Nicola Morton
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Nicola Morton has a total of 12 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Randolph C. Grace
Univ Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
4 shared publications Matt Grice
3 shared publicationsEmma Ward
2 shared publicationsRandolph C. Grace
School of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury
2 shared publicationsSimon Kemp
School of Psychology, Speech and Hearing, University of Canterbury
2 shared publications- Simon Kemp
Department of Psychology, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
The Psychological Scaffolding of Number
Theories of numeracy assume that logical concepts which enable formal definitions of numbers (cardinality, one-to-one correspondence, successor function) play key roles in ontogenesis, but empirical support is lacking. These concepts may not be suitable targets for theory because such definitions are not explanatory of what numbers are. We propose a correspondence between formal ideas that are generative for the natural numbers and children’s cognitive representations prior to numeracy (‘precursor system’). Building on our account of arithmetic foundations (Grice et al., 2024), we give a new construction of the natural numbers – the first to not rely on the Peano axioms – and corresponding theory of numeracy. We show that numbers can be derived from linear order, monotonicity and convexity – evolved principles of perceptual organization. A key concept is the ℕ-chain, the limit of finite linear orders, which we show is equivalent to the successor function but can be approximated in finite terms. The precursor system is based on linear orders – number word sequences, play schemas – and their relationships in the count routine by order embedding (structure mapping). It develops gradually, with order isomorphisms as proto-cardinality, reaching a representation analogous to an ℕ-chain when the child realizes that numbers never end. Ordinality precedes cardinality, one-to-one correspondence results from minimal (and therefore convex) embeddings, and numbers and arithmetic emerge as a common structure. Our theory shows that numeracy is both culturally-mediated and biologically-based, although ‘core number systems’ do not play a direct role. The dawning of numeracy in a child’s mind is both a reinvention and rediscovery of mathematics itself.
- 20 June 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessThe Psychological Scaffolding of Number
Theories of numeracy assume that logical concepts which enable formal definitions of numbers (cardinality, one-to-one correspondence, successor function) play key roles in ontogenesis, but empirical support is lacking. These concepts may not be suitable targets for theory because such definitions are not explanatory of what numbers are. We propose a correspondence between formal ideas that are generative for the natural numbers and children’s cognitive representations prior to numeracy (‘precursor system’). Building on our account of arithmetic foundations (Grice et al., 2024), we give a new construction of the natural numbers – the first to not rely on the Peano axioms – and corresponding theory of numeracy. We show that numbers can be derived from linear order, monotonicity and convexity – evolved principles of perceptual organization. A key concept is the ℕ-chain, the limit of finite linear orders, which we show is equivalent to the successor function but can be approximated in finite terms. The precursor system is based on linear orders – number word sequences, play schemas – and their relationships in the count routine by order embedding (structure mapping). It develops gradually, with order isomorphisms as proto-cardinality, reaching a representation analogous to an ℕ-chain when the child realizes that numbers never end. Ordinality precedes cardinality, one-to-one correspondence results from minimal (and therefore convex) embeddings, and numbers and arithmetic emerge as a common structure. Our theory shows that numeracy is both culturally-mediated and biologically-based, although ‘core number systems’ do not play a direct role. The dawning of numeracy in a child’s mind is both a reinvention and rediscovery of mathematics itself.
- Open Access
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Linking Values and Emotions to High-Impact Climate Action: A Cross-National Comparison in China and New Zealand
High-impact climate actions, such as sustainable transport and dietary choices, play a crucial role in mitigating the climate crisis, yet people’s perceptions of and responses to climate change may vary substantially across different social and cultural contexts. Drawing on the theory of basic human values, appraisal theory of emotion and warm-glow/cold-prickle frameworks, this study examined how biospheric and altruistic values, together with anticipated emotions (pride and guilt), shape intentions to engage in high-impact climate actions among young adults (aged 18–30) in New Zealand (n = 514) and China (n = 520). Multi-group path analyses were used to test the direct and indirect effects of values on climate-friendly transportation and dietary intentions via anticipated emotions. Results showed that biospheric values and anticipated emotions were significant predictors of both types of climate action intentions. After controlling for biospheric values, altruistic values no longer predicted transportation intentions in either country and predicted dietary intentions only in China, where the effect was small. Anticipated emotions mediated the effects of biospheric values on both behavioural intentions. Cross-national comparisons revealed that biospheric values were a weaker predictor of climate action intentions in China than in New Zealand, and their associations with two anticipated emotions were stronger in the latter. Anticipated guilt exerted a stronger effect on sustainable transport intentions in China, whereas the effects of anticipated pride did not differ significantly across countries. These findings advance understanding of the value–emotion–behaviour pathways regarding the cross-national validity and highlight the need for culturally sensitive climate communication strategies that integrate both individual values and emotional engagement.
- 3 March 2026
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessLinking Values and Emotions to High-Impact Climate Action: A Cross-National Comparison in China and New Zealand
High-impact climate actions, such as sustainable transport and dietary choices, play a crucial role in mitigating the climate crisis, yet people’s perceptions of and responses to climate change may vary substantially across different social and cultural contexts. Drawing on the theory of basic human values, appraisal theory of emotion and warm-glow/cold-prickle frameworks, this study examined how biospheric and altruistic values, together with anticipated emotions (pride and guilt), shape intentions to engage in high-impact climate actions among young adults (aged 18–30) in New Zealand (n = 514) and China (n = 520). Multi-group path analyses were used to test the direct and indirect effects of values on climate-friendly transportation and dietary intentions via anticipated emotions. Results showed that biospheric values and anticipated emotions were significant predictors of both types of climate action intentions. After controlling for biospheric values, altruistic values no longer predicted transportation intentions in either country and predicted dietary intentions only in China, where the effect was small. Anticipated emotions mediated the effects of biospheric values on both behavioural intentions. Cross-national comparisons revealed that biospheric values were a weaker predictor of climate action intentions in China than in New Zealand, and their associations with two anticipated emotions were stronger in the latter. Anticipated guilt exerted a stronger effect on sustainable transport intentions in China, whereas the effects of anticipated pride did not differ significantly across countries. These findings advance understanding of the value–emotion–behaviour pathways regarding the cross-national validity and highlight the need for culturally sensitive climate communication strategies that integrate both individual values and emotional engagement.
- Open Access
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Effects of Explicit Instruction and Numeric Feedback on Non-Symbolic Estimation of Ratios and Differences
Grace and colleagues (Chen et al., 2020; Grace et al., 2018) found that participants learned to respond accurately to both ratios and differences of intensive (brightness) and extensive (line length) modalities in a non-symbolic ‘artificial algebra’ task by feedback and without explicit instruction. However, Masin and colleagues (Masin et al., 2019) found that participants were unable to estimate brightness ratios in a task with explicit instructions (magnitude estimation). These contrasting results suggest that use of numbers and explicit cognition may impede the ability to estimate brightness ratios. To test this hypothesis, we conducted several experiments where participants responded to brightness or line length pairs in Grace et al.'s task to estimate ratios or differences. Those in Explicit groups were told specifically to respond based on differences or ratios, and given numeric feedback after each response, whereas those in Implicit groups were trained on Grace et al.’s original non-symbolic task. Experiments 1a (n = 23) and 1b (n = 40) (Line lengths) found that the Explicit group was more accurate than the Implicit group when estimating ratios of line lengths. In contrast, Experiments 2a and 2b found that the Explicit group was less accurate in estimating brightness ratios than the Implicit group. Specific instructions and numeric feedback had no effect on accuracy for participants trained on differences. These results resolve the inconsistency between Grace et al.’s and Masin’s results, suggesting that although the perceptual system can compute brightness ratios, participants have difficulty associating these perceived ratios with numbers.
- 22 October 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessEffects of Explicit Instruction and Numeric Feedback on Non-Symbolic Estimation of Ratios and Differences
Grace and colleagues (Chen et al., 2020; Grace et al., 2018) found that participants learned to respond accurately to both ratios and differences of intensive (brightness) and extensive (line length) modalities in a non-symbolic ‘artificial algebra’ task by feedback and without explicit instruction. However, Masin and colleagues (Masin et al., 2019) found that participants were unable to estimate brightness ratios in a task with explicit instructions (magnitude estimation). These contrasting results suggest that use of numbers and explicit cognition may impede the ability to estimate brightness ratios. To test this hypothesis, we conducted several experiments where participants responded to brightness or line length pairs in Grace et al.'s task to estimate ratios or differences. Those in Explicit groups were told specifically to respond based on differences or ratios, and given numeric feedback after each response, whereas those in Implicit groups were trained on Grace et al.’s original non-symbolic task. Experiments 1a (n = 23) and 1b (n = 40) (Line lengths) found that the Explicit group was more accurate than the Implicit group when estimating ratios of line lengths. In contrast, Experiments 2a and 2b found that the Explicit group was less accurate in estimating brightness ratios than the Implicit group. Specific instructions and numeric feedback had no effect on accuracy for participants trained on differences. These results resolve the inconsistency between Grace et al.’s and Masin’s results, suggesting that although the perceptual system can compute brightness ratios, participants have difficulty associating these perceived ratios with numbers.
- Open Access
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
An Assessment of Lee and Sarnecka's (2010) Knower-level Model of Children's Numeracy Learning
How do children learn to count? Acquisition of number words and their representation of quantity (Cardinality Principle; CP) is commonly assessed with Wynn’s (1990; 1992) give-a-number (Give-N) task. However, results and methods are inconsistent across studies with this task, contributing to theoretical debates about how children acquire number knowledge. The primary aim of this project was to review these debates, and to evaluate systematically a graphical knower-level model of number word acquisition (Lee & Sarnecka, 2010), by analysing both the model fit and predictive error across seven Give-N datasets. Data were sourced from studies with French-, Hungarian-, and English-speaking children (N = 823) aged 24-86 months (M = 49.7). The model described most children’s number word acquisition with a high degree of confidence, and reported 29.6% of participants had applied the CP to their entire counting list (CP-knowers). Fits to data appeared to be reasonably good, but analyses revealed systematic error between model predictions and data. Most notably, predictions for children who had only applied the CP to a subset of their counting list (subset-knowers/N-knowers) were significantly higher than performance in trials for N + 1 and N + 2 (where N is the capacity of this subset). Additionally, performance error was reviewed for each knower-level individually. Ultimately, our results suggested that Lee and Sarnecka’s model did not accurately account for children’s behaviour on the Give-N task. Moreover, this highlights that the knower-level account of children’s number word acquisition may not effectively describe this process.
- 17 June 2025
- Published by Center for Open Science in PsyArXiv
Open AccessAn Assessment of Lee and Sarnecka's (2010) Knower-level Model of Children's Numeracy Learning
How do children learn to count? Acquisition of number words and their representation of quantity (Cardinality Principle; CP) is commonly assessed with Wynn’s (1990; 1992) give-a-number (Give-N) task. However, results and methods are inconsistent across studies with this task, contributing to theoretical debates about how children acquire number knowledge. The primary aim of this project was to review these debates, and to evaluate systematically a graphical knower-level model of number word acquisition (Lee & Sarnecka, 2010), by analysing both the model fit and predictive error across seven Give-N datasets. Data were sourced from studies with French-, Hungarian-, and English-speaking children (N = 823) aged 24-86 months (M = 49.7). The model described most children’s number word acquisition with a high degree of confidence, and reported 29.6% of participants had applied the CP to their entire counting list (CP-knowers). Fits to data appeared to be reasonably good, but analyses revealed systematic error between model predictions and data. Most notably, predictions for children who had only applied the CP to a subset of their counting list (subset-knowers/N-knowers) were significantly higher than performance in trials for N + 1 and N + 2 (where N is the capacity of this subset). Additionally, performance error was reviewed for each knower-level individually. Ultimately, our results suggested that Lee and Sarnecka’s model did not accurately account for children’s behaviour on the Give-N task. Moreover, this highlights that the knower-level account of children’s number word acquisition may not effectively describe this process.
- 1 March 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 131 (2) , 494-522
The psychological scaffolding of arithmetic.
Where does arithmetic come from, and why are addition and multiplication its fundamental operations? Although we know that arithmetic is true, no explanation that meets standards of scientific rigor is available from philosophy, mathematical logic, or the cognitive sciences. We propose a new approach based on the assumption that arithmetic has a biological origin: Many examples of adaptive behavior such as spatial navigation suggest that organisms can perform arithmetic-like operations on represented magnitudes. If so, these operations-nonsymbolic precursors of addition and multiplication-might be optimal due to evolution and thus identifiable according to an appropriate criterion. We frame this as a metamathematical question, and using an order-theoretic criterion, prove that four qualitative conditions-monotonicity, convexity, continuity, and isomorphism-are sufficient to identify addition and multiplication over the real numbers uniquely from the uncountably infinite class of possible operations. Our results show that numbers and algebraic structure emerge from purely qualitative conditions, and as a construction of arithmetic, provide a rigorous explanation for why addition and multiplication are its fundamental operations. We argue that these conditions are preverbal psychological intuitions or principles of perceptual organization that are biologically based and shape how humans and nonhumans alike perceive the world. This is a Kantian view and suggests that arithmetic need not be regarded as an immutable truth of the universe but rather as a natural consequence of our perception. Algebraic structure may be inherent in the representations of the world formed by our perceptual system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 March 2024
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Psychological Review
- Vol. 131 (2) , 494-522
The psychological scaffolding of arithmetic.
Where does arithmetic come from, and why are addition and multiplication its fundamental operations? Although we know that arithmetic is true, no explanation that meets standards of scientific rigor is available from philosophy, mathematical logic, or the cognitive sciences. We propose a new approach based on the assumption that arithmetic has a biological origin: Many examples of adaptive behavior such as spatial navigation suggest that organisms can perform arithmetic-like operations on represented magnitudes. If so, these operations-nonsymbolic precursors of addition and multiplication-might be optimal due to evolution and thus identifiable according to an appropriate criterion. We frame this as a metamathematical question, and using an order-theoretic criterion, prove that four qualitative conditions-monotonicity, convexity, continuity, and isomorphism-are sufficient to identify addition and multiplication over the real numbers uniquely from the uncountably infinite class of possible operations. Our results show that numbers and algebraic structure emerge from purely qualitative conditions, and as a construction of arithmetic, provide a rigorous explanation for why addition and multiplication are its fundamental operations. We argue that these conditions are preverbal psychological intuitions or principles of perceptual organization that are biologically based and shape how humans and nonhumans alike perceive the world. This is a Kantian view and suggests that arithmetic need not be regarded as an immutable truth of the universe but rather as a natural consequence of our perception. Algebraic structure may be inherent in the representations of the world formed by our perceptual system. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2023 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 46 (1) , 1-15
On the origins of computationally complex behavior.
There is considerable evidence for computationally complex behavior, that is, behavior that appears to require the equivalent of mathematical calculation by the organism. Spatial navigation by path integration is perhaps the best example. The most influential account of such behavior has been Gallistel's (1990) computational-representational theory, which assumes that organisms represent key environmental variables such as direction and distance traveled as real numbers stored in engrams and are able to perform arithmetic computations on those representations. But how are these computations accomplished? A novel perspective is gained from the historical development of algebra. We propose that computationally complex behavior suggests that the perceptual system represents an algebraic field, which is a mathematical concept that expresses the structure underlying arithmetic. Our field representation hypothesis predicts that the perceptual system computes 2 operations on represented magnitudes, not 1. We review recent research in which human observers were trained to estimate differences and ratios of stimulus pairs in a nonsymbolic task without explicit instruction (Grace, Morton, Ward, Wilson, & Kemp, 2018). Results show that the perceptual system automatically computes two operations when comparing stimulus magnitudes. A field representation offers a resolution to longstanding controversies in psychophysics about which of 2 algebraic operations is fundamental (e.g., the Fechner-Stevens debate), overlooking the possibility that both might be. In terms of neural processes that might support computationally complex behavior, our hypothesis suggests that we should look for evidence of 2 operations and for symmetries corresponding to the additive and multiplicative groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).
- 1 January 2020
- Published by American Psychological Association (APA) in Journal of Experimental Psychology: Animal Learning and Cognition
- Vol. 46 (1) , 1-15
On the origins of computationally complex behavior.
There is considerable evidence for computationally complex behavior, that is, behavior that appears to require the equivalent of mathematical calculation by the organism. Spatial navigation by path integration is perhaps the best example. The most influential account of such behavior has been Gallistel's (1990) computational-representational theory, which assumes that organisms represent key environmental variables such as direction and distance traveled as real numbers stored in engrams and are able to perform arithmetic computations on those representations. But how are these computations accomplished? A novel perspective is gained from the historical development of algebra. We propose that computationally complex behavior suggests that the perceptual system represents an algebraic field, which is a mathematical concept that expresses the structure underlying arithmetic. Our field representation hypothesis predicts that the perceptual system computes 2 operations on represented magnitudes, not 1. We review recent research in which human observers were trained to estimate differences and ratios of stimulus pairs in a nonsymbolic task without explicit instruction (Grace, Morton, Ward, Wilson, & Kemp, 2018). Results show that the perceptual system automatically computes two operations when comparing stimulus magnitudes. A field representation offers a resolution to longstanding controversies in psychophysics about which of 2 algebraic operations is fundamental (e.g., the Fechner-Stevens debate), overlooking the possibility that both might be. In terms of neural processes that might support computationally complex behavior, our hypothesis suggests that we should look for evidence of 2 operations and for symmetries corresponding to the additive and multiplicative groups. (PsycINFO Database Record (c) 2019 APA, all rights reserved).