Christophe Deleuze
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Christophe Deleuze has a total of 2 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Laure Gonnord
Grenoble INP - LCIS, UGA
1 shared publication - Sébastien Michelland
Université Grenoble-Alpes - Grenoble INP - LCIS, Valence, France
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 17 February 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 174-185
From Low-Level Fault Modeling (of a Pipeline Attack) to a Proven Hardening Scheme
Fault attacks present unique safety and security challenges that require dedicated countermeasures, even for bug-free programs. Models of these complex attacks are made workable by approximating their effects to a suitable level of abstraction. The common practice of targeting the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level isn't ideal because it discards important micro-architectural information, leading to weaker security guarantees. Conversely, including micro-architectural details makes countermeasures harder to model and reason about, creating a new challenge in validating and trusting protections. We show that a semantic approach to modeling faults makes micro-architectural models workable, and enables precise cooperation between software and hardware in the design of countermeasures. We demonstrate the approach by designing and implementing a compiler/hardware countermeasure, which protects against a state-of-the-art pipeline fetch attack that generalizes multi-fault instruction skips. Crucially, we provide a formal security proof that guarantees faults are detected by the end of every basic block. This result shows that carefully embracing the complexity of low-level systems enables finer, more secure countermeasures.
- 17 February 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 174-185
Open AccessFrom Low-Level Fault Modeling (of a Pipeline Attack) to a Proven Hardening Scheme
Fault attacks present unique safety and security challenges that require dedicated countermeasures, even for bug-free programs. Models of these complex attacks are made workable by approximating their effects to a suitable level of abstraction. The common practice of targeting the Instruction Set Architecture (ISA) level isn't ideal because it discards important micro-architectural information, leading to weaker security guarantees. Conversely, including micro-architectural details makes countermeasures harder to model and reason about, creating a new challenge in validating and trusting protections. We show that a semantic approach to modeling faults makes micro-architectural models workable, and enables precise cooperation between software and hardware in the design of countermeasures. We demonstrate the approach by designing and implementing a compiler/hardware countermeasure, which protects against a state-of-the-art pipeline fetch attack that generalizes multi-fault instruction skips. Crucially, we provide a formal security proof that guarantees faults are detected by the end of every basic block. This result shows that carefully embracing the complexity of low-level systems enables finer, more secure countermeasures.