Junhwan Lee
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Junhwan Lee has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David Akopian
Department of Electrical & Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at San Antonio , One UTSA Circle, San Antonio, TX 78249
1 shared publication - Erick Schmidt
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA
1 shared publication - Nikolaos Gatsis
The University of Texas at San Antonio, San Antonio, TX, USA
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 138986-139003
Detection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers’ presence in inflicted signals’ derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver, and 2) a commercial hand-held device.
- 7 December 2023
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Access
- Vol. 11, 138986-139003
Open AccessDetection and Mitigation of Spoofing Attacks Against Time Synchronization and Positioning
Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) receivers are vulnerable to intentional spoofing attacks which can manipulate position, velocity, and time (PVT) measurements. Previous work has demonstrated that Time Synchronization Attacks (TSAs) can be detected and mitigated using sparse optimization techniques which reveal spoofers’ presence in inflicted signals’ derivative domains. Aiming to provide an efficient protection algorithm against spoofing, this paper expands the scope of the sparse signal processing framework to address more complicated attacks for stationary and low-dynamic receivers. In particular, TSAs against stationary receivers should be addressed differently if the position and velocity are manipulated by the spoofer at the same time. A new sparse processing method is presented employing a novel linearization of the measurement equation that includes attacks against time, position, and velocity. The method is assessed against both authentically and synthetically spoofed signals to verify its robustness in two test beds: 1) a lab-based software defined GPS receiver, and 2) a commercial hand-held device.