Jeff McMahan
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jeff McMahan has a total of 14 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Julian Savulescu
Yong Loo Lin School of Medicine, National University of Singapore, Singapore, Singapore
2 shared publications - Alexander Morgan Capron
Gould School of Law, University of Southern California, Los Angeles, CA, USA
1 shared publication - Arthur L. Caplan
Utah State University
1 shared publication - Caesar Alimsinya Atuire
Centre for Tropical Medicine and Global Health, Nuffield Department of Medicine, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK
1 shared publication - Francesca Minerva
Department of Philosophy, University of Milan
1 shared publication - Gustavo Ortiz Millán
Instituto de Investigaciones Filosóficas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México, Ciudad de México, México
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 6 (1)
Editorial
- 10 May 2026
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 6 (1)
Open AccessEditorial
- Open Access
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Ethics & Bioethics
- Vol. 15 (3-4) , 141-150
Are animals – and persons – morally “replaceable”?
This article critically examines Peter Singer’s arguments for two conclusions: first, that non-self-conscious animals are “replaceable” in the sense that the killing of one can be morally offset by the creation of another; and, second, that persons are not replaceable in this sense. Much of the support that Singer provides for the second of these claims is found in his defense of “the debit view of preferences,” which he advanced in response to an earlier critic of his preference utilitarianism. The author argues that the debit view is untenable for several reasons. The author argues further that Singer’s appeal to Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem in support of the replaceability of non-self-conscious individuals is also mistaken. In spite of these problems, however, the author contends that there is a genuine insight in Singer’s “replaceability thesis,” and develops and defends different arguments for both the claim that some animals – and, indeed, some human beings – are replaceable and the claim that persons are not.
- 1 December 2025
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Ethics & Bioethics
- Vol. 15 (3-4) , 141-150
Open AccessAre animals – and persons – morally “replaceable”?
This article critically examines Peter Singer’s arguments for two conclusions: first, that non-self-conscious animals are “replaceable” in the sense that the killing of one can be morally offset by the creation of another; and, second, that persons are not replaceable in this sense. Much of the support that Singer provides for the second of these claims is found in his defense of “the debit view of preferences,” which he advanced in response to an earlier critic of his preference utilitarianism. The author argues that the debit view is untenable for several reasons. The author argues further that Singer’s appeal to Parfit’s Non-Identity Problem in support of the replaceability of non-self-conscious individuals is also mistaken. In spite of these problems, however, the author contends that there is a genuine insight in Singer’s “replaceability thesis,” and develops and defends different arguments for both the claim that some animals – and, indeed, some human beings – are replaceable and the claim that persons are not.
- Open Access
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 5 (3)
Israel’s War Against Gazans: A Response to Lucas
This article defends the claims of an earlier article (“Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024”) against objections advanced by Simon Lucas in “Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza: A Reply to McMahan.” It defends earlier arguments and develops new arguments to show that Israel’s war in Gaza between October 7, 2023, and late October 2025 has egregiously violated two moral principles that govern both the resort to war and continuation of war. These principles require that war be proportionate and necessary. Among the claims defended here are that Lucas’s collectivist conception of war and his appeals to principles of reciprocity are deeply implausible.
- 1 October 2025
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 5 (3)
Open AccessIsrael’s War Against Gazans: A Response to Lucas
This article defends the claims of an earlier article (“Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024”) against objections advanced by Simon Lucas in “Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza: A Reply to McMahan.” It defends earlier arguments and develops new arguments to show that Israel’s war in Gaza between October 7, 2023, and late October 2025 has egregiously violated two moral principles that govern both the resort to war and continuation of war. These principles require that war be proportionate and necessary. Among the claims defended here are that Lucas’s collectivist conception of war and his appeals to principles of reciprocity are deeply implausible.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Moral responsibility for the scarcity of healthcare in Gaza
In response to Arianne Shahvisi’s call for medical ethicists to condemn Israel’s having caused extreme scarcity of healthcare in Gaza, two critical commentaries published in this journal attributed primary moral responsibility for the scarcity to Hamas, arguing that its role in initiating the recent conflict, together with its use of ‘human shields’, justifies Israeli military conduct, up to and including the almost complete destruction of the civilian healthcare infrastructure. This article evaluates and rebuts those claims. First, it challenges the assertion that Hamas’s having wrongly initiated the conflict absolves Israel of responsibility for the harms its military action has caused to civilians, arguing that moral responsibility is not zero-sum. Second, it argues that the claim that Hamas’s actions ‘void’ the protections afforded to civilians and medical facilities as a matter of both morality and international humanitarian law is mistaken. The article argues, furthermore, that Israel’s war has violated the just war principles of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination, particularly in the destruction of much of Gaza’s healthcare delivery capacity. The article concludes that medical ethicists must hold all parties accountable for violations of ethical and humanitarian norms, particularly those that systematically undermine civilian health in wartime.
- 27 August 2025
- Published by BMJ in Journal of Medical Ethics
Moral responsibility for the scarcity of healthcare in Gaza
In response to Arianne Shahvisi’s call for medical ethicists to condemn Israel’s having caused extreme scarcity of healthcare in Gaza, two critical commentaries published in this journal attributed primary moral responsibility for the scarcity to Hamas, arguing that its role in initiating the recent conflict, together with its use of ‘human shields’, justifies Israeli military conduct, up to and including the almost complete destruction of the civilian healthcare infrastructure. This article evaluates and rebuts those claims. First, it challenges the assertion that Hamas’s having wrongly initiated the conflict absolves Israel of responsibility for the harms its military action has caused to civilians, arguing that moral responsibility is not zero-sum. Second, it argues that the claim that Hamas’s actions ‘void’ the protections afforded to civilians and medical facilities as a matter of both morality and international humanitarian law is mistaken. The article argues, furthermore, that Israel’s war has violated the just war principles of proportionality, necessity, and discrimination, particularly in the destruction of much of Gaza’s healthcare delivery capacity. The article concludes that medical ethicists must hold all parties accountable for violations of ethical and humanitarian norms, particularly those that systematically undermine civilian health in wartime.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Analyse & Kritik
- Vol. 46 (2) , 387-407
Proportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024
This article seeks to show that Israel’s war in Gaza in 2023 and 2024 has been an unjust war because it has violated both the requirement of proportionality and the requirement of necessity. The article explains the nature of proportionality, arguing that the main form of proportionality in war is simply the limit to the amount of harm inflicted on innocent people that can be justified either as the lesser evil or, more plausibly, on the basis of the special relations between combatants and their fellow citizens. The argument of the article is that, even on the basis of assumptions about moral justification and the numbers of innocent people who have been killed or saved by the war that are highly favorable to Israel, the war has nevertheless been highly disproportionate and morally unnecessary.
- 1 November 2024
- Published by Walter de Gruyter GmbH in Analyse & Kritik
- Vol. 46 (2) , 387-407
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessProportionality and Necessity in Israel’s Invasion of Gaza, 2023–2024
This article seeks to show that Israel’s war in Gaza in 2023 and 2024 has been an unjust war because it has violated both the requirement of proportionality and the requirement of necessity. The article explains the nature of proportionality, arguing that the main form of proportionality in war is simply the limit to the amount of harm inflicted on innocent people that can be justified either as the lesser evil or, more plausibly, on the basis of the special relations between combatants and their fellow citizens. The argument of the article is that, even on the basis of assumptions about moral justification and the numbers of innocent people who have been killed or saved by the war that are highly favorable to Israel, the war has nevertheless been highly disproportionate and morally unnecessary.
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 22 August 2024
- Published by University of Tartu in Studia Philosophica Estonica
- p. 54-67
Just War Theory and the Russia-Ukraine War
This article deploys what has come to be known as revisionist just war theory to analyze the morality of action by both sides in the current Russia-Ukraine war. Among the conclusions of this analysis are: (i) that virtually all uses of force by the Russian military in Ukraine are impermissible; (ii) that Ukrainian forces are bound by moral constraints, such as the requirement of proportionality, which requires the most careful attention to risks of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons and which may make it impermissible for Ukraine to achieve all of its just goals, and (iii) that some Russian civilians are liable to some harms, so that the imposition of economic sanctions is permissible, though only if they have a sufficiently high probability of being effective.
- 22 August 2024
- Published by University of Tartu in Studia Philosophica Estonica
- p. 54-67
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessJust War Theory and the Russia-Ukraine War
This article deploys what has come to be known as revisionist just war theory to analyze the morality of action by both sides in the current Russia-Ukraine war. Among the conclusions of this analysis are: (i) that virtually all uses of force by the Russian military in Ukraine are impermissible; (ii) that Ukrainian forces are bound by moral constraints, such as the requirement of proportionality, which requires the most careful attention to risks of escalation to the use of nuclear weapons and which may make it impermissible for Ukraine to achieve all of its just goals, and (iii) that some Russian civilians are liable to some harms, so that the imposition of economic sanctions is permissible, though only if they have a sufficiently high probability of being effective.
- Open Access
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 4 (1)
Thou Shalt Not Create; But If Thou Dost, Thou Shalt Kill? A Comment on Belshaw
In his article “Anti-Natalism and the Asymmetry” in this issue, Christopher Belshaw defends the common-sense view that, while there is a reason not to cause individuals to exist whose lives would not be worth living, there is no reason to cause individuals to exist just because their lives would be worth living. But the reasons why these claims are true, he argues, also imply that it is wrong to cause individuals to exist even if their lives would be worth living. I argue that the moral asymmetry between intrinsic goods and intrinsic evils that is the basis of his view is too strong, and that a more defensible view includes a recognition that there is a moral reason to cause well-off individuals to exist, though it is less strong than the reason not to cause an equivalently badly-off individual to exist, and that this weaker asymmetry supports the view that procreation is generally permissible.
- 29 April 2024
- Published by Foundation for Freedom of Thought and Discussion in Journal of Controversial Ideas
- Vol. 4 (1)
Open AccessThou Shalt Not Create; But If Thou Dost, Thou Shalt Kill? A Comment on Belshaw
In his article “Anti-Natalism and the Asymmetry” in this issue, Christopher Belshaw defends the common-sense view that, while there is a reason not to cause individuals to exist whose lives would not be worth living, there is no reason to cause individuals to exist just because their lives would be worth living. But the reasons why these claims are true, he argues, also imply that it is wrong to cause individuals to exist even if their lives would be worth living. I argue that the moral asymmetry between intrinsic goods and intrinsic evils that is the basis of his view is too strong, and that a more defensible view includes a recognition that there is a moral reason to cause well-off individuals to exist, though it is less strong than the reason not to cause an equivalently badly-off individual to exist, and that this weaker asymmetry supports the view that procreation is generally permissible.
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (4) , 4-7
Bioethics’ Duty to Conference in Qatar: Reply to Magnus
Is it unethical to host an international bioethics conference in Qatar? In an editorial in this issue, David Magnus (2024) argues that conferencing in Qatar, or other places where human rights viol...
- 26 March 2024
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (4) , 4-7
Bioethics’ Duty to Conference in Qatar: Reply to Magnus
Is it unethical to host an international bioethics conference in Qatar? In an editorial in this issue, David Magnus (2024) argues that conferencing in Qatar, or other places where human rights viol...
- Top Cited PapersOpen Access
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (8) , 9-19
Reasons and Reproduction: Gene Editing and Genetic Selection
Many writers in bioethics, science, and medicine contend that embryo selection is a morally better way of avoiding genetic disorders then gene editing, as the latter has risks that the former does not. We argue that one reason to use gene editing is that in many cases it would be better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo, so that not to have done it would have been worse for that person. By contrast, embryo selection is never better for the person who develops from the selected embryo. This reason to use gene editing has, however, been challenged on two grounds: first, that it makes no difference, morally, whether a bad effect is worse for someone, or a good effect better for someone; and, second, that beneficent gene editing would not be unequivocally better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo. We argue that both of these objections can be satisfactorily answered and thus that there is indeed a significant moral reason, at least in some cases, to use gene editing rather than embryo selection.
- 11 September 2023
- Published by Taylor & Francis in The American Journal of Bioethics
- Vol. 24 (8) , 9-19
Top Cited PapersOpen AccessReasons and Reproduction: Gene Editing and Genetic Selection
Many writers in bioethics, science, and medicine contend that embryo selection is a morally better way of avoiding genetic disorders then gene editing, as the latter has risks that the former does not. We argue that one reason to use gene editing is that in many cases it would be better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo, so that not to have done it would have been worse for that person. By contrast, embryo selection is never better for the person who develops from the selected embryo. This reason to use gene editing has, however, been challenged on two grounds: first, that it makes no difference, morally, whether a bad effect is worse for someone, or a good effect better for someone; and, second, that beneficent gene editing would not be unequivocally better for the person who would develop from the edited embryo. We argue that both of these objections can be satisfactorily answered and thus that there is indeed a significant moral reason, at least in some cases, to use gene editing rather than embryo selection.
- 6 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 33 (4) , 451-463
Extremism and Confusion in American Views about the Ethics of War: A Comment on Sagan and Valentino
In their article “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino have revealed a wealth of information about the views of contemporary Americans on the ethics of war. Virtually all they have discovered is surprising and much of it is alarming. My commentary in this symposium seeks mainly to extract a bit more from their data and to draw a few further inferences. Among the striking features of Sagan and Valentino's data are that the views of Americans tend to cluster at the extreme ends of the spectrum of possible views about the ethics of war, that an apparent sympathy for pacifism coexists with harshly punitive views about the treatment of soldiers, and that few of those surveyed appear to have given any thought to the implications of the views they expressed for what it might be permissible for enemies of the United States to do to captured American soldiers. The commentary concludes by arguing that Sagan and Valentino's findings do not, as they argue, support the fear that is sometimes expressed that a wider acceptance of revisionist just war theory, and in particular its incorporation into the law, would make the practice of war even more barbarous than it already is.
- 6 December 2019
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 33 (4) , 451-463
Extremism and Confusion in American Views about the Ethics of War: A Comment on Sagan and Valentino
In their article “Just War and Unjust Soldiers: American Public Opinion on the Moral Equality of Combatants,” Scott Sagan and Benjamin Valentino have revealed a wealth of information about the views of contemporary Americans on the ethics of war. Virtually all they have discovered is surprising and much of it is alarming. My commentary in this symposium seeks mainly to extract a bit more from their data and to draw a few further inferences. Among the striking features of Sagan and Valentino's data are that the views of Americans tend to cluster at the extreme ends of the spectrum of possible views about the ethics of war, that an apparent sympathy for pacifism coexists with harshly punitive views about the treatment of soldiers, and that few of those surveyed appear to have given any thought to the implications of the views they expressed for what it might be permissible for enemies of the United States to do to captured American soldiers. The commentary concludes by arguing that Sagan and Valentino's findings do not, as they argue, support the fear that is sometimes expressed that a wider acceptance of revisionist just war theory, and in particular its incorporation into the law, would make the practice of war even more barbarous than it already is.