MPMathieu Parenti

Mathieu Parenti

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Mathieu Parenti has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Top Cited Papers

    Relationship Stickiness, International Trade, and Economic Uncertainty

    by Julien Martin, Isabelle Mejean, Mathieu Parenti

    We study how stickiness in business relationships influences the trade impact of aggregate uncertainty. To begin, we construct a product-level index of relationship stickiness using firm-to-firm relationship duration data. We then demonstrate how relationship stickiness shapes trade dynamics in response to uncertainty shocks. We find that episodes of uncertainty lead to a decline in the overall establishment of new business relationships, with the impact varying depending on the level of stickiness. In markets characterized by high stickiness, uncertainty shocks primarily impede investments in new firm-to-firm relationships. In contrast, for nonsticky products, the adjustment to uncertainty shocks mainly manifests as the disruption of existing relationships.


    • 1 December 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Profit Shifting and International Tax Reforms

    by Alessandro Ferrari, Sébastien Laffitte, Mathieu Parenti, Farid Toubal

    International taxation rules are widely regarded as outdated, enabling multinational corporations to exploit loopholes and shift profits to tax havens. This paper explores how international tax reforms can address profit shifting and shape real income and welfare across countries. We propose a model of corporate tax avoidance that separates profits generated by real economic activities from paper profits shifted to tax havens. The model introduces ’triangle identities’ to estimate bilateral profit-shifting flows. Using macro- and firm-level data, we estimate that the elasticity of paper profits is three times greater than that of the tax base. Applying the model to global minimum tax reforms, we find that these policies improve welfare in two ways: by increasing tax revenues to support public goods and by reducing incentives for tax competition. We identify the optimal minimum tax rate under different scenarios of taxing rights allocation. Finally, our analysis shows that unilateral destination-based cash-flow tax reforms can have either positive or negative welfare effects, with outcomes depending significantly on trade imbalances.

    • 1 October 2024
    • Published by HAL in HAL
    Open Access

    Relationship stickiness, international trade, and economic uncertainty

    by Julien Martin, Isabelle Mejean, Mathieu Parenti

    We study how stickiness in business relationships influences the trade impact of aggregate uncertainty. To begin, we construct a product-level index of relationship stickiness using firm-to-firm relationship duration data. We then demonstrate how relationship stickiness shapes trade dynamics in response to uncertainty shocks.We find that episodes of uncertainty lead to a decline in the overall establishment of new business relationships, with the impact varying depending on the level of stickiness. In markets characterized by high stickiness, uncertainty shocks primarily impede investments in new firm-to-firm relationships. In contrast, for non-sticky products, the adjustment to uncertainty shocks mainly manifests as the disruption of existing relationships.

  • A Simple Theory of Deep Trade Integration

    by Mathieu Parenti, Gonzague Vannoorenberghe

    Which countries should aim for regulatory cooperation, and to what extent should they pursue it? We develop an imperfectly competitive trade model that accounts for differences in technology and regulatory preferences regarding local consumption externalities across countries. Each country sets unique product standards, and firms incur costs when tailoring products to different markets. Trade occurs when the benefits of comparative advantages outweigh the desire for asymmetric regulations. Our findings indicate that regulatory cooperation, defined as the cooperative setting of standards, is most advantageous for countries with moderate differences in regulatory preferences. Shallow integration, however, falls short of achieving the optimal planner’s solution. Countries with strong comparative advantages in distinct externality-generating goods can pursue deeper regulatory cooperation through mutual regulatory concessions. Additionally, when regulatory preferences are highly dispersed, international cooperation tends to form regulatory blocs.