Wendy H. Wong
Current Organizations / Institutes
The organizations/institutes from the scholar's latest article
Research Subjects
Wendy H. Wong has a total of 3 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- David A. Lake
University of California San Diego
2 shared publications - Jamie Duncan
University of Toronto Toronto Ontario Canada
1 shared publication - Molly K. Land1 shared publication
Latest Publications
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 421-434
Human rights, datafication, and the democratic governance of AI
- 9 June 2026
- Published by Edward Elgar Publishing
- p. 421-434
Human rights, datafication, and the democratic governance of AI
- Open Access
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 39 (4) , 312-335
Governing Artificial Intelligence: Designing Professional Structures for the Predictive Age
The consensus on the need to regulate artificial intelligence is clear, but the how remains elusive. Private regulation, as proposed by the tech industry itself, and state regulation, as embodied in the recent EU Artificial Intelligence Act, are two common forms of governance. We advance a third option that has received very little attention to date: professional regulation. Professional regulation is modeled after hybrid public-private regulatory structures found in medicine, such as those put forth by the American Medical Association. Such governance schemes develop both technical and ethical standards, shaping professional training, continuing knowledge, and conduct. We contend that it is the most practical means of ensuring the development of human-centered AI in an era of rapid technological change and intensely opposing views of what regulation ought to do. This article places the responsibility of acting ethically on the group that knows the technology best and can anticipate its effects: AI developers. But unlike other voluntary standards, professional regulation articulates and enforces standards to certify individuals. Professional licensing is an alternative that provides public protections based on privately developed standards that ensure the safety of AI prior to their release.
- 24 February 2026
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Ethics & International Affairs
- Vol. 39 (4) , 312-335
Open AccessGoverning Artificial Intelligence: Designing Professional Structures for the Predictive Age
The consensus on the need to regulate artificial intelligence is clear, but the how remains elusive. Private regulation, as proposed by the tech industry itself, and state regulation, as embodied in the recent EU Artificial Intelligence Act, are two common forms of governance. We advance a third option that has received very little attention to date: professional regulation. Professional regulation is modeled after hybrid public-private regulatory structures found in medicine, such as those put forth by the American Medical Association. Such governance schemes develop both technical and ethical standards, shaping professional training, continuing knowledge, and conduct. We contend that it is the most practical means of ensuring the development of human-centered AI in an era of rapid technological change and intensely opposing views of what regulation ought to do. This article places the responsibility of acting ethically on the group that knows the technology best and can anticipate its effects: AI developers. But unlike other voluntary standards, professional regulation articulates and enforces standards to certify individuals. Professional licensing is an alternative that provides public protections based on privately developed standards that ensure the safety of AI prior to their release.
- Open Access
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 19 (1) , 236-252
Why data about people are so hard to govern
How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.
- 1 April 2024
- Published by Wiley in Regulation & Governance
- Vol. 19 (1) , 236-252
Open AccessWhy data about people are so hard to govern
How data on individuals are gathered, analyzed, and stored remains largely ungoverned at both domestic and global levels. We address the unique governance problem posed by digital data to provide a framework for understanding why data governance remains elusive. Data are easily transferable and replicable, making them a useful tool. But this characteristic creates massive governance problems for all of us who want to have some agency and choice over how (or if) our data are collected and used. Moreover, data are co‐created: individuals are the object from which data are culled by an interested party. Yet, any data point has a marginal value of close to zero and thus individuals have little bargaining power when it comes to negotiating with data collectors. Relatedly, data follow the rule of winner take all—the parties that have the most can leverage that data for greater accuracy and utility, leading to natural oligopolies. Finally, data's value lies in combination with proprietary algorithms that analyze and predict the patterns. Given these characteristics, private governance solutions are ineffective. Public solutions will also likely be insufficient. The imbalance in market power between platforms that collect data and individuals will be reproduced in the political sphere. We conclude that some form of collective data governance is required. We examine the challenges to the data governance by looking a public effort, the EU's General Data Protection Regulation, a private effort, Apple's “privacy nutrition labels” in their App Store, and a collective effort, the First Nations Information Governance Centre in Canada.