks. It achieves this without imposing any performance penalties in the absence of attackers, and with a minimal overhead of less than 3.8% when attackers are active. Significantly, ZeroShield boasts a cost-free standby state and necessitates no adjustments to upper applications, guest OS, or hardware configurations. This attribute positions ZeroShield as an optimal default solution in real-world cloud environments to effectively counter code page sharing attacks.
- Open Access
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1-22
RegKey: A Register-based Implementation of ECC Signature Algorithms Against One-shot Memory Disclosure
To ensure the security of cryptographic algorithm implementations, several cryptographic key protection schemes have been proposed to prevent various memory disclosure attacks. Among them, the register-based solutions do not rely on special hardware features and offer better applicability. However, due to the size limitation of register resources, the performance of register-based solutions is much worse than conventional cryptosystem implementations without security enhancements. This paper presents RegKey, an efficient register-based implementation of ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) signature algorithms. Different from other schemes that protect the whole cryptographic operations, RegKey only uses CPU registers to execute simple but critical operations, significantly reducing the usage of register resources and performance overheads. To achieve this goal, RegKey splits the ECC signing into two parts, (1) complex elliptic curve group operations on non-sensitive data in main memory as normal implementations, and (2) simple prime field operations on sensitive data inside CPU registers. RegKey guarantees the plaintext private key and random number used for signing only appear in registers to effectively resist one-shot memory disclosure attacks such as cold-boot attacks and warm-boot attacks, which are usually launched by physically accessing the victim machine to acquire partial or even entire memory data but only once. Compared with existing cryptographic key protection schemes, the performance of RegKey is greatly improved. Regkey is applicable to different platforms because it does not rely on special CPU hardware features. Since RegKey focuses on one-shot memory disclosure instead of persistent software-based attacks, it works as a choice suitable for embedded devices or offline machines where physical attacks are the main threat.
- 9 November 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM) in ACM Transactions on Embedded Computing Systems
- Vol. 22 (6) , 1-22
Open AccessRegKey: A Register-based Implementation of ECC Signature Algorithms Against One-shot Memory Disclosure
To ensure the security of cryptographic algorithm implementations, several cryptographic key protection schemes have been proposed to prevent various memory disclosure attacks. Among them, the register-based solutions do not rely on special hardware features and offer better applicability. However, due to the size limitation of register resources, the performance of register-based solutions is much worse than conventional cryptosystem implementations without security enhancements. This paper presents RegKey, an efficient register-based implementation of ECC (elliptic curve cryptography) signature algorithms. Different from other schemes that protect the whole cryptographic operations, RegKey only uses CPU registers to execute simple but critical operations, significantly reducing the usage of register resources and performance overheads. To achieve this goal, RegKey splits the ECC signing into two parts, (1) complex elliptic curve group operations on non-sensitive data in main memory as normal implementations, and (2) simple prime field operations on sensitive data inside CPU registers. RegKey guarantees the plaintext private key and random number used for signing only appear in registers to effectively resist one-shot memory disclosure attacks such as cold-boot attacks and warm-boot attacks, which are usually launched by physically accessing the victim machine to acquire partial or even entire memory data but only once. Compared with existing cryptographic key protection schemes, the performance of RegKey is greatly improved. Regkey is applicable to different platforms because it does not rely on special CPU hardware features. Since RegKey focuses on one-shot memory disclosure instead of persistent software-based attacks, it works as a choice suitable for embedded devices or offline machines where physical attacks are the main threat.
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-169
Black-Box Testing of Cryptographic Algorithms Based on Data Characteristics
- 6 October 2022
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 153-169
Black-Box Testing of Cryptographic Algorithms Based on Data Characteristics
- 26 February 2020
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 173-203
Synchrony and Diachrony of Linguistic Signs