Luisa Gehle
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Luisa Gehle has a total of 47 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Christian Schemer
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
3 shared publications Claes de Vreese
Amsterdam School of Communication, University of Amsterdam , Amsterdam , The Netherlands
2 shared publications- David Nicolas Hopmann
University of Southern Denmark
2 shared publications Denis Halagiera
Faculty of Political Science and Journalism, Adam Mickiewicz University , Poznan , Poland
2 shared publicationsFrank Esser
Department of Communication and Media Research, University of Zurich , Zürich , Switzerland
2 shared publicationsJesper Strömbäck
Department of Journalism Media and Communication, University of Gothenburg , Gothenburg , Sweden
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- 30 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Communication Research
Gains, Limits, and Side-Effects of Disinformation Interventions: Corrective Information and Self-Affirmation Assessed With Signal Detection Theory
This study examines the effects of corrective information and self-affirmation on evaluating political claims in two contexts: the Russian invasion of Ukraine and migration to Germany. In a two-wave online experiment in Germany ( N = 1,275), participants were randomly assigned to receive corrective information, a self-affirmation task, both, or neither. Using signal detection theory, we distinguish sensitivity to truth (discernment) from response bias (general skepticism or credulity). Exposure to corrective information significantly improved participants’ truth discernment, with stronger effects for those with higher cognitive reflection test scores. At the same time, corrective information was associated with a shift in response bias for the Ukraine topic, indicating an increased tendency to classify statements as false overall. The self-affirmation intervention corrected an initially credulous response bias in the Ukraine topic, bringing evaluations closer to a balanced position around zero, while leaving responses in the migration domain unchanged. Overall, the findings highlight both the benefits and potential side effects of corrective information interventions and illustrate how psychological interventions can impact evaluative thresholds.
- 30 April 2026
- Published by SAGE Publications in Communication Research
Gains, Limits, and Side-Effects of Disinformation Interventions: Corrective Information and Self-Affirmation Assessed With Signal Detection Theory
This study examines the effects of corrective information and self-affirmation on evaluating political claims in two contexts: the Russian invasion of Ukraine and migration to Germany. In a two-wave online experiment in Germany ( N = 1,275), participants were randomly assigned to receive corrective information, a self-affirmation task, both, or neither. Using signal detection theory, we distinguish sensitivity to truth (discernment) from response bias (general skepticism or credulity). Exposure to corrective information significantly improved participants’ truth discernment, with stronger effects for those with higher cognitive reflection test scores. At the same time, corrective information was associated with a shift in response bias for the Ukraine topic, indicating an increased tendency to classify statements as false overall. The self-affirmation intervention corrected an initially credulous response bias in the Ukraine topic, bringing evaluations closer to a balanced position around zero, while leaving responses in the migration domain unchanged. Overall, the findings highlight both the benefits and potential side effects of corrective information interventions and illustrate how psychological interventions can impact evaluative thresholds.
- 18 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 36 (4)
The Relationship Between Political Entertainment Media Use and Political Efficacy: A Comparative Study in 18 Countries
Political entertainment programs have gained worldwide popularity, prompting research on their effects. One area of interest has been whether this media programming has an impact upon political efficacy. However, existing literature has only examined the impact of a limited number of programs, has failed to consider the simultaneous influence of different genres, and has focused primarily on the US. To address these limitations, we conducted a comparative survey in 18 democracies in 2022, with a sample size of N = 26,000. The findings revealed that viewers of political talk shows exhibited higher levels of both external and internal political efficacy in most countries. Additionally, frequent exposure to political comedy news or satire was positively related to internal political efficacy in certain countries. Finally, the consumption of fictional political dramas was also linked to political efficacy, but only in a few countries.
- 18 September 2024
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in International Journal of Public Opinion Research
- Vol. 36 (4)
The Relationship Between Political Entertainment Media Use and Political Efficacy: A Comparative Study in 18 Countries
Political entertainment programs have gained worldwide popularity, prompting research on their effects. One area of interest has been whether this media programming has an impact upon political efficacy. However, existing literature has only examined the impact of a limited number of programs, has failed to consider the simultaneous influence of different genres, and has focused primarily on the US. To address these limitations, we conducted a comparative survey in 18 democracies in 2022, with a sample size of N = 26,000. The findings revealed that viewers of political talk shows exhibited higher levels of both external and internal political efficacy in most countries. Additionally, frequent exposure to political comedy news or satire was positively related to internal political efficacy in certain countries. Finally, the consumption of fictional political dramas was also linked to political efficacy, but only in a few countries.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 41 (6) , 965-986
Justifying an Invasion: When Is Disinformation Successful?
Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking.
- 22 May 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in Political Communication
- Vol. 41 (6) , 965-986
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessJustifying an Invasion: When Is Disinformation Successful?
Conventional wisdom suggests that social media, especially when used by authoritarian powers with nefarious aims, leaves citizens of democratic countries vulnerable to psychological influence campaigns. But such concerns overlook predispositions among recipients of false claims to reject (or to endorse) conspiratorial narratives. Analyzing responses from a survey fielded in 19 countries, we find that it is a preexisting conspiracy outlook at the individual level, more so than media diets, which consistently predicts rating Russia’s pretenses for the invasion as more accurate. In all countries, individuals who view the world in general with a conspiratorial mindset are more likely to believe war-related disinformation. Receiving news via YouTube, Facebook, or TikTok is also associated with greater belief in Russian narratives justifying the invasion in several countries, but these relationships are weaker compared to those observed for conspiracy thinking. Without downplaying a potential positive role for media interventions, the findings highlight the importance of a deeper understanding of the underlying causes of conspiratorial thinking.
- Open Access
- 29 February 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The International Journal of Press/Politics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 679-704
Why do Citizens Choose to Read Fact-Checks in the Context of the Russian War in Ukraine? The Role of Directional and Accuracy Motivations in Nineteen Democracies
The recent surge of false information accompanying the Russian invasion of Ukraine has re-emphasized the need for interventions to counteract disinformation. While fact-checking is a widely used intervention, we know little about citizen motivations to read fact-checks. We tested theoretical predictions related to accuracy-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to know the truth) versus directionally-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to confirm existing beliefs) by analyzing original survey data ( n = 19,037) collected in early April to late May 2022 in nineteen countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Survey participants read ten statements about the Russian war in Ukraine and could opt to see fact-checks for each of these statements. Results of mixed models for three-level hierarchical data (level 1: statements, level 2: individuals, and level 3: countries) showed that accuracy motivations were better explanations than directional motivations for the decision to read fact-checks about the Russian war in Ukraine.
- 29 February 2024
- Published by SAGE Publications in The International Journal of Press/Politics
- Vol. 30 (3) , 679-704
Open AccessWhy do Citizens Choose to Read Fact-Checks in the Context of the Russian War in Ukraine? The Role of Directional and Accuracy Motivations in Nineteen Democracies
The recent surge of false information accompanying the Russian invasion of Ukraine has re-emphasized the need for interventions to counteract disinformation. While fact-checking is a widely used intervention, we know little about citizen motivations to read fact-checks. We tested theoretical predictions related to accuracy-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to know the truth) versus directionally-motivated goals (i.e., seeking to confirm existing beliefs) by analyzing original survey data ( n = 19,037) collected in early April to late May 2022 in nineteen countries, namely Austria, Belgium, Brazil, Czech Republic, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Italy, Netherlands, Poland, Romania, Serbia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, UK, and USA. Survey participants read ten statements about the Russian war in Ukraine and could opt to see fact-checks for each of these statements. Results of mixed models for three-level hierarchical data (level 1: statements, level 2: individuals, and level 3: countries) showed that accuracy motivations were better explanations than directional motivations for the decision to read fact-checks about the Russian war in Ukraine.