MYMengda Yang

Mengda Yang

*This is an algorithmically generated author record based on publicly available information.

Current Organizations / Institutes

The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article


Mengda Yang has a total of 23 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:


Latest Publications

  • Palladium: Guarding Neural Network Training With Confidential Computing

    by Wenzhe Yi, Mengda Yang, Juan Wang, Hongxin Hu, Ziang Li, Xiaoyang Xu

    In the era of deep learning, protecting the training data and model parameters of high-performance Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) is critical. Data holders often want to use private data to train dedicated DNNs while leveraging AI accelerators hosted on remote servers, such as GPUs or TPUs. However, cloud systems are vulnerable to adversaries who may compromise both computational integrity and user data privacy. Performing verifiable and private training without losing access to untrusted accelerators remains a significant challenge. While previous works rely on Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) to safeguard privacy during inference, they primarily address forward propagation and are not suitable for backward propagation in training. To address this limitation, this paper proposes Palladium, the first system to achieve confidentiality, integrity, and low latency for both model parameters and training data. Palladium leverages TEE-empowered confidential computing to protect privacy and verify integrity, while securely outsourcing most linear layer computations to untrusted GPUs to optimize performance. Specifically, Palladium preserves the confidentiality of outsourced parameters by transforming the weights of linear operators and generating input masks through a carefully designed Cloak strategy. It then fully recovers the execution results inside the TEE using the corresponding UnCloak strategy. To further ensure computational integrity, Palladium incorporates a stochastic operator verification mechanism that detects breaches outside the TEE with 99% confidence. We implement a prototype of Palladium based on Libtorch and Occlum and conduct a comprehensive evaluation on four network architectures and four datasets. Evaluation results show that Palladium provides strong security guarantees with reasonable performance overhead, preserves high training accuracy, and protects model privacy.

  • SLeak: Multi-Target Privacy Stealing Attack Against Split Learning

    by Xiaoyang Xu, Wenzhe Yi, Juan Wang, Hongxin Hu, Mengda Yang, Ziang Li, Yong Zhuang, Yaxin Liu, Mang Ye

    Split Learning (SL) is a distributed learning framework that has gained popularity for its privacy-preserving nature and low computational demands. However, recent studies have the potential that a server adversary to carry out inference attacks, compromising the privacy of victim clients. Nevertheless, upon re-evaluating prior studies, we found that existing methods rely on overly strong assumptions to enhance their performance, resulting in a significant decline in effectiveness under more realistic scenarios. In this work, we provide new insights into the inherent vulnerabilities of SL. Specifically, we discover that both the smashed data and the server model contain the client’s representation preference, which the server adversary can exploit to build a substitute client that approximates the target client’s unique feature extraction behavior. With a well-trained substitute client, the server can perfectly steal the target client’s functionality, training data, and labels. Building on this observation, we introduce Split Leakage (SLeak), a new threat that targets multiple privacy stealing objectives against SL. Notably, SLeak does not depend on strong privacy priors and only requires partial same-domain auxiliary public data to conduct the attacks. Experimental results on diverse datasets and target models show that SLeak surpasses the state-of-the-art method across multiple metrics. Moreover, ablation studies further confirm its robustness and applicability under various scenarios and assumptions.

  • Membership inference attacks against split inference via knowledge transfer

    by Wenzhe Yi, Mengda Yang, Juan Wang, Hongxin Hu, Ziang Li, Xiaoyang Xu, Yu He, Yao Wang


  • Open Access

    Is Difficulty Calibration All We Need? Towards More Practical Membership Inference Attacks

    by Yu He, Boheng Li, Yao Wang, Mengda Yang, Juan Wang, Hongxin Hu, Xingyu Zhao

    The vulnerability of machine learning models to Membership Inference Attacks (MIAs) has garnered considerable attention in recent years. These attacks determine whether a data sample belongs to the model's training set or not. Recent research has focused on reference-based attacks, which leverage difficulty calibration with independently trained reference models. While empirical studies have demonstrated its effectiveness, there is a notable gap in our understanding of the circumstances under which it succeeds or fails. In this paper, we take a further step towards a deeper understanding of the role of difficulty calibration. Our observations reveal inherent limitations in calibration methods, leading to the misclassification of non-members and suboptimal performance, particularly on high-loss samples. We further identify that these errors stem from an imperfect sampling of the potential distribution and a strong dependence of membership scores on the model parameters. By shedding light on these issues, we propose RAPID: a query-efficient and computation-efficient MIA that directly Re-leverAges the original membershiP scores to mItigate the errors in Difficulty calibration. Our experimental results, spanning 9 datasets and 5 model architectures, demonstrate that RAPID outperforms previous state-of-the-art attacks (e.g., LiRA and Canary offline) across different metrics while remaining computationally efficient. Our observations and analysis challenge the current de facto paradigm of difficulty calibration in high-precision inference, encouraging greater attention to the persistent risks posed by MIAs in more practical scenarios.


  • SvTPM: SGX-Based Virtual Trusted Platform Modules for Cloud Computing

    by Juan Wang, Jie Wang, Chengyang Fan, Fei Yan, Yueqiang Cheng, Yinqian Zhang, Wenhui Zhang, Mengda Yang, Hongxin Hu

    Virtual Trusted Platform Modules (vTPMs) are widely used in commercial cloud platforms (e.g., VMware Cloud, Google Cloud, and Microsoft Azure) to provide virtual root-of-trust and security services for virtual machines. Unfortunately, current state-of-the-art vTPM implementations for cloud computing cannot provide strong protection for vTPMs at run-time and suffer from poor performance under binding vTPMs to a physical TPM. In this paper, we propose SvTPM, an SGX-based virtual trusted platform module, which provides complete life cycle protection of vTPMs in the cloud and does not rely on the physical TPM. SvTPM provides strong isolation protection so malicious cloud tenants or even cloud administrators cannot access vTPM's private keys or any other sensitive data. In this paper, we implement a prototype of SvTPM, which identifies and solves a couple of critical security challenges for vTPM protection with SGX, such as NVRAM rollback attacks, NVRAM binding attacks, and vTPM rollback attacks. SvTPM also shows how to establish trust between vTPM and SGX Platform. Our performance evaluation shows that the NVRAM launch time of SvTPM is $1700\times$ faster than vTPM built upon hardware TPM. In TPM standard command evaluation, we find that SvTPM incurs negligible performance overhead while providing strong isolation and protection. To our knowledge, SvTPM is the first practical work to solve the critical security challenges of securing vTPM using SGX.