YCYini Cheng

Yini Cheng

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Yini Cheng has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Open Access

    Adoption of Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL): A Time Inconsistency Perspective

    by Yini Cheng, Jiazhen Huo

    Buy Now, Pay Later (BNPL) is a rapidly growing fintech tool, which is particularly popular among young consumers, with the potential to support more sustainable retail consumption. While firms increasingly adopt BNPL, its impact on time-inconsistent consumers remains underexplored. We address this gap using two game-theoretic models: one with traditional payment and one with BNPL. In both models, time-inconsistent consumers decide whether to purchase and then whether to return a product after learning about their fitness. In the traditional model, greater time inconsistency reduces optimal price, demand, and profit. In contrast, these outcomes remain unaffected by time inconsistency under BNPL. Comparing the equilibrium results of the two models, we find that the firm always benefits more from offering BNPL than traditional payment when consumers are time-inconsistent. By deferring payment, BNPL increases consumers’ present willingness to buy, enabling firms to charge higher prices without reducing demand, and thereby achieve higher profits. Although BNPL can improve firm revenue and overall welfare, it may reduce consumer surplus by encouraging over-consumption. We also consider the presence of the BNPL provider and default of payments to make our results more robust. These findings highlight the need for caution and potential regulation to protect consumers with self-control problems.


  • The role of on‐demand delivery platform in competition between manufacturer and retailer

    by Yini Cheng, Yongrui Duan, Jiazhen Huo

    Traditional retailers can now partner with on‐demand delivery platforms to fulfill consumers' online orders to fight against manufacturers' direct channels. However, it is hard to say whether traditional retailers benefit from cooperating with such platforms due to market encroachment and high commission fees. We build a game‐theoretic model where the manufacturer could decide whether to introduce its direct channel, and the retailer could decide whether to cooperate with the on‐demand delivery platform. We show that when the platform adopts a reasonable pricing and service policy, the retailer can earn more profit when cooperating with the platform. When consumer acceptance of the manufacturer's direct channel is high, the manufacturer should strategically introduce its direct channel even when there are no sales. We also find that the introduction of the platform lowers the retail price at the offline channel, increasing the market's total demand, consumer surplus, and social welfare. The reason lies in the effect of intensifying downstream competition and satisfying the consumer's demand in more market segments.