Chi Zhang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Chi Zhang has a total of 6 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
Dong Xu
State Key Laboratory of Remote Sensing Science, Beijing Normal University, Beijing, China
1 shared publication- Hongjun Zeng
Department of Finance, College of Finance, Nanjing Agricultural University, Nanjing, China
1 shared publication - Shenglin Ma
School of Economics and Management, North University of China, Taiyuan 030051, China
1 shared publication Tingting Bai
School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China
1 shared publicationXue Han
School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang 110169, China
1 shared publicationYong Qi
School of Business Administration, Northeastern University, Shenyang, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 1 October 2026
- Published by IWA Publishing in AQUA — Water Infrastructure, Ecosystems and Society
- Vol. 75 (10) , 993-1013
Evolutionary dynamics of horizontal ecological compensation in transboundary watersheds: institutional incentives and public participation
Horizontal ecological compensation (HEC) can coordinate cross-regional interests in water-resource allocation and pollution control, but strategic conflicts hinder its establishment. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game of upstream governments, downstream governments, and the public, incorporating higher-level governments’ financial support and political rewards and punishments as exogenous incentives. Results show that stronger political incentives, greater public participation, and greater public environmental sensitivity encourage positive upstream environmental governance and proactive downstream action. When upstream governments have not fully adopted positive environmental governance, the direction of public participation depends on the net benefit of supervision and rights protection, whereas government strategies affect only its adjustment speed. Once positive upstream governance is fully adopted, evolutionary pressure on public participation disappears, leaving its probability neutrally stationary at the level reached. Environmental-damage compensation encourages proactive downstream action, whereas larger HEC payments strengthen upstream incentives but may increase downstream burdens. Numerical simulations illustrate mutually reinforcing strategic adjustments between upstream and downstream governments under the baseline parameters. Overall, the system combines reciprocal intergovernmental feedback with a distinct public-participation dynamic, highlighting the roles of political incentives, compensation design, and public supervision in HEC governance.
- 1 October 2026
- Published by IWA Publishing in AQUA — Water Infrastructure, Ecosystems and Society
- Vol. 75 (10) , 993-1013
Evolutionary dynamics of horizontal ecological compensation in transboundary watersheds: institutional incentives and public participation
Horizontal ecological compensation (HEC) can coordinate cross-regional interests in water-resource allocation and pollution control, but strategic conflicts hinder its establishment. This study develops a tripartite evolutionary game of upstream governments, downstream governments, and the public, incorporating higher-level governments’ financial support and political rewards and punishments as exogenous incentives. Results show that stronger political incentives, greater public participation, and greater public environmental sensitivity encourage positive upstream environmental governance and proactive downstream action. When upstream governments have not fully adopted positive environmental governance, the direction of public participation depends on the net benefit of supervision and rights protection, whereas government strategies affect only its adjustment speed. Once positive upstream governance is fully adopted, evolutionary pressure on public participation disappears, leaving its probability neutrally stationary at the level reached. Environmental-damage compensation encourages proactive downstream action, whereas larger HEC payments strengthen upstream incentives but may increase downstream burdens. Numerical simulations illustrate mutually reinforcing strategic adjustments between upstream and downstream governments under the baseline parameters. Overall, the system combines reciprocal intergovernmental feedback with a distinct public-participation dynamic, highlighting the roles of political incentives, compensation design, and public supervision in HEC governance.
- 6 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 27 (7) , 15367-15391
The impact of industry-favoring land allocation strategy on urban carbon emissions: a city-level empirical study in China
- 6 February 2024
- Published by Springer Nature in Environment, Development and Sustainability
- Vol. 27 (7) , 15367-15391
The impact of industry-favoring land allocation strategy on urban carbon emissions: a city-level empirical study in China