Gerald Budigiri
Research Subjects
Gerald Budigiri has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christoph Baumann
Ericsson Research Security
1 shared publication - Eddy Truyen
DistriNet, KU Leuven, 3001 Leuven, Belgium
1 shared publication - Wouter Joosen
KU Leuven
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 22 (2) , 2031-2058
Elastic Cross-Layer Orchestration of Network Policies in the Kubernetes Stack
Packaging applications in Containers, dynamically managed using a cluster orchestrator, is the de-facto approach for deployment of cloud-native applications. When Containers run inside Virtual Machines (VMs) to protect infrastructural assets, Network Policies at the Container layer and Security Groups at the VM layer provide complementary firewall mechanisms that strengthen defenses against lateral movement of attackers. However, least-privilege network policies at the Container layer may not always be consistent with statically defined, over-permissive Security Groups at the VM layer. This is especially a problem with low-latency configuration of Container networking solutions that requires every opened Container protocol, port and traffic direction also to be opened at the VM layer. In any post-exploitation scenario where attackers escape from within an already compromised or infected Container, such over-permissive Security Groups do not prevent the attacker from spreading across VMs to find powerful tokens for accessing the cluster orchestrator. In this paper, we introduce GrassHopper, a fast and dynamic cross-layer enforcement approach for Network Policies, which automatically generates Security Group configurations from dynamically verified Network Policies and Container scheduling decisions. Given the low-latency context, the design of GrassHopper must ensure that dynamically generated Security Group rules come in a timely manner to effect before the newly scheduled Containers become ready to serve traffic. We evaluate the performance of GrassHopper on a Kubernetes cluster running on OpenStack at the network and application level. In comparison to a Security Group management approach that is not scheduling-aware, our findings show that for low-latency applications GrassHopper can reduce the network attack surface between VMs at a ratio of 78-to-99%, while causing no network performance overhead at the application level with respect to latency and throughput.
- 17 January 2025
- Published by Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE) in IEEE Transactions on Network and Service Management
- Vol. 22 (2) , 2031-2058
Elastic Cross-Layer Orchestration of Network Policies in the Kubernetes Stack
Packaging applications in Containers, dynamically managed using a cluster orchestrator, is the de-facto approach for deployment of cloud-native applications. When Containers run inside Virtual Machines (VMs) to protect infrastructural assets, Network Policies at the Container layer and Security Groups at the VM layer provide complementary firewall mechanisms that strengthen defenses against lateral movement of attackers. However, least-privilege network policies at the Container layer may not always be consistent with statically defined, over-permissive Security Groups at the VM layer. This is especially a problem with low-latency configuration of Container networking solutions that requires every opened Container protocol, port and traffic direction also to be opened at the VM layer. In any post-exploitation scenario where attackers escape from within an already compromised or infected Container, such over-permissive Security Groups do not prevent the attacker from spreading across VMs to find powerful tokens for accessing the cluster orchestrator. In this paper, we introduce GrassHopper, a fast and dynamic cross-layer enforcement approach for Network Policies, which automatically generates Security Group configurations from dynamically verified Network Policies and Container scheduling decisions. Given the low-latency context, the design of GrassHopper must ensure that dynamically generated Security Group rules come in a timely manner to effect before the newly scheduled Containers become ready to serve traffic. We evaluate the performance of GrassHopper on a Kubernetes cluster running on OpenStack at the network and application level. In comparison to a Security Group management approach that is not scheduling-aware, our findings show that for low-latency applications GrassHopper can reduce the network attack surface between VMs at a ratio of 78-to-99%, while causing no network performance overhead at the application level with respect to latency and throughput.
- Open Access
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 202, 11-14
Secure and Scalable Policy Management in Cloud Native Networking
Support for Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) in 5G networks has made the adoption of edge computing and cloud-native computing imperative. However, URLLC applications require low-latency security defenses against attackers to maximize resilience without impacting performance. In this PhD project, we explore the use of standardized cloud-native network segmentation solutions to achieve this goal and we develop zero-cost techniques for the enforcement and verification of consistency of network segmentation policies across different system layers of the cloud-native stack that is based on Kubernetes (K8s), a de-facto standard for container-based orchestration. We first evaluate network policies, a K8s-specific network segmentation solution on eBPF-based network plugins configured to avoid the use of network encapsulation techniques such as VxLAN or IP-in-IP. Our findings show negligible overheads. However, without network encapsulation, every protocol and port that is allowed in a container network policy must also be allowed at the underlying system layer, which is typically a VM-based solution with a statically-defined security group per K8s cluster. To drastically reduce the huge network attack surface that ensues from a static solution, we develop two dynamic cross-layer policy management approaches, each tailored to a particular level of trust between the administrators of these different system layers. A preliminary evaluation shows these techniques incur no application-level performance overhead and significantly reduce the network attack surface between VMs by 75-to-99% for low-latency applications.
- 11 December 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- Vol. 202, 11-14
Open AccessSecure and Scalable Policy Management in Cloud Native Networking
Support for Ultra-Reliable Low-Latency Communication (URLLC) in 5G networks has made the adoption of edge computing and cloud-native computing imperative. However, URLLC applications require low-latency security defenses against attackers to maximize resilience without impacting performance. In this PhD project, we explore the use of standardized cloud-native network segmentation solutions to achieve this goal and we develop zero-cost techniques for the enforcement and verification of consistency of network segmentation policies across different system layers of the cloud-native stack that is based on Kubernetes (K8s), a de-facto standard for container-based orchestration. We first evaluate network policies, a K8s-specific network segmentation solution on eBPF-based network plugins configured to avoid the use of network encapsulation techniques such as VxLAN or IP-in-IP. Our findings show negligible overheads. However, without network encapsulation, every protocol and port that is allowed in a container network policy must also be allowed at the underlying system layer, which is typically a VM-based solution with a statically-defined security group per K8s cluster. To drastically reduce the huge network attack surface that ensues from a static solution, we develop two dynamic cross-layer policy management approaches, each tailored to a particular level of trust between the administrators of these different system layers. A preliminary evaluation shows these techniques incur no application-level performance overhead and significantly reduce the network attack surface between VMs by 75-to-99% for low-latency applications.