CFChong Fu

Chong Fu

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

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Previous Organizations / Institutes

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Chong Fu has a total of 26 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Understanding and Mitigating Prompt Leaking Attacks in Real-World LLM-Based Applications

    by Yong Yang, Chong Fu, Tong Zhang, Rui Zeng, Qingming Li, Tianyu Du, Zonghui Wang, Shouling Ji, Wenzhi Chen

  • SecretKeeper: Robust Vertical Federated Learning Against Label Inference Attacks

    by Chong Fu, Yuwen Pu, Qiao Zhang, Jiayu Pan, Jing Qiu, Xuhong Zhang, Yiming Wu, Shouling Ji

  • Open Access

    HashVFL: Defending Against Data Reconstruction Attacks in Vertical Federated Learning

    by Pengyu Qiu, Xuhong Zhang, Shouling Ji, Chong Fu, Xing Yang, Ting Wang

    Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is a trending collaborative machine learning model training solution. Existing industrial frameworks employ secure multi-party computation techniques such as homomorphic encryption to ensure data security and privacy. Despite these efforts, studies have revealed that data leakage remains a risk in VFL due to the correlations between intermediate representations and raw data. Neural networks can accurately capture these correlations, allowing an adversary to reconstruct the data. This emphasizes the need for continued research into securing VFL systems. Our work shows that hashing is a promising solution to counter data reconstruction attacks. The one-way nature of hashing makes it difficult for an adversary to recover data from hash codes. However, implementing hashing in VFL presents new challenges, including vanishing gradients and information loss. To address these issues, we propose HashVFL, which integrates hashing and simultaneously achieves learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results indicate that HashVFL effectively maintains task performance while defending against data reconstruction attacks. It also brings additional benefits in reducing the degree of label leakage, mitigating adversarial attacks, and detecting abnormal inputs. We hope our work will inspire further research into the potential applications of HashVFL.

  • HashVFL: Defending Against Data Reconstruction Attacks in Vertical Federated Learning

    by Pengyu Qiu, Xuhong Zhang, Shouling Ji, Chong Fu, Xing Yang, Ting Wang

    Vertical Federated Learning (VFL) is a trending collaborative machine learning model training solution. Existing industrial frameworks employ secure multi-party computation techniques such as homomorphic encryption to ensure data security and privacy. Despite these efforts, studies have revealed that data leakage remains a risk in VFL due to the correlations between intermediate representations and raw data. Neural networks can accurately capture these correlations, allowing an adversary to reconstruct the data. This emphasizes the need for continued research into securing VFL systems. Our work shows that hashing is a promising solution to counter data reconstruction attacks. The one-way nature of hashing makes it difficult for an adversary to recover data from hash codes. However, implementing hashing in VFL presents new challenges, including vanishing gradients and information loss. To address these issues, we propose HashVFL, which integrates hashing and simultaneously achieves learnability, bit balance, and consistency. Experimental results indicate that HashVFL effectively maintains task performance while defending against data reconstruction attacks. It also brings additional benefits in reducing the degree of label leakage, mitigating adversarial attacks, and detecting abnormal inputs. We hope our work will inspire further research into the potential applications of HashVFL.


  • Open Access

    FreeEagle: Detecting Complex Neural Trojans in Data-Free Cases

    by Chong Fu, Xuhong Zhang, Shouling Ji, Ting Wang, Peng Lin, Yanghe Feng, Jianwei Yin

    Trojan attack on deep neural networks, also known as backdoor attack, is a typical threat to artificial intelligence. A trojaned neural network behaves normally with clean inputs. However, if the input contains a particular trigger, the trojaned model will have attacker-chosen abnormal behavior. Although many backdoor detection methods exist, most of them assume that the defender has access to a set of clean validation samples or samples with the trigger, which may not hold in some crucial real-world cases, e.g., the case where the defender is the maintainer of model-sharing platforms. Thus, in this paper, we propose FreeEagle, the first data-free backdoor detection method that can effectively detect complex backdoor attacks on deep neural networks, without relying on the access to any clean samples or samples with the trigger. The evaluation results on diverse datasets and model architectures show that FreeEagle is effective against various complex backdoor attacks, even outperforming some state-of-the-art non-data-free backdoor detection methods.