Georg Northoff
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Previous Organizations / Institutes
The organizations / institutes from the scholar's other articles in the past ten years
Research Subjects
Georg Northoff has a total of 9 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Felix Bermpohl
3 shared publicationsHeinz Boeker
3 shared publications- Andre Richter
Department of Consultation-Liaison-Psychiatry and Psychosomatic Medicine, University Hospital Zurich, University of Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland
1 shared publication Constance Wahl
1 shared publicationDaniel Hell
1 shared publicationErnst Martin
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 April 2007
- Published by S. Karger AG in Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics
- Vol. 76 (3) , 141-153
How Does Our Brain Constitute Defense Mechanisms? First-Person Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis
Current progress in the cognitive and affective neurosciences is constantly influencing the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice. However, despite the emerging dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the neuronal processes underlying psychoanalytic constructs such as defense mechanisms remain unclear. One of the main problems in investigating the psychodynamic-neuronal relationship consists in systematically linking the individual contents of first-person subjective experience to third-person observation of neuronal states. We therefore introduced an appropriate methodological strategy, ‘first-person neuroscience’, which aims at developing methods for systematically linking first- and third-person data. The utility of first-person neuroscience can be demonstrated by the example of the defense mechanism of sensorimotor regression as paradigmatically observed in catatonia. Combined psychodynamic and imaging studies suggest that sensorimotor regression might be associated with dysfunction in the neural network including the orbitofrontal, the medial prefrontal and the premotor cortices. In general sensorimotor regression and other defense mechanisms are psychoanalytic constructs that are hypothesized to be complex emotional-cognitive constellations. In this paper we suggest that specific functional mechanisms which integrate neuronal activity across several brain regions (i.e. neuronal integration) are the physiological substrates of defense mechanisms. We conclude that first-person neuroscience could be an appropriate methodological strategy for opening the door to a better understanding of the neuronal processes of defense mechanisms and their modulation in psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
- 1 April 2007
- Published by S. Karger AG in Psychotherapy and Psychosomatics
- Vol. 76 (3) , 141-153
How Does Our Brain Constitute Defense Mechanisms? First-Person Neuroscience and Psychoanalysis
Current progress in the cognitive and affective neurosciences is constantly influencing the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice. However, despite the emerging dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the neuronal processes underlying psychoanalytic constructs such as defense mechanisms remain unclear. One of the main problems in investigating the psychodynamic-neuronal relationship consists in systematically linking the individual contents of first-person subjective experience to third-person observation of neuronal states. We therefore introduced an appropriate methodological strategy, ‘first-person neuroscience’, which aims at developing methods for systematically linking first- and third-person data. The utility of first-person neuroscience can be demonstrated by the example of the defense mechanism of sensorimotor regression as paradigmatically observed in catatonia. Combined psychodynamic and imaging studies suggest that sensorimotor regression might be associated with dysfunction in the neural network including the orbitofrontal, the medial prefrontal and the premotor cortices. In general sensorimotor regression and other defense mechanisms are psychoanalytic constructs that are hypothesized to be complex emotional-cognitive constellations. In this paper we suggest that specific functional mechanisms which integrate neuronal activity across several brain regions (i.e. neuronal integration) are the physiological substrates of defense mechanisms. We conclude that first-person neuroscience could be an appropriate methodological strategy for opening the door to a better understanding of the neuronal processes of defense mechanisms and their modulation in psychoanalytic psychotherapy.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Neuropsychoanalysis
- Vol. 8 (1) , 69-84
Principles of Neuronal Integration and Defense Mechanisms: Neuropsychoanalytic Hypothesis
Current progress in the cognitive and affective neurosciences affects the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice. However, despite the emerging dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the neuronal processes underlying defense mechanisms remain unclear. We consider defense mechanisms as complex emotional-cognitive constellations. As such they require specific functional mechanisms to integrate neuronal activity across several brain regions—that is, neuronal integration. We develop hypotheses about the relationship between principles of neuronal integration and certain defense mechanisms. Neuropsychological and imaging findings in neuropsychiatric disorders are discussed in relation to neuronal integration and specific defense mechanisms. We conclude that the investigation of neuronal integration contributes to revealing the psychophysiological mechanisms underlying defense mechanisms.
- 1 January 2006
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Neuropsychoanalysis
- Vol. 8 (1) , 69-84
Principles of Neuronal Integration and Defense Mechanisms: Neuropsychoanalytic Hypothesis
Current progress in the cognitive and affective neurosciences affects the development of psychoanalytic theory and practice. However, despite the emerging dialogue between neuroscience and psychoanalysis, the neuronal processes underlying defense mechanisms remain unclear. We consider defense mechanisms as complex emotional-cognitive constellations. As such they require specific functional mechanisms to integrate neuronal activity across several brain regions—that is, neuronal integration. We develop hypotheses about the relationship between principles of neuronal integration and certain defense mechanisms. Neuropsychological and imaging findings in neuropsychiatric disorders are discussed in relation to neuronal integration and specific defense mechanisms. We conclude that the investigation of neuronal integration contributes to revealing the psychophysiological mechanisms underlying defense mechanisms.
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Schizophrenia Research
- Vol. 72 (2-3) , 235-248
NMDA hypofunction in the posterior cingulate as a model for schizophrenia: an exploratory ketamine administration study in fMRI
- 1 January 2005
- Published by Elsevier in Schizophrenia Research
- Vol. 72 (2-3) , 235-248
NMDA hypofunction in the posterior cingulate as a model for schizophrenia: an exploratory ketamine administration study in fMRI
- Top Cited Papers
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 102-107
Cortical midline structures and the self
- 1 March 2004
- Published by Elsevier in Trends in Cognitive Sciences
- Vol. 8 (3) , 102-107
Top Cited PapersCortical midline structures and the self
- 1 October 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 25 (5) , 555-577
What catatonia can tell us about “top-down modulation”: A neuropsychiatric hypothesis
Differential diagnosis of motor symptoms, for example, akinesia, may be difficult in clinical neuropsychiatry. Symptoms may be either of neurologic origin, for example, Parkinson's disease, or of psychiatric origin, for example, catatonia, leading to a so-called “conflict of paradigms.” Despite their different origins, symptoms may appear more or less clinically similar. Possibility of dissociation between origin and clinical appearance may reflect functional brain organisation in general, and cortical-cortical/subcortical relations in particular. It is therefore hypothesized that similarities and differences between Parkinson's disease and catatonia may be accounted for by distinct kinds of modulation between cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical relations. Catatonia can be characterized by concurrent motor, emotional, and behavioural symptoms. The different symptoms may be accounted for by dysfunction in orbitofrontal-prefrontal/parietal cortical connectivity reflecting “horizontal modulation” of cortico-cortical relation. Furthermore, alteration in “top-down modulation” reflecting “vertical modulation” of caudate and other basal ganglia by GABA-ergic mediated orbitofrontal cortical deficits may account for motor symptoms in catatonia. Parkinson's disease, in contrast, can be characterized by predominant motor symptoms. Motor symptoms may be accounted for by altered “bottom-up modulation” between dopaminergic mediated deficits in striatum and premotor/motor cortex. Clinical similarities between Parkinson's disease and catatonia with respect to akinesia may be related with involvement of the basal ganglia in both disorders. Clinical differences with respect to emotional and behavioural symptoms may be related with involvement of different cortical areas, that is, orbitofrontal/parietal and premotor/motor cortex implying distinct kinds of modulation – “vertical” and “horizontal” modulation, respectively.
- 1 October 2002
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Behavioral and Brain Sciences
- Vol. 25 (5) , 555-577
What catatonia can tell us about “top-down modulation”: A neuropsychiatric hypothesis
Differential diagnosis of motor symptoms, for example, akinesia, may be difficult in clinical neuropsychiatry. Symptoms may be either of neurologic origin, for example, Parkinson's disease, or of psychiatric origin, for example, catatonia, leading to a so-called “conflict of paradigms.” Despite their different origins, symptoms may appear more or less clinically similar. Possibility of dissociation between origin and clinical appearance may reflect functional brain organisation in general, and cortical-cortical/subcortical relations in particular. It is therefore hypothesized that similarities and differences between Parkinson's disease and catatonia may be accounted for by distinct kinds of modulation between cortico-cortical and cortico-subcortical relations. Catatonia can be characterized by concurrent motor, emotional, and behavioural symptoms. The different symptoms may be accounted for by dysfunction in orbitofrontal-prefrontal/parietal cortical connectivity reflecting “horizontal modulation” of cortico-cortical relation. Furthermore, alteration in “top-down modulation” reflecting “vertical modulation” of caudate and other basal ganglia by GABA-ergic mediated orbitofrontal cortical deficits may account for motor symptoms in catatonia. Parkinson's disease, in contrast, can be characterized by predominant motor symptoms. Motor symptoms may be accounted for by altered “bottom-up modulation” between dopaminergic mediated deficits in striatum and premotor/motor cortex. Clinical similarities between Parkinson's disease and catatonia with respect to akinesia may be related with involvement of the basal ganglia in both disorders. Clinical differences with respect to emotional and behavioural symptoms may be related with involvement of different cortical areas, that is, orbitofrontal/parietal and premotor/motor cortex implying distinct kinds of modulation – “vertical” and “horizontal” modulation, respectively.