Guiping Li

The expeditious development of the digital economy has posed critical challenges for tax compliance. Recent reforms and technological changes, such as the emergency of platform data sharing, perform as potential instruments to potentially solve the tax compliance issue in the digital economy. This article innovatively combines tax compliance and digital economy taxation and proposes an expected utility theory model and a multiagent simulation model of tax compliance in the context of the digital economy, incorporating an important impact factor—platform data quality. In addition, the discrepancy and applicable conditions of three audit modes have been first compared and analyzed in this research: unconstrained signal audit, constrained random audit, and constrained signal audit. Applying computational experiments, this paper further investigates the effect of platform data quality on tax compliance in the digital economy. The key findings include: (1) the signal role of platform data is affected by three factors—the quality of platform data, the audit intensity and audit rate; (2) the signal role of platform data can be negative in given situations; and (3) the tax compliance rate varies in three different audit modes, which depend on the platform data quality, audit rate, and audit intensity. Based on the findings, this article provides policy recommendations on tax collection and management in digital economy.

Effectively managing fresh food supply chains (FFSCs) has long been a big challenge owing to the complexity in practice. Adoption of innovative technologies, blockchain traceability (BT), and cold-chain preservation (CP) technology to improve the efficiency of FFSC management has attracted much attention practically and academically. Distinct from existing studies, this paper provides a specific insight into the application of these two technologies by taking into account their functions in restraining misreporting behavior with BT technology due to its traceability and transparency and improving the freshness with CP technology based on the investment in fresh preservation equipment. With this in mind, this paper develops game theoretic models to identify the conditions under which technologies are the optimal selection for the supplier/retailer. It assumes that the retailer is the Stackelberg leader and the supplier is the follower. The key findings show that: (1) with the foci to eliminate suppliers’ misreporting behavior and minimize the incentive fees, BT investment can increase prices and promote order quantities and demand; (2) only when the consumers demonstrate “appropriate” sensitivity to freshness, a win–win situation can be achieved without adoption of BT technology; and (3) suppliers are not keen to invest in BT or CP technology when the circulation time is short, while retailers prefer to invest in CP technology when the circulation time is long.

Taking the tax evasion of live streamers as a reference case, this article aims to establish a tax compliance prospect theory model, in which the reference point is determined by the taxpayer's perceived compliance level. The taxpayer compliance behavior is analyzed from two dimensions of the tax authority's audit deterrence and the taxpayer's conformity mentality. We find that both deterrence effect and conformity effect are existing in the taxpayer compliance behavior, which is affected by the tax authority's enforcement effort. When the enforcement effort is low, the deterrence effect and the conformity effect do not exist, and the taxpayer does not comply at all. When the enforcement effort is moderate, the deterrence effect and the conformity effect coexist and the taxpayer complies partially. Besides, the taxpayer compliance level will not exceed the perceived compliance level, and an increase in the perceived compliance level will prompt the taxpayer to comply more. When the enforcement effort is high, there is only a strong deterrence effect, and the taxpayer completely complies. We use the theoretical analysis result to explain the tax compliance behavior of live streamers and find that it is consistent with the predictions of the model. Finally, we propose some policy recommendations on tax administration in digital economy.

Increasing attention to sustainable development issues and recycling are forcing the recyclers to use different incentives to capture more market share. Recycling innovation input is one of the effective topics in reverse competitive chains. Because of the importance of this issue, firstly, a basic closed-loop supply chain (CLSC) system is discussed that includes an integrated manufacturer and a third-party collector. Then the impact of the integration with the innovation input into third-party product collectors is considered. Eventually, two models are constructed. The first model is a basic model that includes an integrated manufacturer and one third-party collector with innovation investment. The other model is the hybrid model that includes an integrated manufacturer and two third-party collectors with and without innovation input. Stackelberg game models are used to study the optimal pricing strategies for all three models and players’ attitudes toward different scenarios. Finally, numerical analysis is presented. Our findings are generated on the following three aspects. The collector’s recycling choice, recycling innovation input, and influence on recyclers and manufacturers. It is found that the manufacturer will always choose to recycle and prefers the hybrid recycling market, which depends on the rate of collection and the compensation from production-collecting. Moreover, the results reveal that the highest return rate of recyclers occurred under the hybrid model. However, the recyclers may not be able to invest the sustainable recycle innovation input under the exorbitant innovation barriers.

Sustainable green technology innovation is essential in all the stages of the supply chain development. The members of the supply chain in each stage need to invest in sustainable green technology innovation research and development. However, whether the sustainable green technology innovation investments and profits for all the members are fairness concerned is a critical factor to motivate the supply chain members. Motivated by a real business investigation, in this study, a supply chain model with one supplier and one manufacturer is analyzed. We consider fairness concerns for the supplier and the manufacturer with sustainable green technology innovation development. We derive the optimal results in both with and without fairness concern. The results indicate that fairness concerns can promote and coordinate the supply chain members without advantage inequity averseness, to invest more on their sustainable green technology innovation development.