Philipp Machauer
Research Subjects
Research Interests
Philipp Machauer has a total of 5 co-authors. Here are the top co-authors by number of shared publications:
- Dennis R. E. Gnad
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Hassan Nassar
Department of Computer Science, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
2 shared publications - Jorg Henkel
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Chair for Embedded Systems (CES), Karlsruhe, Germany
2 shared publications - Lars Bauer
Ubitium GmbH
2 shared publications - Mehdi Baradaran Tahoori
Karlsruhe Institute of Technology
2 shared publications
Latest Publications
- Open Access
- 27 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-9
DoS-FPGA: Denial of Service on Cloud FPGAs via Coordinated Power Hammering
- 27 October 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 1-9
Open AccessDoS-FPGA: Denial of Service on Cloud FPGAs via Coordinated Power Hammering
- Open Access
- 2 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43
Covert-Hammer: Coordinating Power-Hammering on Multi-tenant FPGAs via Covert Channels
With the rise of AI, end of Moore's law, and the digitization of public services, the demand for accelerated computing is growing. To address this demand, major cloud service providers like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have incorporated FPGA instances into their infrastructure with efficient and adaptable resource allocation models. Interest is increasing in multi-tenant FPGAs, which enable multiple users to utilize FPGA resources concurrently, while the FPGA can be split into smaller sections, one per tenant. Nevertheless, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities. For instance, by configuring a malicious circuit in one tenant's section of the FPGA, attacks that cause faults or crash the entire FPGA become feasible, affecting other tenants. By splitting an FPGA into smaller fractions, a single tenant has less potential to cause catastrophic outcomes. However, in this paper, we propose another threat, which is to perform an attack where several malicious tenants coordinate an attack using an unintended covert channel. We practically verify this possibility and introduce such a synchronized and coordinated voltage drop attack from multiple malicious tenants. For synchronization, the malicious tenants use a voltage-based covert channel. Our results show that the communication is robust reaching less than 1% packet error rate and that the attack is successful and avoids state-of-the-art countermeasures.
- 2 April 2024
- Published by Association for Computing Machinery (ACM)
- p. 43
Open AccessCovert-Hammer: Coordinating Power-Hammering on Multi-tenant FPGAs via Covert Channels
With the rise of AI, end of Moore's law, and the digitization of public services, the demand for accelerated computing is growing. To address this demand, major cloud service providers like Amazon Web Services, Microsoft Azure, and Google Cloud Platform have incorporated FPGA instances into their infrastructure with efficient and adaptable resource allocation models. Interest is increasing in multi-tenant FPGAs, which enable multiple users to utilize FPGA resources concurrently, while the FPGA can be split into smaller sections, one per tenant. Nevertheless, it introduces significant security vulnerabilities. For instance, by configuring a malicious circuit in one tenant's section of the FPGA, attacks that cause faults or crash the entire FPGA become feasible, affecting other tenants. By splitting an FPGA into smaller fractions, a single tenant has less potential to cause catastrophic outcomes. However, in this paper, we propose another threat, which is to perform an attack where several malicious tenants coordinate an attack using an unintended covert channel. We practically verify this possibility and introduce such a synchronized and coordinated voltage drop attack from multiple malicious tenants. For synchronization, the malicious tenants use a voltage-based covert channel. Our results show that the communication is robust reaching less than 1% packet error rate and that the attack is successful and avoids state-of-the-art countermeasures.