Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Tobin Feldman-Fitzthum has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Daniele Buono
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, USA
3 shared publications - Angelo Ruocco
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, USA
2 shared publications - Claudio Carvalho
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, USA
2 shared publications - Hubertus Franke
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Mengmei Ye
IBM Research, Yorktown Heights, NY, USA
2 shared publications - Anton Burtsev
University of Utah, Salt Lake City, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 2 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 19-27
Position Paper: From Confidential Computing to Zero Trust, Come Along for the (Bumpy?) Ride
- 2 November 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 19-27
Open AccessPosition Paper: From Confidential Computing to Zero Trust, Come Along for the (Bumpy?) Ride
- Open Access
- 22 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 32-40
Serverless Confidential Containers: Challenges and Opportunities
Serverless computing allows users to execute pieces of code (so called functions) on-demand in the cloud without having to provision any hardware resources. However, by executing in the cloud and delegating control over hardware resources, the integrity of the execution and the confidentiality of function code and data are at the mercy of the cloud provider and serverless runtime. Confidential computing aims to remove trust from the cloud provider by executing applications inside hardware enclaves. In spite of the increasing adoption of confidential computing, designing a confidential serverless runtime with moderate performance overhead remains an open challenge. In this short article we present our experience porting the Knative serverless runtime to a confidential setting using Confidential Containers (CoCo), a technology that allows the execution of unmodified (encrypted) container images inside confidential VMs (cVMs). Our results show that cVMs are not ready to execute container-based serverless functions. Starting a serverless function in a CoCo from an encrypted container image with attestation takes up to 17 seconds. Starting 16 serverless functions concurrently takes more than three minutes, 20× slower than its non-confidential counterpart. We analyze the main sources of overhead, and outline the research challenges to bridge the gap between confidential and serverless computing.
- 22 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 32-40
Open AccessServerless Confidential Containers: Challenges and Opportunities
Serverless computing allows users to execute pieces of code (so called functions) on-demand in the cloud without having to provision any hardware resources. However, by executing in the cloud and delegating control over hardware resources, the integrity of the execution and the confidentiality of function code and data are at the mercy of the cloud provider and serverless runtime. Confidential computing aims to remove trust from the cloud provider by executing applications inside hardware enclaves. In spite of the increasing adoption of confidential computing, designing a confidential serverless runtime with moderate performance overhead remains an open challenge. In this short article we present our experience porting the Knative serverless runtime to a confidential setting using Confidential Containers (CoCo), a technology that allows the execution of unmodified (encrypted) container images inside confidential VMs (cVMs). Our results show that cVMs are not ready to execute container-based serverless functions. Starting a serverless function in a CoCo from an encrypted container image with attestation takes up to 17 seconds. Starting 16 serverless functions concurrently takes more than three minutes, 20× slower than its non-confidential counterpart. We analyze the main sources of overhead, and outline the research challenges to bridge the gap between confidential and serverless computing.
- Open Access
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 732-743
Remote attestation of confidential VMs using ephemeral vTPMs
Trying to address the security challenges of a cloud-centric software deployment paradigm, silicon and cloud vendors are introducing confidential computing – an umbrella term aimed at providing hardware and software mechanisms for protecting cloud workloads from the cloud provider and its software stack. Today, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), AMD secure encrypted virtualization (SEV), Intel trust domain extensions (TDX), etc., provide a way to shield cloud applications from the cloud provider through encryption of the application’s memory below the hardware boundary of the CPU, hence requiring trust only in the CPU vendor. Unfortunately, existing hardware mechanisms do not automatically enable the guarantee that a protected system was not tampered with during configuration and boot time. Such a guarantee relies on a hardware root of trust, i.e., an integrity-protected location that can store measurements in a trustworthy manner, extend them, and authenticate the measurement logs to the user (remote attestation). In this work, we design and implement a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) that virtualizes the hardware root of trust without requiring trust in the cloud provider. To ensure the security of a vTPM in a provider-controlled environment, we leverage unique isolation properties of the SEV-SNP hardware that allows us to execute secure services (such as vTPM) as part of the enclave environment protected from the cloud provider. We further develop a novel approach to vTPM state management where the vTPM state is not preserved across reboots. Specifically, we develop a stateless ephemeral vTPM that supports remote attestation without any persistent state on the host. This allows us to pair each confidential VM with a private instance of a vTPM completely isolated from the provider-controlled environment and other VMs. We built our prototype entirely on open-source components – Qemu, Linux, and Keylime. Though our work is AMD-specific, a similar approach could be used to build remote attestation protocols on other trusted execution environments (TEE).
- 4 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 732-743
Open AccessRemote attestation of confidential VMs using ephemeral vTPMs
Trying to address the security challenges of a cloud-centric software deployment paradigm, silicon and cloud vendors are introducing confidential computing – an umbrella term aimed at providing hardware and software mechanisms for protecting cloud workloads from the cloud provider and its software stack. Today, Intel Software Guard Extensions (SGX), AMD secure encrypted virtualization (SEV), Intel trust domain extensions (TDX), etc., provide a way to shield cloud applications from the cloud provider through encryption of the application’s memory below the hardware boundary of the CPU, hence requiring trust only in the CPU vendor. Unfortunately, existing hardware mechanisms do not automatically enable the guarantee that a protected system was not tampered with during configuration and boot time. Such a guarantee relies on a hardware root of trust, i.e., an integrity-protected location that can store measurements in a trustworthy manner, extend them, and authenticate the measurement logs to the user (remote attestation). In this work, we design and implement a virtual trusted platform module (vTPM) that virtualizes the hardware root of trust without requiring trust in the cloud provider. To ensure the security of a vTPM in a provider-controlled environment, we leverage unique isolation properties of the SEV-SNP hardware that allows us to execute secure services (such as vTPM) as part of the enclave environment protected from the cloud provider. We further develop a novel approach to vTPM state management where the vTPM state is not preserved across reboots. Specifically, we develop a stateless ephemeral vTPM that supports remote attestation without any persistent state on the host. This allows us to pair each confidential VM with a private instance of a vTPM completely isolated from the provider-controlled environment and other VMs. We built our prototype entirely on open-source components – Qemu, Linux, and Keylime. Though our work is AMD-specific, a similar approach could be used to build remote attestation protocols on other trusted execution environments (TEE).