Fei Lv
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Fei Lv has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Shuaizong Si
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences
2 shared publications - Gaosheng Wang
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Hongsong Zhu
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Jintao Huang
Beijing Key Laboratory of IOT Information Security Technology, Institute of Information Engineering, CAS, Beijing, China
1 shared publication - Limin Sun
Chinese Academy of Sciences
1 shared publication Sen Zhao
Institute of Information Engineering, Chinese Academy of Sciences, and the School of Cyberspace Security, University of Chinese Academy of Sciences, Beijing, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 21 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Knowledge and Information Systems
- Vol. 67 (10) , 9307-9336
Task-oriented and attractor regularized multi-task learning for environmental spatial–temporal time series prediction
- 21 June 2025
- Published by Springer Nature in Knowledge and Information Systems
- Vol. 67 (10) , 9307-9336
Task-oriented and attractor regularized multi-task learning for environmental spatial–temporal time series prediction
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 11 (8) , 14771-14788
RIETD: A Reputation Incentive Scheme Facilitates Personalized Edge Tampering Detection
Edge nodes provide service cooperatively in edge computing, where third-party nodes are common. However, they cannot be fully trusted and can intentionally alter service results (e.g., edge tampering). Although some mechanisms can help detect edge tampering, they come with additional detection overhead. It is essential to note that most edge nodes are willing to serve honestly. Therefore, it is reasonable to decrease the detection frequency for those nodes, which helps reduce the overhead. Reputation is the common way to evaluate trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose a reputation incentive scheme called RIETD, which evaluates the reputations of edge nodes using their detection results. Moreover, RIETD is loosely coupled with detection mechanisms as an external service. Reputation is the fundamental parameter in RIETD, as it determines an edge node’s appraisal weight on other nodes, personalized detection strategy, and node’s obtained revenues in one service. We demonstrate that RIETD does not significantly reduce the overall detection capability while the overhead is reduced effectively. For instance, when the tampering rate of edge nodes is 10%, and the target detection rate is 90% of a specific detection mechanism, RIETD reduces overhead by approximately 60%. If a full-reputation node is detected to have tampered with the results, its reputation recovery time is similar to the time required for reputation to improve from 0 to 1. Moreover, a node’s expected revenue is lower than that of an honest node, emphasizing the importance of serving honestly and continuously for edge nodes to earn higher revenue.
- 5 January 2024
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Internet of Things Journal
- Vol. 11 (8) , 14771-14788
RIETD: A Reputation Incentive Scheme Facilitates Personalized Edge Tampering Detection
Edge nodes provide service cooperatively in edge computing, where third-party nodes are common. However, they cannot be fully trusted and can intentionally alter service results (e.g., edge tampering). Although some mechanisms can help detect edge tampering, they come with additional detection overhead. It is essential to note that most edge nodes are willing to serve honestly. Therefore, it is reasonable to decrease the detection frequency for those nodes, which helps reduce the overhead. Reputation is the common way to evaluate trustworthiness. In this paper, we propose a reputation incentive scheme called RIETD, which evaluates the reputations of edge nodes using their detection results. Moreover, RIETD is loosely coupled with detection mechanisms as an external service. Reputation is the fundamental parameter in RIETD, as it determines an edge node’s appraisal weight on other nodes, personalized detection strategy, and node’s obtained revenues in one service. We demonstrate that RIETD does not significantly reduce the overall detection capability while the overhead is reduced effectively. For instance, when the tampering rate of edge nodes is 10%, and the target detection rate is 90% of a specific detection mechanism, RIETD reduces overhead by approximately 60%. If a full-reputation node is detected to have tampered with the results, its reputation recovery time is similar to the time required for reputation to improve from 0 to 1. Moreover, a node’s expected revenue is lower than that of an honest node, emphasizing the importance of serving honestly and continuously for edge nodes to earn higher revenue.
- 15 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 92-111
SeHBPL: Behavioral Semantics-Based Patch Presence Test for Binaries
- 15 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature
- p. 92-111
SeHBPL: Behavioral Semantics-Based Patch Presence Test for Binaries