Jianing Wang
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Jianing Wang has a total of 4 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Ao Qiao
Affiliation School of Logistics, Chengdu University of Information Technology, Chengdu, China
2 shared publications Siyu Zeng
Affiliation School of Logistics, Chengdu University of Information Technology, Chengdu, China
1 shared publication- Siyu Zeng
School of Logistics, Chengdu University of Information Technology, China
1 shared publication - Xia Zhou
School of Logistics, Chengdu University of Information Technology, China
1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (4) , e0336358
A game-theoretic analysis of production and coordination under combined carbon policies
To mitigate the growing threat of global warming, countries have increasingly adopted carbon policies to control industrial carbon emissions. Although previous research has analysed the effectiveness of individual carbon policies, such as cap-and-trade and subsidy schemes, the combined effects of these policies remain largely unexplored. Moreover, existing studies often overlook detailed production processes, such as lot-sizing decisions, which significantly influence total emissions of the manufacturer. To bridge these gaps, this study examines the coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer under a combined carbon policy framework, incorporating both cap-and-trade and low-carbon subsidy policies. A Stackelberg game model is developed to explore the strategic decisions of supply chain members. The manufacturer’s production process is modelled using queuing theory to capture the impact of operational details on carbon emissions. Supply chain scenarios are compared and analysed under different combinations of carbon policies and contractual arrangements. The results demonstrate that a combined carbon policy can enhance both profitability and sustainability across the supply chain. Among subsidy schemes, the green investment subsidy is more effective than product subsidy in emissions reduction. Additionally, while revenue-sharing contracts yield greater emissions reductions, cost-sharing contracts offer a better balance between economic and environmental objectives. These findings offer practical implications for policymakers and supply chain managers aiming to design integrated strategies that simultaneously achieve profitability and sustainability.
- 29 April 2026
- Published by Public Library of Science (PLoS) in PLOS ONE
- Vol. 21 (4) , e0336358
Open AccessA game-theoretic analysis of production and coordination under combined carbon policies
To mitigate the growing threat of global warming, countries have increasingly adopted carbon policies to control industrial carbon emissions. Although previous research has analysed the effectiveness of individual carbon policies, such as cap-and-trade and subsidy schemes, the combined effects of these policies remain largely unexplored. Moreover, existing studies often overlook detailed production processes, such as lot-sizing decisions, which significantly influence total emissions of the manufacturer. To bridge these gaps, this study examines the coordination between a manufacturer and a retailer under a combined carbon policy framework, incorporating both cap-and-trade and low-carbon subsidy policies. A Stackelberg game model is developed to explore the strategic decisions of supply chain members. The manufacturer’s production process is modelled using queuing theory to capture the impact of operational details on carbon emissions. Supply chain scenarios are compared and analysed under different combinations of carbon policies and contractual arrangements. The results demonstrate that a combined carbon policy can enhance both profitability and sustainability across the supply chain. Among subsidy schemes, the green investment subsidy is more effective than product subsidy in emissions reduction. Additionally, while revenue-sharing contracts yield greater emissions reductions, cost-sharing contracts offer a better balance between economic and environmental objectives. These findings offer practical implications for policymakers and supply chain managers aiming to design integrated strategies that simultaneously achieve profitability and sustainability.
- Open Access
- 13 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 40-44
Effects of subsidy and cap-and-trade allocation rules on carbon management of multi-party supply chain
Many countries have implemented the cap-and-trade (C&T) policy to control carbon emissions, and provided subsidies to foster the green investment of manufacturing companies. This paper investigates the effect of mixed carbon policy composed by subsidy and C&T policies with different allowance allocation rules on carbon abatement and profit achievement of a green supply chain. It considered the green effort of the supplier, which is also a major emission source. Stackelberg game models are proposed to analyse the operation strategies of three supply chain parties under different mixed policy scenarios. The results show that green effort of the supplier contributes better emission reduction and profitability. Besides, the application of the mixed carbon policy can contribute to higher emission reduction. To better achieve the goal of controlling the carbon emission of industry, the government should cooperate with industrial companies to enhance consumer green awareness and establish a greener marketing environment.
- 13 October 2023
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 40-44
Open AccessEffects of subsidy and cap-and-trade allocation rules on carbon management of multi-party supply chain
Many countries have implemented the cap-and-trade (C&T) policy to control carbon emissions, and provided subsidies to foster the green investment of manufacturing companies. This paper investigates the effect of mixed carbon policy composed by subsidy and C&T policies with different allowance allocation rules on carbon abatement and profit achievement of a green supply chain. It considered the green effort of the supplier, which is also a major emission source. Stackelberg game models are proposed to analyse the operation strategies of three supply chain parties under different mixed policy scenarios. The results show that green effort of the supplier contributes better emission reduction and profitability. Besides, the application of the mixed carbon policy can contribute to higher emission reduction. To better achieve the goal of controlling the carbon emission of industry, the government should cooperate with industrial companies to enhance consumer green awareness and establish a greener marketing environment.