YXYuan Xu

Yuan Xu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yuan Xu has a total of 11 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    PhyScout: Detecting Sensor Spoofing Attacks via Spatio-temporal Consistency

    by Yuan Xu, Gelei Deng, Xingshuo Han, Guanlin Li, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang

    Existing defense approaches against sensor spoofing attacks suffer from the limitations of limited specific attack types, requiring GPU computation, exhibiting considerable detection latency and struggling with the interpretability of corner cases. We developed PhyScout, a holistic sensor spoofing defense framework to overcome the above limitations. Our framework capitalizes on the observation that human drivers can rapidly and accurately identify spoofing attacks by performing spatio-temporal consistency checks of their environment. We commence by defining the generalized conflicts that different sensor spoofing attacks produce regarding the spatio-temporal consistency. These conflicts are subsequently unified and formalized through a least squares problem approach. This process is modeled using image-based feature point extraction and matching techniques, followed by the design of a risk identification method for each conflict. We evaluate PhyScout across various environments, including simulators, datasets, and real-world scenarios. Compared to existing defense solutions, PhyScout offers rapid identification of sensor attacks (within 100ms) with low performance overhead (CPU-based), and conflict visualization. It demonstrates a fresh paradigm in autonomous vehicle security and presents new avenues for future research in robust and efficient defense mechanisms against sensor spoofing attacks. More video demos are at our anonymous website https://sites.google.com/view/physcout.


  • Open Access

    VisionGuard: Secure and Robust Visual Perception of Autonomous Vehicles in Practice

    by Xingshuo Han, Haozhao Wang, Kangqiao Zhao, Gelei Deng, Yuan Xu, Hangcheng Liu, Han Qiu, Tianwei Zhang

    Modern Autonomous Vehicles (AVs) implement the Visual Perception Module (VPM) to perceive their surroundings. This VPM adopts various Deep Neural Network (DNN) models to process the data collected from cameras and LiDAR. Prior studies have shown that these models are vulnerable to physical adversarial examples (PAEs), which pose a critical safety risk to the autonomous driving task. While a few defense methods have been proposed to safeguard AVs, most of them only target a limited set of attack types and specific scenarios, making them impractical for real-world protection. In this paper, we introduce VisionGuard, a novel and practical methodology to comprehensively detect and mitigate various types of PAEs to the VPM. The key of VisionGuard is to leverage the spatiotemporal inconsistency property of PAEs to detect anomalies. It predicts the motion states from historical ones and compares them with the current driving states to identify any motion inconsistency caused by physical attacks. We evaluate 9 state-of-the-art PAEs against both camera and camera-LiDAR fusion-based object classification & detection models. Experimental results in both simulation and physical world validate the effectiveness and robustness of VisionGuard. Codes, demo videos and appendix can be found on our anonymous website: https://sites.google.com/view/visionguard.


  • Function Interaction Risks in Robot Apps: Analysis and Policy-Based Solution

    by Yuan Xu, Yungang Bao, Sa Wang, Tianwei Zhang

    Robot apps are becoming more automated, complex and diverse. An app usually consists of many functions, interacting with each other and the environment. This allows robots to conduct various tasks. However, it also opens a new door for cyber attacks: adversaries can leverage these interactions to threaten the safety of robot operations. Unfortunately, this issue is rarely explored in past works. We present the first systematic investigation about the function interactions in common robot apps. First, we disclose the potential risks and damages caused by malicious interactions. We introduce a comprehensive graph to model the function interactions in robot apps by analyzing 3,100 packages from the Robot Operating System (ROS) platform. From this graph, we identify and categorize three types of interaction risks. Second, we propose novel methodologies to detect and mitigate these risks and protect the operations of robot apps. We introduce security policies for each type of risks, and design coordination nodes to enforce the policies and regulate the interactions. We conduct extensive experiments on 110 robot apps from the ROS platform and two complex apps (Baidu Apollo and Autoware) widely adopted in industry. Evaluation results showed our methodologies can correctly identify and mitigate all potential risks.