Guanghui Yang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Guanghui Yang has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Guoling Wang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, People’s Republic of China
3 shared publications - Hui Yang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, GuiZhou University, Guiyang, China
2 shared publications - Zhenli Liu
Guizhou University, Guiyang, China
2 shared publications Bolin Yang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang 550025, China
1 shared publication- Chanchan Li
College of mathematics and statistics State Key Laboratory of Public Big Data Guizhou University 550025 Guiyang Guizhou China
1 shared publication - Chun Wang
School of Mathematics and Statistics, Guizhou University, Guiyang, Guizhou 550025, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 23 July 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Chinese Physics B
- Vol. 35 (3)
Evolutionary analysis of multi-player snowdrift game with cost sharing under Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule
This paper firstly constructs a multi-player snowdrift game with all players’ cost sharing once the snowdrift is removed for a fairness. Secondly, an Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule is proposed to derive an extended average abundance function via Markov chain evolutionary processes. Besides, extensive numerical simulations well verify theoretical results. Our findings show that both cost sharing and the Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule significantly promote the cooperation by enhancing the average abundance in multi-person snowdrift game. By comparison with the existing woks, our proposed model and hybrid strategy-update rule provide novel insights into the evolution of cooperation in multi-person games.
- 23 July 2025
- Published by IOP Publishing in Chinese Physics B
- Vol. 35 (3)
Evolutionary analysis of multi-player snowdrift game with cost sharing under Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule
This paper firstly constructs a multi-player snowdrift game with all players’ cost sharing once the snowdrift is removed for a fairness. Secondly, an Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule is proposed to derive an extended average abundance function via Markov chain evolutionary processes. Besides, extensive numerical simulations well verify theoretical results. Our findings show that both cost sharing and the Aspiration-Fermi hybrid rule significantly promote the cooperation by enhancing the average abundance in multi-person snowdrift game. By comparison with the existing woks, our proposed model and hybrid strategy-update rule provide novel insights into the evolution of cooperation in multi-person games.
- 22 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 203 (3) , 2739-2758
Existence of $\alpha $-Robust Weak Nash Equilibria for Leader–Follower Population Games with Fuzzy Parameters- 22 November 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 203 (3) , 2739-2758
Existence of $\alpha $-Robust Weak Nash Equilibria for Leader–Follower Population Games with Fuzzy Parameters- 26 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 189-202
Existence of robust weak Nash equilibria for leader-follower games with uncertainty
- 26 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Annals of Operations Research
- Vol. 356 (1) , 189-202
Existence of robust weak Nash equilibria for leader-follower games with uncertainty
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 200 (2) , 585-601
Existence of Equilibrium Solution for Multi-Leader–Follower Games with Fuzzy Goals and Parameters
- 21 December 2023
- Published by Springer Nature in Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications
- Vol. 200 (2) , 585-601
Existence of Equilibrium Solution for Multi-Leader–Follower Games with Fuzzy Goals and Parameters
- Open Access
- 28 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Existence of equilibrium solution for multi-leader-follower games with fuzzy goals and parameters
In this paper, we first propose the model of multi-leader-follower games with fuzzy goals and involving fuzzy parameters and introduce its α-FNS equilibrium. Next, we shift our attention to the existence of α-FNS equilibrium and prove it by Kakutani’s fifixed point theorem. Finally, we illustrate an example to show that the equilibrium existence result is valid. Mathematics Subject Classification. 91A06, 91A07, 91A10.
- 28 December 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Research Square
Open AccessExistence of equilibrium solution for multi-leader-follower games with fuzzy goals and parameters
In this paper, we first propose the model of multi-leader-follower games with fuzzy goals and involving fuzzy parameters and introduce its α-FNS equilibrium. Next, we shift our attention to the existence of α-FNS equilibrium and prove it by Kakutani’s fifixed point theorem. Finally, we illustrate an example to show that the equilibrium existence result is valid. Mathematics Subject Classification. 91A06, 91A07, 91A10.
- Open Access
- 5 January 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 99
Characterizations of Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Potential Population Games
This paper studies the characterizations of (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games with a vector-valued potential function called multiobjective potential population games, where agents synchronously maximize multiobjective functions with finite strategies via a partial order on the criteria-function set. In such games, multiobjective payoff functions are equal to the transpose of the Jacobi matrix of its potential function. For multiobjective potential population games, based on Kuhn-Tucker conditions of multiobjective optimization, a strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state is introduced for its vector-valued potential function and it is proven that each strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state is one (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibrium. The converse is obtained for multiobjective potential population games with two strategies by utilizing Tucker’s Theorem of the alternative and Motzkin’s one of linear systems. Precisely, each (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state for multiobjective potential population games with two strategies. These characterizations by a vector-valued approach are more comprehensive than an additive weighted method. Multiobjective potential population games are the extension of population potential games from a single objective to multiobjective cases. These novel results provide a theoretical basis for further computing (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibria of multiobjective potential population games and their practical applications.
- 5 January 2021
- Published by MDPI AG in Mathematics
- Vol. 9 (1) , 99
Open AccessCharacterizations of Pareto-Nash Equilibria for Multiobjective Potential Population Games
This paper studies the characterizations of (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibria for multiobjective population games with a vector-valued potential function called multiobjective potential population games, where agents synchronously maximize multiobjective functions with finite strategies via a partial order on the criteria-function set. In such games, multiobjective payoff functions are equal to the transpose of the Jacobi matrix of its potential function. For multiobjective potential population games, based on Kuhn-Tucker conditions of multiobjective optimization, a strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state is introduced for its vector-valued potential function and it is proven that each strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state is one (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibrium. The converse is obtained for multiobjective potential population games with two strategies by utilizing Tucker’s Theorem of the alternative and Motzkin’s one of linear systems. Precisely, each (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibrium is equivalent to a strongly (weakly) Kuhn-Tucker state for multiobjective potential population games with two strategies. These characterizations by a vector-valued approach are more comprehensive than an additive weighted method. Multiobjective potential population games are the extension of population potential games from a single objective to multiobjective cases. These novel results provide a theoretical basis for further computing (weakly) Pareto-Nash equilibria of multiobjective potential population games and their practical applications.