Bin Hu

FrodoKEM is a lattice-based Public-Key Encryption (PKE)/Key Encapsulation Mechanism (KEM) scheme selected as a third-round candidate in the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) post-quantum cryptography standardization process. It has also been recommended by the German Federal Office for Information Security and the Dutch National Communications Security Agency as a long-term confidential encryption algorithm and has been included in the ISO/IEC JTC 1/SC 27/WG 2 draft international standard for post-quantum cryptography. To address the threats of Side-Channel Attacks (SCA, including timing attacks, power analysis attacks, and fault attacks) against FrodoKEM, this paper proposes a security-enhanced implementation scheme. Specifically, during the sampling phase and ciphertext comparison, isochronous operations are adopted to eliminate timing sensitivity and mitigate timing attack risks. In public key computation, masking techniques are introduced to obscure critical data and operations, thereby resisting power analysis attacks. Additionally, a sampling calibration mechanism is implemented to detect and circumvent fault attacks. Under the same parameter sets, a performance comparison between the SCA-resistant scheme and the original FrodoKEM demonstrates that the computational overhead increase is less than 0.8%. The scheme’s strengthened resilience against SCA is further validated through Test Vector Leakage Assessment (TVLA), achieving a balance between enhanced security and minimal performance degradation.

A lot of work in the field of quantum cryptanalysis is currently devoted to finding applications of Grover-meets-Simon algorithm and its complexity is given in the form of O , but research on how to implement the attack efficiently is still insufficient. After all, it is crucial to study quantum attacks in resource-limited situations, according to NIST’s guidance on circuit depth. This work first evaluates the parallelization of Grover-meets-Simon by drawing on the Grover’s parallel approach and shows that as the width increases by 2 ^t ( t > 0), the depth decreases by a factor of √2 ^t . Further, the first dedicated quantum attack on a class of functions that appear in cryptographic scheme applications (so-called XOR-type function) is proposed. The depth, width, and the number of gates required for the attack are greatly reduced compared to the general parallelization. Then we apply the attack to various Beyond-Birthday-Bound (BBB) MACs, where the XOR function can be constructed, including SUM-ECBC and its variants (2K-SUM-ECBC, 2K-ECBC_Plus), and GCM-SIV2. In the typical case where SUM-ECBC is based on AES-128, our attack saves at least 62.3% in depth, 19.5% in width and 22.2% in gate count simultaneously. The impact on some lightweight ciphers is further explored, and it is interesting to note that the lighter the quantum circuit implementation of the cipher is, the greater the possible impact of an attack will be. This observation may provide new insights into quantum cryptanalysis.

FRIET is a duplex-based authenticated encryption scheme proposed at EUROCRYPT 2020. It follows a novel design approach for built-in countermeasures against fault attacks. By a judicious choice of components, the designers propose the permutation FRIET-PC that can be used to build an authenticated encryption cipher denoted as FRIET-AE. And FRIET-AE provides a 128-bit security claim for integrity and confidentiality. In this paper, we research the propagation of pairs of differences and liner masks through the round function of FRIET-PC. For the full-round FRIET-PC, we can construct a differential distinguisher whose probability is 1 and a linear distinguisher whose absolute value of correlation is 1. Moreover, we use the differential distinguisher with probability 1 to construct a set consisting of valid tags and ciphertexts which are not created by legal users. This breaks FRIET-AE’s security claim for integrity and confidentiality. As far as we know, this is the first practical attack that threatens the security of FRIET-AE.

KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems TIIS Paper Details

KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems TIIS Paper Details

As a generalized integral property, division property was proposed by Todo at EUROCRYPT 2015. We propose a new security criterion of S‐boxes against division property and prove that it is invariant under permutation‐xor equivalence. Based on the criterion, the division properties of some important 4‐bit S‐boxes are showed. Then, we apply it to improve the resistance of ciphers against division‐property‐based integral attacks while keeping the same security level against other attacks. Specifically, the resistance of the cipher PRESENT against division‐property‐based integral attack is improved by 2 rounds, and the resistance of the cipher LBlock against division‐property‐based integral attack is improved by 1 round.

KSII Transactions on Internet and Information Systems TIIS Paper Details