Jiajun Duan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Jiajun Duan has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Lingyan Chen
Department of Management Engineering, Guangxi Polytechnic of Construction, Nanning, China
1 shared publication - Yangbing Zhang
South China University of Technology
1 shared publication - Yousong Wang
School of Civil Engineering and Transportation, South China University of Technology, Guangzhou 510640, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
- Vol. 31 (7) , 11096-11114
Strategic interaction among stakeholders on low-carbon buildings: A tripartite evolutionary game based on prospect theory
Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs’ stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.
- 13 January 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environmental Science and Pollution Research
- Vol. 31 (7) , 11096-11114
Strategic interaction among stakeholders on low-carbon buildings: A tripartite evolutionary game based on prospect theory
Low-carbon buildings (LCBs) are still in the early stages of development in China. The promotion and implementation of associated policies are not yet fully matured. Meanwhile, their status as public goods exacerbates the uncertainty and complexity regarding anticipated gains and potential losses. Few studies have explored the impact of perception parameters on the decision-making processes of LCBs’ stakeholders. Thus, combined with prospect theory, this paper establishes a tripartite game model composed of governments, developers, and consumers to explore their interactions and influences in different stages. Real-life scenarios are further utilized to validate the effectiveness of the model in predicting the behaviors under respective preferences. The results show that the increase in subsidy and penalty intensity instead diminishes the enthusiasm for LCBs. More specifically, the existing subsidy policies offer limited incentives to consumers. With the addition of the perception parameter, there exist differences in the sensitivity of consumers and developers towards risk levels and potential losses. The findings also highlight the importance of consumers in the LCBs market. Future policies should encourage developers and consumers to jointly promote the LCBs implementation.