EKEun Jung Kim

Eun Jung Kim

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Eun Jung Kim has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    SuperMesh: Energy-Efficient Collective Communications for Accelerators

    by Sabuj Laskar, Pranati Majhi, Abdullah Muzahid, Eun Jung Kim


  • Open Access

    Enhancing Program Analysis with Deterministic Distinguishable Calling Context

    by Sungkeun Kim, Khanh Nguyen, Chia-Che Tsai, Jaewoo Lee, Abdullah Muzahid, Eun Jung Kim

    Calling context is crucial for improving the precision of program analyses in various use cases (clients), such as profiling, debugging, optimization, and security checking. Often the calling context is encoded using a numerical value. We have observed that many clients benefit not only from a deterministic but also globally distinguishable value across runs to simplify bookkeeping and guarantee complete uniqueness. However, existing work only guarantees determinism, not global distinguishability. Clients need to develop auxiliary helpers, which incurs considerable overhead to distinguish encoded values among all calling contexts. In this paper, we propose Deterministic Distinguishable Calling Context Encoding () that can enable both properties of calling context encoding natively. The key idea of is leveraging the static call graph and encoding each calling context as the running call path count. Thereby, a mapping is established statically and can be readily used by the clients. Our experiments with two client tools show that has a comparable overhead compared to two state-of-the-art encoding schemes, PCCE and PCC, and further avoids the expensive overheads of collision detection, up to 2.1× and 50%, for Splash-3 and SPEC CPU 2017, respectively.


  • Open Access

    Attack of the Knights:Non Uniform Cache Side Channel Attack

    by Farabi Mahmud, Sungkeun Kim, Harpreet Singh Chawla, Eun Jung Kim, Chia-Che Tsai, Abdullah Muzahid

    For a distributed last-level cache (LLC) in a large multicore chip, the access time to one LLC bank can significantly differ from that to another due to the difference in physical distance. In this paper, we successfully demonstrate a new distance-based side-channel attack by timing the AES decryption operation and extracting part of an AES secret key on an Intel Knights Landing CPU. We introduce several techniques to overcome the challenges of the attack, including the use of multiple attack threads to ensure LLC hits, to detect vulnerable memory locations, and to obtain fine-grained timing of the victim operations. While operating as a covert channel, this attack can reach a bandwidth of 205 KBPS with an error rate of only 0.02%. We also observed that the side-channel attack can extract 4 bytes of an AES key with 100% accuracy with only 4000 trial rounds of encryption.