John D. Kepler
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
John D. Kepler has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Brandon Gipper
Stanford University Graduate School of Business
1 shared publication Christopher S. Armstrong
1 shared publication- Daniel J. Taylor
The Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania 19104
1 shared publication David F. Larcker
1 shared publication- David Tsui
Analysis Group
1 shared publication - Guoman She
National University of Singapore, Singapore 119077
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 111-141
Firm Boundaries and Voluntary Disclosure
We study how vertical integration shapes firms’ public disclosures. Theory suggests that firms can use public disclosure to coordinate with supply chain partners and predicts a substitution between vertical integration and public disclosure of future strategic plans, since the internalization of production reduces the need to publicly coordinate. Using data on the extent of vertical integration, we find that firms that become more vertically integrated reduce their public disclosures about their product strategies and that the reduction is most pronounced for vertically integrated firms with greater internalization of production and those with the largest informational and strategic frictions along the supply chain. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; L14; M41.
- 15 June 2024
- Published by American Accounting Association in The Accounting Review
- Vol. 99 (4) , 111-141
Open AccessFirm Boundaries and Voluntary Disclosure
We study how vertical integration shapes firms’ public disclosures. Theory suggests that firms can use public disclosure to coordinate with supply chain partners and predicts a substitution between vertical integration and public disclosure of future strategic plans, since the internalization of production reduces the need to publicly coordinate. Using data on the extent of vertical integration, we find that firms that become more vertically integrated reduce their public disclosures about their product strategies and that the reduction is most pronounced for vertically integrated firms with greater internalization of production and those with the largest informational and strategic frictions along the supply chain. JEL Classifications: D83; G14; L14; M41.
- 7 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 78 (1)
Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality
- 7 January 2024
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 78 (1)
Rank-and-file accounting employee compensation and financial reporting quality
- Open Access
- 6 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 27 (3) , 1125-1156
Audit process, private information, and insider trading
While the shareholder benefits of audits are well documented, evidence on whether audits can facilitate opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders is scarce. In this paper, we examine whether the audit process facilitates one particular form of opportunism: informed trading by corporate insiders. We focus our analysis on insider trading around the audit report date. We find an increase in trading around the audit report date and that the increase is abnormally large for firms that subsequently report modified opinions. The abnormal increase in trading is concentrated among officers and non-audit committee independent directors, and most pronounced in first-time modified opinions and modified opinions in years where financial results are subsequently restated. These trades are highly opportunistic: they predict restatements, and as a consequence, we show they avoid significant losses. Collectively, our findings provide novel evidence that insiders appear to exploit private information about the audit process––a process ostensibly designed to protect shareholders––for opportunistic gain.
- 6 July 2022
- Published by Springer Nature in Review of Accounting Studies
- Vol. 27 (3) , 1125-1156
Open AccessAudit process, private information, and insider trading
While the shareholder benefits of audits are well documented, evidence on whether audits can facilitate opportunistic behavior by corporate insiders is scarce. In this paper, we examine whether the audit process facilitates one particular form of opportunism: informed trading by corporate insiders. We focus our analysis on insider trading around the audit report date. We find an increase in trading around the audit report date and that the increase is abnormally large for firms that subsequently report modified opinions. The abnormal increase in trading is concentrated among officers and non-audit committee independent directors, and most pronounced in first-time modified opinions and modified opinions in years where financial results are subsequently restated. These trades are highly opportunistic: they predict restatements, and as a consequence, we show they avoid significant losses. Collectively, our findings provide novel evidence that insiders appear to exploit private information about the audit process––a process ostensibly designed to protect shareholders––for opportunistic gain.
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 72 (2-3) , 101428
Cost shielding in executive bonus plans
- 1 November 2021
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Accounting and Economics
- Vol. 72 (2-3) , 101428
Cost shielding in executive bonus plans