YKYves Kone

Yves Kone

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yves Kone has a total of 10 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Understanding Intel User Interrupts

    by Yves Kone, Louis Duval, Renaud Lachaize, Pascal Felber, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    User interrupts (UINTR) is a new hardware feature available in recent Intel Xeon processors. It enables a CPU to send, receive, and handle hardware inter-processor interrupts directly in user mode, %(ring 3), meaning without the intervention of the OS kernel. In this paper, we shed light on the inner working of this facility and investigate, with detailed performance and overhead measurements considering deployments on physical machines and virtual machines with Linux and KVM, how it can be leveraged for more efficient inter-process communications, as an alternative to OS (Unix) signals. With UINTR, preemptive user-level thread schedulers can achieve quantum lengths in the microsecond scale.

  • Open Access

    Understanding Intel User Interrupts

    by Yves Kone, Louis Duval, Renaud Lachaize, Pascal Felber, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

  • Open Access

    Understanding Intel User Interrupts

    by Yves Kone, Louis Duval, Renaud Lachaize, Pascal Felber, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    User interrupts (UINTR) is a new hardware feature available in recent Intel Xeon processors. It enables a CPU to send, receive, and handle hardware inter-processor interrupts directly in user mode, meaning without the intervention of the OS kernel. In this paper, we shed light on the inner working of this facility and investigate, with detailed performance and overhead measurements considering deployments on physical machines and virtual machines with Linux and KVM, how it can be leveraged for more efficient inter-process communications, as an alternative to OS (Unix) signals. With UINTR, preemptive user-level thread schedulers can achieve quantum lengths in the microsecond scale.


  • Open Access

    GuaNary: Efficient Buffer Overflow Detection In Virtualized Clouds Using Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection Support

    by Stella Bitchebe, Yves Kone, Pierre Olivier, Jalil Boukhobza, Yérom-David Bromberg, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    Buffer overflow is a widespread memory safety violation in C/C++, reported as the top vulnerability in 2022. Secure memory allocators are generally used to protect systems against attacks that may exploit buffer overflows. Existing allocators mainly rely on two types of countermeasures to prevent or detect overflows: canaries and guard pages, each with pros and cons in terms of detection latency and memory footprint. This paper follows the Out of Hypervisor (OoH) trend for virtualized cloud applications. It introduces GuaNary, a novel safety guard against overflows allowing synchronous detection at a low memory footprint cost. OoH is a new virtualization research axis introduced in 2022 advocating the exposure of hardware features for virtualization to the guest OS so that its processes can take advantage of them. Based on the OoH principle, GuaNary leverages Intel Sub-Page write Permission (SPP), a recent hardware virtualization feature that allows to write-protect guest memory at the granularity of 128B (namely, sub-page) instead of 4KB. We implement a software stack, LeanGuard, which promotes the utilization of SPP from inside virtual machines by new secure allocators that use GuaNary. Our evaluation shows that for the same number of protected buffers, LeanGuard consumes 8.3x less memory than SlimGuard, a state-of-the-art secure allocator. Furthermore, for the same memory consumption, LeanGuard protecting 25x more buffers than SlimGuard.


  • Open Access

    GuaNary: Efficient Buffer Overflow Detection In Virtualized Clouds Using Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection Support

    by Stella Bitchebe, Yves Kone, Pierre Olivier, Jalil Boukhobza, Yérom-David Bromberg, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    Buffer overflow is a widespread memory safety violation in C/C++, reported as the top vulnerability in 2022. Secure memory allocators are generally used to protect systems against attacks that may exploit buffer overflows. Existing allocators mainly rely on two types of countermeasures to prevent or detect overflows: canaries and guard pages, each with pros and cons in terms of detection latency and memory footprint. This paper follows the Out of Hypervisor (OoH) trend for virtualized cloud applications. It introduces GuaNary, a novel safety guard against overflows allowing synchronous detection at a low memory footprint cost. OoH is a new virtualization research axis introduced in 2022 advocating the exposure of hardware features for virtualization to the guest OS so that its processes can take advantage of them. Based on the OoH principle, GuaNary leverages Intel Sub-Page write Permission (SPP), a recent hardware virtualization feature that allows to write-protect guest memory at the granularity of 128B (namely, sub-page) instead of 4KB. We implement a software stack, LeanGuard, which promotes the utilization of SPP from inside virtual machines by new secure allocators that use GuaNary. Our evaluation shows that for the same number of protected buffers, LeanGuard consumes 8.3x less memory than SlimGuard, a state-of-the-art secure allocator. Furthermore, for the same memory consumption, LeanGuard protecting 25x more buffers than SlimGuard.

  • Open Access

    GuaNary: Efficient Buffer Overflow Detection In Virtualized Clouds Using Intel EPT-based Sub-Page Write Protection Support

    by Stella Bitchebe, Yves Kone, Pierre Olivier, Jalil Boukhobza, Yérom-David Bromberg, Daniel Hagimont, Alain Tchana

    Write buffer overflow is a widespread and prevalent memory safety violation in C/C++, reported as the top vulnerability in 2022 and 2023. Secure memory allocators are generally used to protect systems against attacks that may exploit buffer overflows. Existing allocators mainly rely on two types of countermeasures to prevent or detect write overflows: canaries and guard pages, each with pros and cons in terms of detection latency and memory footprint. For virtualized cloud applications, this paper follows the Out of Hypervisor (OoH) trend and introduces GuaNary, a safety guard against write overflows, allowing synchronous detection at a low memory footprint cost. OoH is a new virtualization research axis introduced in 2022 advocating the exposure of hardware features for virtualization to the guest OS so that its processes can take advantage of them. Based on the OoH principle, GuaNary leverages Intel Sub-Page write Permission (SPP), a recent hardware virtualization feature that allows to write-protect guest memory at the granularity of 128B (namely, sub-page) instead of 4KB. We implement a software stack, LeanGuard, which promotes the utilization of SPP from inside virtual machines by new secure allocators that use GuaNary. Our evaluation shows that for the same number of protected buffers, LeanGuard consumes 8.3× less memory than SlimGuard, a recent state-of-art secure allocator. Further, for the same memory consumption, LeanGuard allows protecting 25× more buffers than SlimGuard.